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Abstract 
This thesis focuses on the philosophical differences between civic republicanism 
and liberalism. Utilising the recent work of Philip Pettit and Quentin Skinner, this 
thesis develops and extends the theoretical implications of a distinctive 
republican conception of liberty as nondomination. The thesis explores the 
complex interdependent relationship between liberty as nondomination and 
conflict, citizenship, and civic virtue to develop a contemporary theory of 
republicanism. 
The first part of the thesis explores the work of Machiavelli and other neo- 
Roman theorists and historians and identifies several key themes such as a 
distinct interpretation of civic virtue and the nature of conflict and civil discord 
in the development of republican thought. The section begins with a historical 
account of the development of a distinct neo-Roman version of republicanism 
and then considers its unique conception of liberty as nondomination. 
Next, the thesis explores two rival liberal approaches, liberal neutrality 
and political liberalism, to argue that republicanism is a distinct and compelling 
approach. This section first compares and contrasts republicanism with Will 
Kymlicka's liberal neutralist approach. I argue that a republican state 
characterised by the ideal of freedom as nondomination can address liberal 
concerns without embracing the type of neutrality favoured Kymlicka. 
Furthermore, this section also compares and contrasts the republican approach 
with John Rawls' political liberalism. I argue that republicanism is not reducible 
to political liberalism because it actively, and without regret, seeks to affect 
individuals qua individuals in the whole of their life. The republican approach 
that I defend regulates the way in which individuals and groups cast their final 
ends in a manner that maximises nondomination. 
Finally, the thesis develops a republican account of pluralism and argues 
that liberty as nondomination, and the necessary values and virtues that 
accompany it, is a relevant and powerful public philosophy that brings a fresh 
approach to contemporary political discourse. I argue that a republican state 
characterised by the ideal of freedom as nondomination can cope with a 
population characterised by deep moral pluralism. Furthermore, I argue that 
republicanism can harness the energy generated by pluralism to help secure 
liberty for its citizens. Additionally, I explore the institutional arrangements of 
liberty as nondomination and how individuals and groups relate to them. I argue 
that robust forms of civic virtue and citizenship must be cultivated through a 
progressive republican approach to civic education. This section of the thesis 
also explores the interdependent relationship between republican institutions, 
education, and social norms. 
Taken as a whole, the thesis seeks to establish firmly a republican 
approach that is distinct from liberalism, but yet can satisfy many liberal 
concerns. Through robust versions of civic virtue and citizenship, the republican 
state can cope with the inevitable conflict brought about by a population 
characterised by pluralism. 
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Introduction 
By most accounts, 1994 was a remarkable year in American politics. After more 
than 40 years in the majority in the House of Representatives, the Democrats 
had been routed. In the Senate too, Democrats lost their majority status and the 
power that accompanies it. The Speaker of the House, Tom Foley, a Democrat 
from Washington state had become the first sitting holder of that office to lose 
re-election since 1862. In 11 states, Democratic Governors had been defeated 
including New York Governor Mario Cuomo, a leader of the liberal wing of the 
party. More worrying for the party was the breakup of the New Deal coalition 
due to the defeat of old style southern democrats who had been beaten by 
conservative political novices (Time, 1994a: 46-7). 
On the other side of the political spectrum, Republicans triumphed in 
what was called by some a political revolution. Led by the outspoken Newt 
Gingrich, the Republican party experienced one of the most solid political 
performances in recent times. In the House and Senate, no Republican 
incumbent had lost re-election. Nor did any sifting Republican governors suffer 
defeat (Time, 1994a: 47). Republicans rallied around Newt Gingrich and the 
`Contract with America', a ten point policy document that was the centre of their 
Congressional campaign efforts. Gingrich and his supporters `promised' the 
American people that if elected, in the first 100 days of the new Congress, 
Republicans would pass benchmark legislation ranging from tax cuts to term 
limits to balanced budget amendments (Time, 1994b: 57). The Republicans 
took aim at big government and promised people a reduced federal presence 
in their lives. The Republicans advocated a program of devolution that would 
send power back to the state and local level so that ordinary citizens, and not 
Beltway insiders, could make policy decisions. The 1994 congressional 
elections offered the Republicans an opportunity to define themselves as the 
party of ordinary people and smaller government with power firmly rooted in 
local politics (Time, 1994b: 52-61). 
This remarkable sea change, for many, was the result of a combination 
of mis-steps by the President and his party since taking office in early 1993 
which contributed to the widespread disenchantment with politics that voters had 
expressed in 1992. First there was the controversy surrounding gays in the 
military which erupted even before Bill Clinton was sworn in to office. Next there 
was the defeat of the President's `energy tax', a proposal to add a value added 
tax to sources of energy. Then there was the single vote passage of the 
President's economic stimulus package which would increase federal spending 
on domestic programmes, a central tenet of the Democratic party. However, the 
biggest fiasco of the early Clinton years was the failure of his health care reform 
programmes. Framed by opponents of health care reform as the epitome of `tax- 
and-spend' liberal programs, the measure was roundly defeated without any 
elements of it surviving (Time, 1994a: 49). The widespread discontent that 
Americans felt for the President and politics presented him with a difficult task. 
On the one hand, the President believed that his government's policies were 
good for the country. On the other hand, the President had to acknowledge that 
somewhere along the line, he had failed to connect with the voters and they 
made him and his party pay dearly for it. In reconciling these two problems, the 
President sought to re-orient his policies to better reflect the concerns of voters. 
In response to this massive repudiation at the Polls, President Clinton 
searched for a way to re-take the political initiative he had lost and place his 
own standing on firmer ground. For many, the 1995 State of the Union speech 
represented the last opportunity for the President to outline his vision for the 
country and revive his political fortunes in anticipation of the 1996 Presidential 
election (Time, 1995: 38). In searching for answers to why his party lost so 
badly at the polls in November, 1994, Clinton and his advisors believed that they 
had failed to connect with voters and put forth a policy agenda that addressed 
the concerns of ordinary citizens. In seeking to address this shortcoming and 
to prepare for the State of the Union speech, the President summoned a wide 
ranging group of academics to Camp David for a weekend retreat to solicit their 
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views on repairing the ruptures in society and putting his policy agenda back on 
track (Washington Post, 1995: A8). Among these `big thinkers' was Robert 
Putnam whose essay `Bowling Alone' focussed on the breakdown of civic 
America and called for a renewed effort to encourage civic engagement to 
replace declining levels of social capital (Putnam, 1995). Also in attendance 
was Benjamin Barber, whose work in Strong Democracy touches on the need 
for robust versions of citizenship to reinvigorate American political institutions 
(Barber, 1984). The President tried his new message out on Democratic law- 
makers one week before the State of the Union speech where he told them that 
they had to rise above partisan battles and instead focus on the deterioration of 
society and the worrying trends of voter anxiety and apathy. The President 
implored the politicians to find new ways of getting out and connecting with 
voters and to "change the way we are conducting politics to make citizenship 
matter again" (President Clinton, as quoted in International Herald Tribune, 
1995a: 3). The State of the Union speech itself was also a reflection of the 
President's new direction. The central themes of the speech revolved around 
building a `new social compact' between the federal government and civic 
responsible citizens to forge a cooperative effort to stem the erosion of 
community (International Herald Tribune, 1995b: 3). 
In soliciting the ideas of academics, the President highlighted the 
important role that political philosophy can play in the development of public 
policy. This role was pushed even further when William Galston left his position 
at the University of Maryland to become one of the President's advisors on the 
Domestic Policy Council, the linchpin of the White House's policy making 
machine. Other noteworthy political philosophers have sought to impact policy 
makers such as Michael Sandel, whose book Democracy's Discontent argues 
that civic republican ideals are a needed prescription for the woes of today's 
modern polity (Sandel, 1996). The broad thesis of Sandel's book is that the 
republican civic tradition in American politics has been overwhelmed by 
`procedural liberalism' leaving the political landscape barren of important 
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debates surrounding citizenship, civic virtue, self-government, and community. 
Instead, political debates have focussed on neutrality and individual choice 
causing widespread disenchantment with the political process. What is needed, 
for Sandel, is a new commitment on behalf of public servants to initiate a 
national dialogue that moves beyond debates about the procedural republic, and 
instead focusses on the important moral questions facing the modern polity 
(Sandel, 1996). Another example of political philosophers engaging with policy 
makers is Will Kymlicka's recent book, Finding our Way (Kymlicka, 1998a). This 
book is a study into ethnocultural relations in Canada based on a series of 
papers Kymlicka wrote for the Department of Canadian Heritage who were 
interested in knowing if debates among political philosophers could prove useful 
in the formulation of public policy (Kymlicka, 1998a: vii). In Great Britain, 
Bernard Crick has just chaired a government commission charged with 
developing a set of proposals to integrate citizenship classes into the national 
school curriculum (The Qualifications and Curriculum Authority, 1999). 
However, the relationship between theory and practice should not be 
overestimated. In 1987, an interesting symposium appeared in the journal 
Ethics titled `On the Role of Philosophers in the Development of Public Policy' 
(Wikler, 1987: 775-791). The two brief essays provided an insight into the 
workings of the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in 
Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research in which two staff 
philosophers were appointed and a Philosophy Advisory Board on distributive 
justice was impaneled to help the committee sort through the complex problems 
of medical ethics. The goal of the commission was to inform and shape the 
policy of government agencies and officials whose policy areas involved issues 
of medical ethics. However, for some, "the joinder of philosophy and practical 
politics proved precarious and easily subject to inadvertent or deliberate misuse" 
(Weisbard, 1987: 783). Both opinions surveyed in the symposium were 
sceptical in nature about the usefulness of theoretical principles engaging with 
practical policy matters (Brock, 1987: 791). So what role, if any, can political 
philosophy play in policy making? 
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As a former government employee myself, I believe that political 
philosophy has a limited, but yet crucial, role to play in both identifying and 
informing policy solutions to the many problems facing the modern polity. ' 
Political philosophers have an important role in not only highlighting and 
attempting to understand problems facing the modern polity. They also have a 
role in helping policy makers to understand the broad theoretical implications of 
government programmes and in challenging them to frame their initiatives in a 
philosophically coherent manner. When Will Kymlicka or Michael Sandel 
interacts with normative dimensions of social and political initiatives, policy 
makers are better off, even if they do not accept their theoretical point of view. 
What is clear to me is that when politicians and policy makers seek advice on 
important issues and social or cultural trends, political philosophers can play a 
positive role in moulding the broad direction of public policy. However, I am less 
convinced that political philosophers have a role directly impacting public policy, 
as was the case in the Presidential Commission on Medical Ethics discussed 
above. Notwithstanding my reservations about the role of political philosophy 
in policy making, the motivation of this thesis revolves around a desire to 
contribute to the creation and direction of public policy in the broadest of terms. 
What follows in this thesis is not a effort to make policy. Rather, what 
follows is an effort to inform, influence, and change the way politicians, policy 
makers, and everyday citizens relate to one another as they participate in the 
democratic process. Specifically, the central task of this thesis is to offer 
suggestions on how to reinvigorate politics in the modern democratic nation- 
state by embracing the energy created by its diverse population; encouraging 
active civic engagement through specific forms of citizenship and civic virtue; 
and, most importantly, showing how to utilise the republican conception of liberty 
as nondomination as the foundation of policy initiatives. Drawing on the recent 
'From 1993-96 I worked in a number of positions in the U. S. government, 
including for a member of the House of Representatives and the Clinton 
administration at the Department of Agriculture. 
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work of Philip Pettit and Quentin Skinner, this thesis develops and extends the 
theoretical implications of a distinct republican conception of liberty as 
nondomination. As a whole, the thesis explores the complex interdependent 
relationship between nondomination, conflict, citizenship, and civic virtue. 
In seeking to outline a coherent contemporary republican approach, this 
thesis seeks to go beyond rival approaches and instead propose a theory that 
is firmly based on neo-Roman republican thought and captures the essence of 
Machiavelli's republican legacy. The strategy of this thesis centres on three 
important areas of enquiry and, to this end, I have divided this thesis into three 
inter-related parts. The first part of the thesis seeks to explore the origins of 
neo-Roman republicanism by examining the development of republican ideas 
through the work of Machiavelli and those later republican theorists who 
followed him. Chapter 1 takes the important work of J. G. A. Pocock (1975), who 
argues that Machiavelli's republican thought developed in three different 
locations and times, and seeks to explore a conception of republicanism that is 
distinct from other versions, including Pocock's, and the one recently advanced 
by Michael Sandel (1996). The upshot of chapter 1 is to put forth a coherent 
version of republicanism and explore its constituent parts to lay the foundation 
fora contemporary conceptualisation of a republican public philosophy. Chapter 
1 begins with a look at how Machiavelli and his contemporaries developed a 
neo-Roman inspired republicanism to see how its various components became 
entrenched in the reality and language of Renaissance politics. This chapter 
also examines how Machiavelli's republicanism was transmitted and recovered 
by both the English republicans of the seventeenth century, and later during the 
period surrounding American independence. Taken as a whole, this chapter 
has four main goals. First, it seeks to establish that there is a distinctive neo- 
Roman republican approach inspired by Machiavelli. Second, it seeks to 
present the reader with a solid historical overview utilising a historical narrative 
that combines contemporary views with original source material. Third, it seeks 
to familiarise the reader with the key concepts of the republican approach and 
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the central values and ideals that support it. Finally, it seeks to highlight an 
aspect of Machiavelli's thought that will prove useful in constructing a 
contemporary republican approach. I will argue that Machiavelli's unique belief 
in the positive effects of internal conflict and tumults has important implications 
for contemporary republican approaches. In utilising Pocock's `Machiavellian 
Moment', I seek to differentiate Machiavelli's republicanism from its neo- 
Athenian counterpart inspired by Aristotle. In exploring the development of 
Machiavelli's republican ideas, I follow Pocock's outline and explore how 
republican thought developed through time. However, my relationship with 
Pocock is somewhat complex, and dialectical in nature. While I accept Pocock's 
general theory that Machiavelli's thought was transmitted from its origin into two 
crucial historical epochs, I differ from his Aristotelean civic humanist analysis of 
that theory. Instead, I follow the lead of Quentin Skinner and take Machiavelli's 
thought as representing a departure from the civic humanism of Aristotle. Taken 
in this manner, the republicanism which I espouse is compatible with many 
liberal approaches, although it remains a distinct theory. 
Chapter 2 seeks to follow through on the theoretical points in chapter 1 
and begins to explore the contemporary implications of Machiavelli's republican 
thought. Utilising the recent work of Philip Pettit (1997), this chapter argues that 
neo-Roman republicans held an alternative conception of liberty to the 
traditional positive/negative dichotomy of freedom. In chapter 2, I argue that the 
conceptual landscape of freedom is not filled to capacity and that republican 
liberty as nondomination represents an alternative way of understanding 
freedom. Chapter 2 seeks to go beyond the important work of Pettit and explore 
how republican liberty as nondomination relates to positive and negative 
conceptions of liberty. I accept Pettit's contention that republican liberty as 
nondomination combines some aspects of both positive and negative freedom. 
However, I argue that Pettit does not go far enough in differentiating republican 
liberty from the type of negative liberty embedded in rival liberal approaches. 
Furthermore, I explore an alternative way of understanding nondomination and 
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those elements of positive liberty that equate freedom with self-mastery. Where 
Pettit defends nondomination in an instrumental manner, I argue that it is better 
understood as an intrinsically valuable approach that helps individuals to enrich 
their lives. If understood in this manner, republican liberty as nondomination 
can be distinguished from other liberal instrumental approaches in a more robust 
manner which is the focus of the next part of the thesis. 
Part 2 of the thesis seeks to bring republican liberty as nondomination out 
of the history of ideas and compares and contrasts it with two rival contemporary 
liberal approaches, liberal neutrality and political liberalism. In chapter 3, 
explore the contemporary implications of republicanism's alternative conception 
of liberty in light of the argument for liberal neutrality put forth by Will Kymlicka 
(1998b). Chapter 3 seeks to differentiate the contemporary republican project 
from liberal neutrality in three important respects. In the first respect, I argue 
that republicanism, and the virtues and values that accompany it, is not an 
instrumental approach. Instead the ideals and institutions of the republic 
constitute the liberty experienced by its citizens. In the second respect, I argue 
that the republican state appeals to the intrinsic value of some versions of the 
good in its ideals and institutions. In the third respect, I argue that 
republicanism is characterised by certain quasi-perfectionist features that mould 
and condition the way in which individuals cast their chosen conceptions of the 
good. However, in each of these areas, I argue that Kymlicka has good reasons 
to accept the republican approach that I developed. 
Chapter 4 focusses on the recent political turn of John Rawls (1993). In 
this chapter, I argue that despite Rawls' insistence, republicanism is not 
reducible to political liberalism. In five crucial areas, the republican theory which 
I defend purposely, and without regret, seeks to affect individuals in their 
nonpolitical lives. In the first area, I argue that the republican conception of 
liberty differs from Rawls' in that it presupposes certain comprehensive values 
and virtues. In the second area, I develop a substantive theory of republicanism 
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that relies on certain inherently valuable ideals and institutions that constitute 
the liberty experienced by republican citizens. In the third area, I argue that 
republican liberty as nondomination regulates the permissible ends available to 
individuals without restricting their liberty. It does so by securing individuals 
from arbitrary interference. In the fourth area, I examine how republicanism 
recognises the close and intimate relationship between the right and the good 
in a way that political liberalism denies. Finally, in the fifth area, I argue that 
republican liberty as nondomination differs from Rawls' political liberalism 
because its aims are not neutral. In each of these five areas, I argue that 
republicans have good reason to stand back from Rawls' political project, and 
instead develop their own account of how the modern polity can respond to the 
challenges facing it in a distinctively republican manner. 
The final part of the thesis seeks to -explore how a contemporary 
republican approach would cope in today's modern polity. In this section, I take 
the contemporary republican approach developed in the first two parts on a 'test 
drive' by first exploring a republican account of pluralism, and second identifying 
three important areas where a contemporary republican approach can manifest 
itself and affect the way in which the modern polity addresses the problems 
facing it. In chapter 5, I argue that a contemporary republican approach can 
cope with the difference and diversity found in today's modern polity without 
sacrificing several important liberal concerns. In this chapter, I explore how 
Machiavelli responded to the challenges raised by a population defined by 
difference and diversity in a progressive manner that sought to harness and 
channel its energy in a way that helped secure republican liberty. By stressing 
the interdependent relationship between liberty as nondomination, good laws 
and institutions, and civic virtue and citizenship, I argue that a contemporary 
republican state can cope with moral pluralism. By tolerating and 
institutionalising the moral pluralism found within the modern polity, a 
contemporary republican state can channel the dynamic energy and activity 
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generated by difference and diversity to secure and enhance liberty as 
nondomination. 
In chapter 6,1 identify three important areas that a contemporary 
republican approach can affect in a positive manner. I argue that in civic 
education, a republican approach can go farther than the liberal account in 
cultivating certain forms of citizenship and civic virtue. Furthermore, I argue that 
a contemporary republican approach can strengthen the institutions of the 
modern polity by stressing republican liberty as nondomination and the 
accompanying need for a politics based on strong forms of contestation and 
open and inclusive forums. Finally, I argue that a contemporary republican 
approach can reinvigorate and mould the important social norms that 
characterise the modern democratic polity in a distinct republican manner that 
seeks to secure individuals and groups from domination. Taken together, in 
each of these three interdependent areas, I argue that the republican approach 
developed in the thesis can reinvigorate social and political institutions in a 
manner that supports republican liberty as nondomination. I argue that in many 
ways, these three components foster group-level commitments to certain 
distinctive ways of doing things so that republican liberty as nondomination can 
take root and become embedded in the prevailing public philosophy that 
characterises today's modern democratic polity. 
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Part I 
Neo-Roman Civic Republicanism: Civic Virtue, 
Citizenship, and an Alternative Conception of Liberty 
That the language and discourse of civic republicanism has been near or at the 
centre of recent debates among political philosophers is not surprising. In 
response to the dominance of liberalism, some theorists have recently embraced 
the republican model as an alternative way forward. For example, in 
Democracy's Discontent, Michael Sandel argues that civic republican ideals are 
a needed prescription for the woes of today's modern polity (Sandet, 1996). 
Others, including such diverse theorists as Charles Taylor and John Rawls, 
have also touted republican values as a way to reinvigorate liberal institutions 
(Taylor, 1995: 193; Rawls, 1993: 205). However, it is my belief that to an 
alarming degree many of these discussions of civic republicanism in 
contemporary theory are inconsistent and fail to capture the essence of 
Machiavelli's republican legacy. 
For example, Sandel's republicanism is characterised by a positive 
conception of liberty which relies on a particular conception of human flourishing 
inspired by civic humanism and Aristotle. This neo-Athenian inspired 
republicanism holds that rights should be defined in light of a particular 
conception of the good society - the self-governing republic - and not 
according to principles that are neutral among conceptions of the good (Sandel, 
1996: 5-6). Sandel maintains that self-governing republics value the necessary 
link between self-government and the cultivation of civic virtue. For Sandel, 
republicanism regards moral character as a public, not merely private, concern 
(Sandet, 1996: 25). At the centre of Sandel's thesis is the belief that if 
individuals are to be free, self-government and the virtues and versions of 
citizenship that accompany it are essential elements that must be forcefully 
promoted by the state. These distinct and intrinsically valuable versions of civic 
virtue and citizenship are cultivated by the political communities and institutions 
that represent the people (Sandel, 1996: 117). 
At its essence, Sandel's version of republicanism can be said to be an 
effort to provide the modern polity with strong versions of civic virtue and 
citizenship in the hope of reinvigorating public debates in light of the deep 
diversity found in the modern polity. Because liberty is conceived in a positive 
manner, these republicans believe that it is only in a self-governing republic that 
individuals can find excellence and flourish (Sandel, 1996; Taylor, 1991). 
However, while certain principles and concepts are mostly consistent across the 
republican spectrum, I believe that important differences separate neo-Athenian 
republicanism from its neo-Roman counterpart. The key to this distinction lies 
in the conception of liberty that each approach endorses and the subsequent 
effects this has on the key principles and components of each theory. 
Over the next two chapters, I will further explore these differences and 
argue that Machiavelli sits at the centre of an inspired and distinctive neo- 
Roman version of republicanism. In chapter 1, I will seek to clarify and develop 
this republican account relying on Machiavelli and those other writers he 
influenced to explore how its concepts and applications have developed 
throughout history. In many ways, these republicans were critical of Athens as 
unstable and excessively reliant on pure democracy. According to Philip Pettit, 
for these republicans, one of the great advantages of the Roman republic was 
that it was characterised by "a constitution in which government was built on a 
democratic foundation but was better devised to guard against problems of 
faction and demagoguery and tyranny. " Certain Roman technologies were 
celebrated such as the "dispersion of democratic power across different 
assemblies, adherence to a more or less strict rule of law, election to public 
office, limitation on the tenure of public office, rotation of offices among the 
citizenry, and the like" (Pettit, 1998: 83). Furthermore, certain neo-Athenian 
ideals, such as civic virtue and citizenship, were modified and re-focussed to fit 
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an alternative conception of liberty. In chapter 2, I will take a closer look into 
this alternative conception of liberty as nondomination and explore the 
necessary virtues and values that must accompany it (Pettit, 1997; Skinner, 
1997). Neo-Roman republican liberty seeks to supersede Isaiah Berlin's 
positive/negative distinction and instead be understood as the absence of 
arbitrary interference or domination (Pettit, 1997: 21-2; Berlin, 1969). To this 
end, chapter 2 will seek to distinguish this alternative conception of liberty from 
both positive and negative prevailing contemporary approaches. 
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Chapter 1- Civic Republicanism: Ideal of Polity 
A common error in contemporary theory is to view civic republicanism as simply 
the opposite of monarchy. Indeed, those who subscribe to this error often make 
the further mistake of equating republicanism with the principle of governments 
conducting the common business of the people in the name of the common good 
(Miller, 1987). The term res publica is generally used to describe a set of 
"constitutional arrangements under which it might justifiably be claimed that the 
res (the government) genuinely reflects the will and promotes the good of the 
publica (the community as a whole)" (Skinner, 1991: 196). Although republican 
thought can claim to have a lineage that dates back to Plato, Aristotle, and 
Polybius, I believe that Rome became the defining moment for republicanism 
through writers such as Livy, Sallust, and Plutarch who developed its history and 
an account of its leaders, laws, and institutions that have come to symbolise the 
essence of republicanism. 
To explore these issues fully, I have divided the present chapter into two 
sections. In section 1, I will look closely at Machiavelli and his contemporaries 
and the development of neo-Roman republicanism to see how its various 
components became entrenched in the reality and language of politics. This 
enquiry will attempt to explore the historical environment within which 
Machiavelli's republicanism emerged and fully explicate its various components. 
In section 2, following the lead of J. G. A. Pocock, this chapter will explore how 
Machiavelli's republicanism was recovered and transmitted by first the English 
republicans of the seventeenth century, and second during the period 
surrounding American independence (Pocock, 1975). Overall, this chapter has 
four main goals. First, this chapter seeks to establish that there is a distinctive 
neo-Roman republican approach inspired by Machiavelli. Second, this chapter 
seeks to present the reader with a solid historical overview utilising a historical 
narrative that combines contemporary views with original source material. Third, 
this chapter seeks to familiarise the reader with the key concepts of the 
republican approach and the central values and ideals that support it. Finally, 
this chapter seeks to highlight an aspect of Machiavelli's thought that I believe 
has been overlooked by many contemporary theorists. I will argue that 
Machiavelli's unique belief in the positive effects of internal conflict and tumults 
has important implications for contemporary republican approaches. This 
enquiry into neo-Roman civic republicanism is not meant to be an exhaustive 
survey of the literature, but rather should be viewed as an attempt to analyse 
civic republicanism in a historically based, but thematically driven account. 
Section 1- The Development of Neo-Roman Republicanism 
1.1 - Machiavelli and the civic humanists 
Recent scholarship has shown that although the principles of civic 
republicanism were widespread throughout the classical world, it was not until 
the emergence of the civic humanists in Italy that it became a coherent and 
powerful ideology (Pocock, 1975; Skinner, 1978). However, this chapter will 
argue that Machiavelli broke with the civic humanist tradition and developed a 
distinctive account of neo-Roman republicanism that put an alternative 
conception of liberty at the centre of its approach. This is not to say that 
Machiavelli's republicanism was not influenced by the language and values of 
civic humanism. According to Quentin Skinner, this intellectual tradition not only 
owes a great debt to the Greek classical writers such as Plato and Aristotle, but 
also to their heirs in the Roman tradition such as Cicero and Sallust (Skinner,. 
1990a: 121). At its most basic, civic republicanism in Machiavelli's time 
consisted of several essential elements: vita activa or participation; civic virtue; 
security; civil discord; citizenship and patriotism; and finally, a distinctive 
conception of liberty. A republic, as exemplified by Rome, Sparta, or Venice 
embodied an ideal of polity that, if fully realised, offered a convincing and 
powerful system of government to Machiavelli and his contemporaries. 
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The main thrust of republican government was to secure freedom for its 
people by promoting the common interest of the body politic while at the same 
time allowing individuals maximum liberty to pursue their own chosen ends. For 
Machiavelli and others, civic republicanism represented a dynamic and 
progressive outlook beyond that of mere maintenance, but rather one offering 
forward thinking principles aimed at securing and enhancing greater liberty for 
its people. To that end, republican governments were labour intensive and 
required constant attention while demanding a high degree of involvement from 
the citizens that comprised it. Republics also sought to confront civil discord 
and the factionalisation of society by promoting strong laws and institutions and 
a government founded on shared meanings based on the common good while 
ensuring security and liberty for its citizens by adopting mixed constitutions 
rooted in self-government (Viroli, 1990: 152-161). However, according to 
Pocock, the re-discovery of the ancient republics and their ideals was 
representative of a much more fundamental examination of humanity in the face 
of extraordinary obstacles. To explore further this phenomenon, as mentioned 
above, this chapter will utilise J. G. A. Pocock's seminal work The Machiavellian 
Moment to serve as our guide through the development of civic republican 
ideals and values (Pocock, 1975). 1 
The main thrust of Pocock's work was two-fold: first, Pocock posits that 
Machiavelli and his contemporaries were seeking to examine thoroughly the 
ideal republic and an active citizenry in light of historical questions of self- 
understanding; and second, to explore how this phenomenon, which manifested 
itself in the form of humanity's confrontation of virtue with `fortuna' and 
`corruption', freed itself from its static temporal limits and became a dynamic 
progressive force moving through history (Pocock, 1975: vii-viii). The climax of 
Pocock's thesis takes place in the debate surrounding American independence 
'As I mentioned in the introduction, my relationship with Pocock is not 
straightforward. While I use his general thesis, on a micro level my 
interpretation of Machiavelli is quite distinct from his. In the course of this 
chapter, this difference will become clear. 
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and the subsequent struggle to create and maintain a republic. In this section, 
I will review briefly the events that influenced Machiavelli and his 
contemporaries and led Pocock to propose his overall thesis, and explore their 
theoretical implications. In addition to those aspects of republican thought 
highlighted by Pocock, it is my intention to explicate and explore further another 
important aspect in Machiavelli's thought that can also be said to have 
influenced later generations. I want to posit that the debate surrounding 
Machiavelli's bold attempt to argue in favour of the internal tumults and civil 
discord that characterised the Roman republic as opposed to the domestic 
tranquillity and concord of Venice can also be said to have freed itself from the 
temporal and geographic constraints of mid-sixteenth century Italy and travelled 
through time climaxing in the struggle to create the America republic. To this 
end, the nature of conflict and its important implications for contemporary 
republican thought will be a recurring theme throughout this thesis. 
Pocock argues that in the late medieval period ideas about institutions, 
events, or traditions were epistemologically static in that they were viewed as 
being influenced by some external cosmic or metaphysical force. For believers 
in the Christian faith, this took the form of providence while for those of no faith 
it was viewed as Fortuna. With the advent of civic humanism, individuals began 
to understand that as political citizens "involved in vivere civile [(civic life)] with 
[their] fellows", they could achieve the self-realisation of their true nature and 
achieve virtue so that their world became rational (Pocock, 1975: 114). In other 
words, Pocock argues that the advent of civic humanism was symbolic of the 
movement away from humanity's view of their environment as external to their 
true nature to one that was part of their true nature. Humanity was no longer 
impotent against the cosmic forces that shaped their everyday lives and thus 
also shaped their institutions, events, and traditions. Virtue became humanity's 
weapon against fortuna who now could be manipulated and positively used. For 
Pocock, this allowed humanity to free itself from its temporal prison and begin 
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to have alternative views of the world that were no longer trapped in any one 
moment in time. 
However, before this new science of political organisation and nation 
building could fully develop and entrench itself as virtue, fortuna struck back. 
Pocock maintains that the failure of the Florentine republic signalled a period in 
which external forces overwhelmed a divided and demoralised citizenry who had 
never quite fulfilled their promise of harmonic vivere civile. This double setback, 
which allowed the restoration of Medicean rule, plunged Florence into a period 
of instability characterised by corruption and graft. Machiavelli, Guicciardini, 
and other "men of genius, " Pocock informs us, were present during this "complex 
crisis in thought" and provide a useful source to investigate the "constitution and 
stabilisation of civic bodies in intimate tension with thought aimed at the 
understanding of rapid and unpredictable change" (Pocock, 1975: 117). The 
only way to appreciate fully the enormity of the changes at hand was to engage 
fellow citizens and fulfil the promise of the z6on politikon, or political animal, in 
the community. This vivere civile was, according to Pocock, built primarily from 
Aristotelian influences which manifested themselves in the citizen's activity to 
"equate political activity with the practice of virtue and to make the flow of 
political and particular events intelligible and justifiable. " This process 
culminated in the view that the establishment of the republic, and thus 
everything that went along with it--citizenship, institutions, and laws--was the 
only way to triumph over the ever changing and fickle fortuna that tried to 
seduce humanity back into a period of instability and insecurity (Pocock, 1975: 
116). Only virtue, and civic virtue in particular, could stave off fortuna's alluring 
temptations. In other words, civic activity aimed at the common good was 
necessary to ensure the survival of the republic and the conquest of fortuna. 
Importantly, virtue is not something that can be displayed only by individuals. 
Machiavelli maintained that the Roman people as a whole were also able to 
display virtue (Skinner, 1978: 176). Thus, a widespread commitment to the 
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common good accompanied by a meaningful dedication to an active life was 
necessary to minimise corruption and confront the fickle fortuna. 
However, it would be a rush to judgment to accept tacitly Pocock's 
assertion that Machiavelli and his contemporaries were under some kind of 
Aristotelian spell. To be sure, Aristotle's influence on civic humanism 
contributed indirectly to Machiavelli's broader understanding of political issues. 
Although Aristotle's influence is implicit in Machiavelli's writings, he never refers 
directly to Aristotle's thought and explicitly pleads ignorance when asked about 
his Politics (Machiavelli to Vettori, 26 August, 1513 in Lettere as cited in Viroli, 
1998: 4). Furthermore, Skinner argues that many in the Italian humanist 
movement had been far more directly influenced by Roman writers who were 
concerned with the administration of laws and institutions of self-governing 
republics as represented by Cicero and the historian Sallust (Skinner, 1990a: 
122). This Roman influence intertwined with the broad principles of Aristotle's 
moral thought became a powerful theoretical weapon amid the erosion of 
republican values on the Italian peninsula during the 1500s. The Venetian 
republic became the one exception as their constitution of 1297 proved superior 
to those of the other Italian city-states. Venice represented a progressive 
account of "traditional values of independence and self-government" as 
manifested in its unique approach to republican government. The Venetian 
constitution consisted of three main elements: the Consiglio Grande which 
appointed most city officials; the Senate which had under its authority financial 
and foreign affairs; and the Doge who served as the elected head of government 
(Skinner, 1978: 139). 
After suffering minor disturbances at the advent of the constitution, Venice 
began a period of uninterrupted liberty and, most importantly, security from 
external and internal threats. While Venice's commitment to self-government 
and liberty attracted admiration, it was the avoidance of internal strife and 
factions that became the focal point of later theorists and writers. According to 
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Skinner, Pier Paolo Vergerio, a fourteenth century constitutional theorist, 
attributed Venice's success to the perfect balance of the three pure forms of 
government: monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy (Skinner, 1978: 139-40). 
In essence, the Venetian republic became synonymous with humanity's own 
issues of self-realisation. If civic virtue had become the ideal that humanity 
strived to attain, then the republic was the technological advance that would 
offer citizens the means to achieve it. The republic offered the structural 
foundation through its strong institutions and laws that allowed citizens to 
exercise their civic virtue to ensure that the common good was promoted over 
private interests. All the while, liberty was secured and enhanced under 
republican governments. As a precondition of the republic, the common good 
had to be paramount to ensure that private interests would not surrender to the 
fickle ways of fortuna through the corruption of the citizenry (Pocock, 1975: 184). 
1.2 - the crisis of Florence and the development of a coherent theory 
The Venetian legend continued through the fifteenth century and, by the 
beginning of the sixteenth century, interest in it had spread throughout Italy just 
as Florence began to experience internal tumults and external aggression. 
History shows that the coming of the French in 1494 forced the Medicean despot 
Piero de Medici to flee Florence. After his departure, the Florentine republic had 
a brief revival until the restoration of the Medici in 1512. It was during this short 
lived restoration that Machiavelli served as the second secretary of the 
Chancellery until the Medici's return forced him out of office. As Machiavelli 
failed to regain his position under the new rulers, he drifted into a circle of 
republican sympathisers who met at the Orti Oricellari gardens on the outskirts 
of Florence to discuss politics and create a forum in which the principles of 
republicanism could be fully explicated (Skinner, 1978: 153). It is during this 
period that Machiavelli composed his best known works including The Prince 
and The Discourses, the latter providing an account of his civic republican 
approach. 
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Other republicans in Florence included Francesco Guicciardini, another 
civil servant of the failed republic who had republican leanings. Guicciardini 
managed to survive the Medicean restoration, but he remained a supporter of 
republican ideals and goals. Although his writings were more cautious than 
Machiavelli's, he nevertheless maintained a republican focus that would 
highlight many of the same themes as Machiavelli's Discourses (Skinner, 1978: 
155). Another important republican writer during this time was the lesser known 
Donato Giannotti, an expert on the Venetian constitution who primarily made his 
contributions to Florentine thought in his account of the Florentine liberty during 
the republic (Skinner, 1978: 155). By reviewing the main themes of these three 
writers, observers can, as Pocock has informed us, gain an insight into how 
humanity began to deal with the immense changes afoot that signalled, and 
would later be characterised as, the `Machiavellian Moment'. Additionally, 
observers can gain an important insight into civic republicanism if they explore 
how these themes elicited by Machiavelli and his contemporaries struggled to 
break out of their temporal confines and subsequently influenced later 
generations of political thinkers. 
1.3 - liberty and the constitution of government 
At the centre of republican thought at the time was a preoccupation with 
the creation and maintenance of liberty. Although Machiavelli's usage of liberty 
has been taken by some contemporary theorists such as Sandel and Taylor as 
in many ways consistent with earlier civic humanist approaches to freedom, I 
believe that it is an alternative conception of liberty. In the next chapter, I will 
develop this thought more, but for the purposes of this chapter, I will briefly 
sketch the conception of liberty inherent in Machiavelli's thought. For 
Machiavelli, to be free means not to depend upon the will of another. According 
to Maurizio Viroli, 
To be a free people means for Machiavelli not to depend on the will of 
others and to be able to live under laws to which citizens have freely given 
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their consent. Accordingly, an individual is free when he is not dependent 
on the will of another individual, but is dependent on the laws only. Hence, 
to be at liberty means to be in full agreement with the Roman republican 
tradition, the opposite of being enslaved or in servitude (Viroli, 1998: 5). 
This type of freedom can be threatened in two important ways for Machiavelli. 
Firstly, a state that is under the control of an external force or another state is 
not considered by Machiavelli to be free. In other words, a state whose people 
are dependent on the will of outsiders is not free. Secondly, it can be 
undermined by tyranny and/or internal divisions that place narrow self interests 
above the common good. Thus, a state that is at the mercy of a dictator or 
tyrant is not free just as a state that is governed by those who seek to place their 
own private self interests above that of the common good is not free. For 
Machiavelli, the real challenge presented to republics was how to maintain and 
enhance liberty for its citizens. So that citizens can pursue their chosen ends 
within the scope of republican liberty, Machiavelli argues that they must be 
prepared to take an active part in political life and respect the laws and 
institutions of the republic (Viroli, 1998: 6). Importantly, it was the combination 
of these two elements that Machiavelli believed made republics superior to other 
forms of government. Machiavelli maintained that only republican liberty could 
secure individuals from either domination and/or dependency on others. 
For example, early in book 1, chapter 5 of The Discourses Machiavelli tells 
us that safeguarding liberty is one of the most essential services a government 
can provide its citizens (Machiavelli, The Discourses, 1965: 204). Machiavelli 
reiterates this point later in The Discourses when he insists that a wise legislator 
is one who can anticipate laws required to maintain liberty. Rome's greatness, 
Machiavelli proclaims, was in part due to the innovative institutions that 
supported and enhanced liberty by legislating "new laws on behalf of free 
government" (Machiavelli, The Discourses, 1965: 295-7). People who had 
thrown off tyranny and expelled their despotic princes to institute representative 
government were said to have begun the process of acquiring and maintaining 
their liberty (Machiavelli, The Discourses, 1965: 235-6; 239). Because 
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Machiavelli believed that citizens wanted different goals in their lives, he 
believed that republican laws and institutions would combine with the citizens' 
desire to be free of dependency, to enhance and secure their liberty 
(Machiavelli, The Discourses, 1965: 332). Alternatively, Guicciardini was 
perhaps less fervent in his support for this type of liberty, but nevertheless he 
believed that it was a crucial component in the nature of the Florentine citizen. 
He felt that the Florentines had become so accustomed to their freedom that 
they were "naturally attached to liberty" as represented by their institutions and 
their will to fight to retain what they had achieved (Skinner, 1978: 156). 
Importantly, Machiavelli believed that properly constituted republican institutions 
and laws helped republics secure liberty for citizens of the republic. 
Since the goal of a republic was the creation and maintenance of liberty, 
Machiavelli and his contemporaries believed that a mixed constitution, like that 
of Venice, was the best way to achieve such a government (Skinner, 1978: 158). 
These writers had an intense hostility toward monarchical forms of government 
due to their propensity to fall easily into the hands of tyrants and despots and 
thus deny the citizens liberty. Early in The Discourses Machiavelli offers us a 
Polybian account of the three pure forms of government -- principality, 
aristocracy, and democracy -- and the various cycles that they endure before 
emphatically declaring that 
... all the said types are pestiferous, 
by reason of the short life of the three 
good and the viciousness of the three bad. Hence, since those who have 
been prudent in establishing laws have recognized this defect, they have 
avoided each one of these kinds by itself alone and chosen one that 
partakes of them all, judging it more solid and more stable, because one 
keeps watch over the other, if in the same city there are princedom, 
aristocracy, and popular government (Machiavelli, The Discourses, 1965: 
199). 
Moreover, Machiavelli furthers this line of thought by declaring later in The 
Discourses that paramount to this arrangement is that the people as a whole 
were best situated to place the common good above that of individuals' private 
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interest because it is the "well-being of communities" that makes cities great 
(Machiavelli, The Discourses, 1965: 332). Even the more restrained 
Guicciardini begrudgingly echoes this point of view by maintaining that cities 
governed by popular consent are more successful than those governed by a 
prince. Furthermore, his own preference is for a government characterised by 
a mixed republican constitution that seeks to ensure "liberty against those who 
seek to oppress the Republic" (Skinner, 1978: 158). By arguing that liberty was 
best created and maintained by the citizens themselves, Machiavelli and his 
contemporaries made the important connection between liberty and activity that 
will be a recurring theme throughout this chapter, and the thesis as a whole. 
Immediately, however, before I explore that claim further, I will turn to an 
important issue that foreshadows a point of contention between Machiavelli and 
the other republican theorists. 
While these theorists were consistent in their belief that the people should 
play a role in a mixed republican government, the question of how much of a 
role they would play highlights an important aspect of Machiavelli's thought. 
The debate centred on whether political power should be concentrated in the 
hands of the aristocracy, or grandi, or rather invested in the body politic as a 
whole which would give some power to the masses, or popolo. Machiavelli's 
belief in the diffusion of political power is best put forth in chapter 5 of book 1 of 
The Discourses where he argues that liberty can be better safeguarded by the 
body politic as a whole rather than by the narrow upper class. The reason for 
this can be found in Machiavelli's belief that the nobility may use their political 
power for personal gain or to oppress the people whereas the common people 
will use their political power to prevent themselves from losing their liberty 
because "if one will look at the purpose of the nobles and of those who are not 
noble, there will be seen in the former great longing to rule, and in the latter 
merely longing not to be ruled, and as a consequence greater eagerness to live 
in freedom" (Machiavelli, The Discourses, 1965: 204). Echoing Cicero, 
Machiavelli believed that civic inequality created very dangerous conditions for 
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republics because it resulted in unmanageable conflict (Viroli, 1990: 153). As 
for public offices, Machiavelli maintains that all citizens should be eligible to 
serve the republic regardless of class or social standing (Machiavelli, The 
Discourses, 1965: 242). Machiavelli reiterates many of these observations in 
the short Discourse on Remodelling the Government of Florence, where he 
stresses the need for inclusive public bodies comprised of representatives from 
the various classes and guilds found in Florence (Machiavelli, Discourse on 
Remodelling the Government of Florence, 1965: 101-115). Important in 
Machiavelli's belief in the rule of law is an understanding that no one is exempt 
from it and that all those who stand before it do so as equals. 2 Machiavelli's 
friend and contemporary Giannotti is consistent with this line of reasoning in his 
treatise The Florentine Republic where he declares that republics should be 
founded on the body politic (Giannotti, Opere, as cited by Pocock, 1975: 275). 
Furthermore, for Giannotti, republics should be organised in such a manner that 
the elected body should be comprised of citizens from the various social strata, 
including those of the common class even though he, unlike Machiavelli, 
believed that they should remain ineligible to serve as magistrates (Skinner, 
1978: 160). 
While these two theorists concur in their belief that the preponderance of 
political power should rest with the body politic as a whole, Guicciardini provides 
the exception. Guicciardini firmly believed that the common populace was 
unprepared to play such an important role in exercising political power and, if 
allowed to do so, the republic was bound to fall into decay. Instead, Guicciardini 
believes that political power should be placed with the nobles who can rule with 
more prudence and intelligence than the populace as a whole (Skinner, 1978: 
161). Although Guicciardini's dissent on this matter is important, it should not 
be over emphasised. Whether or not substantial political power was placed with 
21t is important to note that Machiavelli's equality is not social or economic in 
nature, but rather legal and political. For further discussion see Bock (1990: 
189). 
33 
the common populace, it should not be overlooked that these writers were 
opposed to endowing the part of the constitution representing princes with too 
much power. They were consistent in their belief that the best guardian for 
liberty lay with some part of the people. Of greater concern, however, was how 
to prevent private interests from influencing the political process and thus 
corrupting the polity. This issue of checks and balances is a consistently 
contentious issue that lies at the centre of many later debates about 
republicanism as I will argue when discussing the English republicans and their 
American intellectual ancestors in section 2. 
Thus far, I have argued that Machiavelli and his contemporaries struggled 
to cope with an important shift in the relationship between self-realisation and 
the ever changing and unknown world as represented by the fickle fortuna. To 
counter her capricious ways, humanity had to strive to achieve virtue which 
could be gained through a vivere civile, that is, living an active public life in a 
vibrant civil society. For some contemporary republicans closer to the civic 
humanist tradition such Hannah Arendt, this vita activa, as it became known, 
plays a central role in the development of the self and the acquisition of virtue 
(Arendt, 1958). However, in many ways, Machiavelli departs from this kind of 
moral reading of the self and how to realise it. As I outlined earlier, Philip Pettit 
has argued that Machiavelli's republicanism was distinct from the neo-Athenian 
version of the civic humanist in two important ways (Pettit, 1998: 83). Firstly, 
Machiavelli and his contemporaries were critical of Athens as unstable and 
excessively reliant on pure democracy. Alternatively, they viewed the Roman 
republic as a government built on democratic foundations that was better able 
to cope with internal strife and divisions through its unique republican 
institutions and laws. They admired and adopted certain Roman technologies 
such as dispersing power across different institutions, strong laws, and elections 
for public offices (Pettit, 1998: 83). For these republicans, then, these 
technologies represented important checks and balances so that the republic 
could be both popular and stable. Secondly, these republicans held an 
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alternative conception of liberty that differed from the civic humanist version in 
that it was not based on any single version of human flourishing in a self- 
governing polity. Where neo-Athenian republicans view liberty as being 
connected to a version of human flourishing and only realisable in a self- 
governing democratic society, these republicans considered individuals to be 
free when no one, or thing, exercises mastery, either real or threatened, over 
them (Pettit, 1997, Skinner, 1997). 
1.4 - fortuna and corruption 
For Machiavelli and his contemporaries, to realise virtue fully, the common 
good had to be placed above narrow private interests. The republic, and its 
public institutions and laws, became an essential vehicle that allowed citizens 
to attain the necessary virtue to combat fortuna and stave off corruption. 
Significantly, these writers argued that republican liberty was essential to the 
realisation of virtue and that in order to ensure freedom, political power needed 
to be diffused throughout a mixed constitution with political power vested in 
some part of the body politic, whether with the grandi or with the popolo. By 
arguing that a primitive form of checks and balances was the best way to ensure 
that liberty was maintained, these writers firmly fused the future of the republic 
with the delicate equilibrium of competing interests and a need to create strong 
laws and institutions to ensure security. Responsibility lay with the citizenry to 
embrace a vita activa or public life which reflected the values and ideals 
consistent with virtue to keep narrow private interests secondary to the public 
good. Corruption was said to exist when narrow private interests eclipsed the 
common good. As Pocock informs us, a defining moment of this period was the 
realisation that virtue, corruption, and fortuna were interrelated and that a 
reciprocal relationship existed between virtue and corruption (Pocock, 1975: 38). 
Fortuna was the external force that tempted individuals to stray from a life of 
virtue and into a life of corruption. 
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A central theme in both The Discourses and The History of Florence is the 
struggle between virtue and corruption, and the role that liberty and institutions 
play in countering fortuna's subversive influence on the citizenry. Skinner 
maintains that corruption, for Machiavelli, "is a failure to devote one's energies 
to the common good, and a corresponding tendency to place one's own interests 
above those of the community" (Skinner, 1978: 164). In chapters 16-18 of book 
1 of The Discourses, Machiavelli recounts how corruption had caused the 
Romans great strife because the powerful proposed laws for their own benefit 
and not the common good. For Machiavelli and his contemporaries, virtue and 
liberty, essential themes for republicans, cannot be known to corrupt people. In 
The History of Florence, Machiavelli argues that corruption plays a pivotal role 
in the erosion of virtue and the end of the Florentine Republic. Throughout this 
work, Machiavelli informs us how the people began to place their own private 
interests over the common good, and did so more and more frequently as virtue 
fled and the republic began to crumble (Machiavelli, The History of Florence, 
1965: 1141). Machiavelli attributes the loss of virtue and the corresponding rise 
in corruption to the people being excluded from the political process. These 
alienated people began to lose sight of their collective liberty and became more 
concerned with their own narrow self-interest characterised by licenza, avarice, 
and graft. This sentiment is echoed in chapter 17 of the opening book of The 
Discourses where Machiavelli attributes the rise of corruption to a corresponding 
decline in the equality found within a city where an oligarchy rules in its own 
narrow interests, and not in the interests of the body politic (Machiavelli, The 
Discourses, 1965: 240-1). Later in The Discourses Machiavelli suggests that 
while he did not disagree in principle with the Roman office of Dictator, it was 
the abuse of its power that ultimately usurped freedom from the people and led 
to an increasingly corrupt populace and the end of Roman liberty (Machiavelli, 
The Discourses, 1965: 267-9). Another cause of the loss of virtue and the rise 
of corruption for Machiavelli was the subversive role of Christianity. In the next 
section I will explore this claim and further develop Machiavelli's theory of virtue. 
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1.5 - citizenship and virtue: religion, patriotism, and citizen warriors 
On one level, Machiavelli's belief that the Christian faith subverted and 
eroded virtue and the vita activa of a republic's citizens may seem somewhat 
extraordinary and inconsistent with his views on the important role that religion 
played in ancient Rome. Indeed, early in The Discourses Machiavelli tells us 
that republics who wish to be free of corruption should maintain and venerate 
the institutions and ceremonies of religion. Furthermore, republics would be 
wise, according to Machiavelli, to "preserve the foundations" and encourage 
those things associated with religion because it will cultivate important values 
and keep the people united (Machiavelli, The Discourses, 1965: 226-7). 
However, on a much more fundamental level, Machiavelli's problem with 
Christianity was primarily born from the belief that it cultivated the wrong kind of 
person that was incompatible with the necessary requirements of maintaining 
the republic. Christianity tended to stress ideals that were antagonistic with 
Machiavelli's own conception of virtue and he consequently believed that it had 
weakened the citizens' love of patria (Skinner, 1978: 183). Machiavelli 
maintained that Christianity glorifies "humble and contemplative men, rather 
than men of action. It has assigned as man's highest good humility, abnegation, 
and contempt for mundane things... " (Machiavelli, The Discourses, 1965: 331). 
Where the Romans' religion sought to glorify civic virtue and thus nourish 
political liberty, Christianity had the effect of diverting individuals' purposes away 
from the virtue necessary to maintain the republic, and instead focussing them 
on their own lives and on God. Machiavelli's position on this issue is important 
for two main reasons. First, it allows us to gain an insight into how Machiavelli 
conceived virtue and the necessary skills that accompanied it. Machiavelli 
believed that certain character traits and skills were necessary for virtuous 
citizens, and that the republic, through its laws and institutions, should cultivate 
these through distinctive republican versions of citizenship. Second, it 
highlights another significant aspect of Machiavelli's thought because it 
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suggests that citizens should revere and esteem the republic with all of their 
heart. Therefore, when such issues arise that place the virtue of the citizen at 
odds with the virtue of Christianity or any other set of values, Machiavelli 
implores individuals to give priority to the maintenance of the republic. For 
Machiavelli, love of the patria is an essential component of a properly 
constituted republic. According to Viroli, this love of country serves several 
important and necessary purposes for a republic. 
... Machiavelli emphasizes that love of country is a moral force that makes the citizens capable of understanding what the common good of the 
republic consists of and pursuing it. It is a passion that makes them wise 
and virtuous; because they can see beyond the boundaries of their family 
or of their social group, they act in the way that is most apt to secure their 
own and the republic's interests (Viroli, 1998: 157). 
Thus, in both of these areas, republican citizens must practice and understand 
the ideals and values associated with republican civic virtue and citizenship 
because they help to secure the republic from internal or external threats. 
Patriotism, or love of country, helps to cultivate certain essential traits within the 
citizenry and underlies a citizen's moral commitment to the common good and 
the maintenance of liberty by supporting the institutions and laws that constitute 
the republic (Viroli, 1998: 163). In later chapters I will further develop republican 
versions of civic virtue and citizenship and their intimate relationship to both the 
laws and institutions, and to liberty. 
Machiavelli was not alone in his condemnation of the Christian faith and 
the negative effects it was having on the Italian Republics of his day. 
Guicciardini too believed that Christianity had become a negative force within 
the republic by forcing men away from a life of civic virtue to further the interests 
of religious institutions (Skinner, 1978: 167). This sentiment perhaps reflected 
the frustration experienced by some writers of the period over the loss of an 
important agent of socialisation. However, Machiavelli firmly believes that 
religion can play an important role in the maintenance of the republic. By acting 
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as a school of citizenship, for Machiavelli religion could potentially fulfill its role 
as moral leader and teacher in the inculcation of republican values throughout 
the citizenry. For Machiavelli, religion could be an important asset to a republic 
if it could teach the people how to be good citizens and practice good customs. 
In this case, good citizens are ones who exercise virtue and readily place the 
interests of the community above that of their own (Viroli, 1990: 157). The 
important thing to remember though, is that the religion itself had to act 
accordingly as well. For Machiavelli and his contemporaries, Christianity did not 
put the republic before itself and thus was the target of much condemnation. In 
other words, citizens could be good republicans and Christians, but not good 
Christians and good republicans because their commitment had to be to the 
republic first (Berlin, 1981: 45-6; Garver, 1996: 197,215). Thus, love of the 
patria had to supersede love of God. Because Christianity could have played 
a positive role in the development of civic virtue and been an important `teacher', 
Machiavelli and his contemporaries were forced to lament the loss of potential 
and look for a replacement. To compensate, the role of the citizen-warrior 
became increasingly important due to its focus on discipline and the cultivation 
of virtue. 
From many of Machiavelli's writings, it is clear that he was extremely 
concerned about military issues, especially when dealing with the protection of 
the republic from external aggressors who wanted to subjugate its citizens and 
take away their liberty. Like internal dependency, Machiavelli believed that any 
dependency on external states undermined liberty. The solution to this problem 
came in the form of military virtue that was closely related to citizenship and 
patriotism. A leading theme of Machiavelli's Art of War is the necessity of 
involving everyday citizens in the protection of the city due to their commitment 
to protecting and maintaining the public good, and thus preserving their 
individual liberty. Unlike the mercenary, the citizen-warrior has a life of liberty 
to protect that requires a unique blend of self-interest and military discipline that 
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combines to create a committed protector of the republic and the common good 
(Machiavelli, The Art of War, 1965). 
Citizen soldiers who protected their liberty by defending their city 
themselves exemplified the proper ethic of Machiavelli's military virtue because 
he believed that such citizens would have more reason to fight in battle than 
those soldiers who were hired mercenaries (Skinner, 1978: 164). In other 
words, citizens who are part time soldiers but full time members of the body 
politic with homes and occupations will wish to protect their freedom and 
maintain the security to live their life according to their own desires. Therefore, 
just as the citizen possesses virtue in the body politic, the patriot will possess 
virtue in the protection of the republic. For Machiavelli, an interdependent and 
reciprocal relationship existed between private citizens and military patriots 
because military virtue transmits certain important moral and ethical dimensions 
of virtue that helps to inculcate the citizenry with republican values and ideals 
(Pocock, 1975: 201-2). However, as I argued above, the risk to liberty from 
external sources was not the only threat to the republic. Machiavelli and his 
contemporaries also spent time analysing the threat to liberty that came from 
within the republic from its own citizens. In the next section, I will argue that a 
key feature of Machiavelli's republican approach was his unique response to 
internal tumults and conflict. Furthermore, I will argue that Machiavelli's 
response to this problem has important implications for contemporary republican 
approaches. 
1.6 - Rome vs. Venice: the positive effects of conflict 
Because a republic is the type of state favoured by Machiavelli and his 
contemporaries, the main question that arises, then, is just how to achieve and 
maintain it? Earlier, I argued that for republicans, securing and maintaining 
liberty was a paramount concern. However, the republican conception of liberty 
is not necessary centred on strict interpretations of individual freedom. For 
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republicans, in order to guarantee liberty, individuals had to exhibit high levels 
of civic virtue and be willing to place the common good above that of their own 
narrow private interests. Without virtue, citizens exposed themselves to the 
whims of fortuna and her corrupting influence. However, liberty could not be 
secured by virtue alone. High levels of citizen virtue had to be accompanied by 
certain essential republican institutions and ideals that would further secure 
freedom for individuals. For some, the Venetian Republic had been revered for 
its longevity and many writers advocated the adoption of her laws and 
institutions. 
Against the backdrop of intense civil discord among many of the Italian 
city-states, Venice's harmonious co-existence between the classes became the 
hallmark of the republic and, subsequently, the characteristic most likely to be 
coveted by observers. It was Venice's unique constitutional arrangement that 
managed to deliver a prolonged period of stability and peace while, at the same 
time, it brought the realisation of liberty into the lives of its citizens. The crude 
checks and balances system of the Venetian mixed form of republican 
government seemed to be the key to its success and many Florentines began 
to clamour for a similar construction. However, Machiavelli provides the one 
notable exception to the glorification of the Venetian Republican experience. 
Contrary to the popular convention of his time, Machiavelli's revolutionary 
thoughts on the role of civil discord within a republic provide a marked departure 
that, I believe, highlights another important republican legacy that has important 
implications for contemporary republican approaches. The realisation that a 
republic could best function in conditions of intense civic activity and civil 
discord foreshadows an important later theoretical aspect that repeatedly 
emerges in many of the republican approaches that developed after 
Machiavelli's time. 
Machiavelli's controversial embrace of civic discord was a direct challenge 
to a historical-theoretical legacy dating back to Cicero and other Roman writers. 
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As I briefly outlined above, the Roman writers, and subsequently many of the 
civic humanists who were influenced by them, believed that one of the keys to 
maintaining a republic was to insure that there was internal concord. Cicero's 
concordia ordinum was the basis of the belief that the common good took 
precedence over factional or selfish interest (Skinner, 1990a: 130). However, 
Machiavelli challenges this point of view and instead argues that one of the keys 
to maintaining republican institutions and laws was to be progressive in nature 
and to anticipate the inevitable clash of internal divisions that could potentially 
cause an increase in corruption and subsequently the loss of liberty. At the 
centre of this departure is an issue that goes to the heart of one of civic 
republicanism's most appealing and enduring assets: the ability to sculpt laws 
and create institutions that accommodate a wide range of individuals and 
classes. Early in The Discourses, especially in chapters 4-6, Machiavelli offers 
readers an account of the how the early tumults of Rome characterised the laws 
and institutions that secured and maintained Roman liberty. It was Machiavelli's 
belief that Rome's liberty was enhanced by the clashes that resulted from the 
different dispositions of the upper classes and the populace. Machiavelli 
believed that this type of conflict was healthy for a republic and not detrimental 
to it like so many of his contemporaries. 
Nor can a republic in any way reasonably be called unregulated where 
there are so many instances of honourable conduct; for these good 
instances have their origin in good education; good education in good 
laws; good laws in those dissensions that many thoughtlessly condemn. 
For anyone who will properly examine their outcome will not find that they 
produced any exile or violence damaging to the common good, but rather 
laws and institutions conducive to public liberty (Machiavelli, The 
Discourses, 1965: 203). 
Although Machiavelli's thought here demonstrates that class and other types of 
internal discord and conflict require a great deal of attention and the creation of 
good laws and institutions to accommodate such diversity, a republic that 
addresses this issue up front is one that is likely to maintain a high degree of 
liberty for its citizens and prevent corruption. The practice of this crude form of 
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checks and balances ensures that the laws and institutions are fully reflective 
of the community as a whole, and promote the common good. As I will discuss 
shortly, this issue figures prominently when the Americans were struggling to 
create the American Republic. 
As if anticipating criticism from those who felt that Venice offered a more 
convincing example, Machiavelli compares the Roman experience with that of 
ancient Sparta and modern Venice. In Sparta and Venice, power was placed 
with the nobles and not with the greater populace as in Rome. Consistent with 
our earlier discussion of where to place political power, Machiavelli argues that 
the body politic as a whole offers a better residence for political power to secure 
and enhance liberty. Machiavelli's republican contemporaries exalted the 
stability found in Venice and argued that a mixed republican constitution that 
vested political power in the nobility was the first important step toward a lasting 
Florentine republic. 
Both Guicciardini and Giannotti celebrated the Venetian model and 
proposed similar for the crumbling Florence before and after the return of the 
Medicean despots (Skinner, 1978: 173). Guicciardini believed that the body 
politic was not necessarily capable of ever truly realising enough virtue to 
ensure that the republic was maintained and advocated that the nobles should 
lead by example (Pocock, 1975: 255). This departure from Machiavelli 
represents Guicciardini's belief that virtue was not readily accessible to the 
masses, especially under the conditions of then present-day Florence. 
Guicciardini was not yet ready to arm the masses as was Machiavelli, and thus 
the discipline and ethic of the citizen-warrior could not transmit the virtue 
necessary for the maintenance of the republic (Pocock, 1975: 271). 
Alternatively, Giannotti had long been a supporter of the Venetian model due to 
its combination of the Polybian elements he thought necessary for a lasting 
republic. Unlike Guicciardini, Giannotti advocated the Venetian model for its 
instrumental qualities rather than its divestiture of political power to the nobility. 
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Giannotti's departure in favour of Venice had more to do with the actual 
technology of Venice's enduring republic than the myth of its superior laws and 
institutions. Giannotti simply believed that Venice had set an encouraging 
example that deserved the attention and study he devoted to it as it reflected the 
best living illustration of the Polybian mixed constitution that he thought 
exemplified the essence of government (Pocock, 1975: 319-20). 
Several key factors influenced Machiavelli's decision to promote the 
tumults of Rome over the tranquillity of Venice. The first of these was 
Machiavelli's belief that conflict and tumults were inevitable (Garver, 1996: 209). 
To be sure, Machiavelli believed that tumults and conflict could prove fatal to 
republics. Indeed, much of the latter half of The History of Florence is occupied 
by a catalogue of internal conflict and tumults that inflicted much pain and 
suffering on the citizens of Florence. Even in The Discourses, Machiavelli's 
affinity for conflict and tumults comes into question especially in book 1, chapter 
37 where he seems to contradict himself by suggesting that the internal power 
struggle between the grandi and the popolo over the Agrarian law was one of 
the causes of the decline in the Roman republic (Machiavelli, The Discourses, 
1965: 272-275, esp. 274). However, for Machiavelli, a properly constituted 
republic could channel the energy generated by internal conflict with its strong 
institutions and laws. This realisation leads us to the second factor that 
influenced Machiavelli to embrace civil discord and tumults. Because internal 
conflict was necessarily accompanied by high levels of political activity, 
Machiavelli believed that if the laws and institutions could properly channel the 
energy generated by tumults, high levels of civic virtue could keep fortuna, and 
thus corruption, in check. Furthermore, it followed that a tumultuous populace 
was simply another manifestation of civic virtue which in turn ensured that high 
levels of freedom were enjoyed by the republic, and corruption, the pursuit of 
private interests over that of the common good, was monitored and thus kept in 
check (Skinner, 1978: 181). 
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Internal conflict and tumults may cause republics to be unstable at times, 
but they require citizens to keep maximum vigilance and attention which leads 
to the creation of good laws and institutions that can offer innovative solutions 
to the often complex problems brought about by an active citizenry. Machiavelli 
argued that republican institutions had to provide the citizenry with appropriate 
public forums where their competing interests could find meaningful expression. 
In The Discourses book 1, chapter 7 Machiavelli argues that essential to the 
stability of republics are the many public forums and institutions which provide 
proper outlets for disagreements and differences between the various humours 
that comprise the republic (Machiavelli, The Discourses, 1965: 211). 3 Another 
example of Machiavelli's belief in proper public forums and inclusionary 
government is his prescription for Florence in the Discourse on Remodelling the 
Government of Florence where he stresses the need for inclusive public bodies 
comprised of representatives from the various classes and guilds found in 
Florence (Machiavelli, Discourse on Remodelling the Government of Florence, 
1965: 101-115). Finally, the third important factor that influenced Machiavelli's 
belief in the positive effects of internal conflict and tumults was that they 
performed an important educative function within the republic. For Machiavelli, 
open and inclusive public forums allowed the citizenry to educate themselves 
in not only the important issues facing them, but also in the skills and art of 
rhetoric and decision making (Machiavelli, The Discourses, 1965: 242). 
Furthermore, along with expansion, high levels of political activity served to give 
the republic more options in dealing with the often complex problems they faced 
(Machiavelli, The Discourses, 1965: 210-1; Garver, 1996: 209). 
Machiavelli maintained that there was an interdependent relationship 
between good laws and institutions, civic virtue, good education, and, 
importantly, liberty (Machiavelli, The Discourses, 1965: 203). For Machiavelli, 
even though internal conflict and tumults were extremely dangerous for 
'For a good discussion on the role of humours in Machiavelli's political writings 
see Parel (1992: 101-112; 140-152) and Ivison (1997: 58). 
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republics, the potential benefits brought about by such activity became a central 
part of his republican approach. Each of these three factors combined in a 
positive manner for Machiavelli because they served the greater goal of 
securing and enhancing liberty for republican citizens. It is my belief that this 
fundamental break with orthodoxy represents a defining moment in the thought 
of Machiavelli that has important implications for the contemporary recovery of 
republican values. By embracing the inherent diversity and differences found 
within republics, Machiavelli anticipates what would later become one of the 
most contentious issues facing the modern polity: how to cope with a population 
characterised by deep differences and sometimes incompatible values. 
In section 1, I have sought to define further and explicate a distinctive neo- 
Roman republican approach exemplified by Machiavelli, and to a lesser extent 
his republican contemporaries. I have argued that these republicans held a 
conception of liberty from distinct civic humanist versions which tied freedom to 
human flourishing within a certain type of society. Machiavelli maintained that 
certain republican technologies such as citizenship, strong laws and institutions, 
and education had an intimate connection to civic virtue and, ultimately, to the 
citizenry as a whole. At the centre of each of these republican technologies is 
the goal of securing liberty for the citizenry. Mixed constitutions that distributed 
power throughout the various interests combined with the strong versions of 
civic virtue and citizenship that exemplified the love of the patria to fight off 
fortuna and her corrupting temptations. I have also argued that unlike his 
contemporaries, Machiavelli's enthusiastic embrace of civil discord and internal 
tumults has important contemporary implications for the modern nation polity. 
To assess further the importance of Machiavelli's legacy, in section 2, I will 
continue following Pocock's original outline and explore how the so-called 
`Machiavellian Moment' occurred again and what effects this had on 
Machiavelli's theory as it marched forward. 
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Section 2- The Transmission of Neo-Roman Republican Thought 
When the American colonies began their push for independence from the 
British crown, the very public distaste of the monarchy played a central role and, 
to this end, republicanism became synonymous with this sentiment. 
Republicanism, whether in the form of Pocock's `Machiavellian Moment' or in the 
form of opposition to a monarchy, continued to play a powerful role in the history 
of politics. Nowhere was this more evident than in the writings of the English 
republicans characterised by such figures as James Harrington. Harrington, in 
particular, is often credited for the `rediscovery' and subsequent `re-legitimation' 
of Machiavelli's thought. Until Harrington's embrace, Machiavelli had been 
known as the destroyer of republican politics and the leading proponent of 
"politics as the art of tyranny" (Viroli, 1990: 144). The French thinker 
Montesquieu became another powerful republican proponent whose influence 
was central in the debate surrounding the creation of the American republic. To 
explore these issues, I have divided section 2 into three sub-sections. The first 
two sub-sections will provide a brief historical narrative of the influence and 
recovery of neo-Roman republican themes in two key periods. The first sub- 
section will explore Machiavelli's role in the development of English 
republicanism and the second sub-section will take a similar look at the 
American experience. The third sub-section of this section will focus on how the 
role of conflict manifested itself in the American experience and what solutions 
they offered to counter it. 
2.1 - English republicanism 
Before embarking on this present endeavour, we must heed Pocock's 
caution when considering how Machiavelli's influence became present in a 
seventeenth century England where the relatively simple concepts of vita activa, 
vivere civile, and mixed constitution do not readily translate into a country 
dominated by monarchy, theology and common law (Pocock, 1975: 333-4). To 
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understand properly how Machiavelli became a relevant party to the intellectual 
and structural growth of England, Pocock first attempts to establish that a 
parallel did exist between the world of the `Machiavellian Moment' and the 
English world thrown into chaos by civil war and regicide. Throughout the 
myriad of political crises that England had experienced during this period, 
Pocock asserts that although the environment had changed dramatically from 
ancient times, the fundamental structural principles of the `Machiavellian 
Moment' began to emerge (Pocock, 1975: 360). By the time of the civil war in 
1642, England had begun to display similar tensions between the population 
and the rival authorities of the King and the House of Commons that alluded 
back to the earlier experiences of the ancient republics. The struggle to 
understand- the emerging consciousness of the people with the continuing 
struggle for power among the political institutions, and the presence of 
increasing corruption, greatly influenced the English republicans. By the time 
the political crises had reached their boiling points, English republicanism had 
found an audience prepared to accept the thrust of ancient republicanism that 
necessarily connected liberty with virtue and the need to place the common 
good above private interests. England, it was said, could survive only if its 
leaders looked to the "wisdom and political architecture of ancient republics" 
(Worden, 1994a: 46). Marchamont Nedham, James Harrington, and, to a lesser 
extent in his political works, John Milton all became influential writers during this 
period and their works would later influence Henry Neville and Algernon Sidney 
who would write after this tumultuous period in England's history. 
By 1649, republicanism, it seemed to some, was the future of England. 
That this `new republican world' did not materialise may have dealt a death blow 
to the prospects of a sustained republican project. However, the true legacy of 
the English republicans, as I will soon argue, would have to wait until the next 
century and the emergence of the `New World' (Worden, 1994a: 48-9). English 
republicanism was heavily influenced by traditional republican sources through 
the works of Machiavelli, Livy, Sallust and other ancient writers. The glories of 
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Rome, Sparta and Greece became an area of intense focus as the English 
began to acknowledge a greater need for more effective political institutions. 
Additionally, the Ciceronian values of political virtue and public service, 
combined with the ethical premises of Aristotle, became interwoven within a 
larger and more profound debate on humanity. Although not unchallenged at 
the time, English republicanism could be said to have centred on the very issues 
associated with their ancient counterparts: good laws and institutions to create 
a healthy government; placing the public welfare above that of private interests; 
the promotion of the common citizen into the ranks of government; and, most 
importantly for the English, the establishment of a mixed or balanced 
constitution to ensure the liberty of the people and the ultimate survival of the 
republic (Worden, 1994a: 53). In many ways, however, Machiavelli's real 
contribution to English republicanism is somewhat opaque. The English 
republicans were inspired by Machiavelli's theories on vita activa and 
citizenship, his belief that liberty was protected and secured by participating in 
politics, and, it follows, his advocacy of participatory democracy over that of 
monarchy. 
However, on another level, the English republicans began a gradual shift 
away from those principles that occupy much of Machiavelli's theory to what 
would later become a central element of the republican contribution to the 
development of governments. By focussing on the actual mechanics of 
government, the English republicans once again highlighted the need for a 
government to have a perfectly balanced mixed constitution. James 
Harrington's timely work The Commonwealth of Oceana, first published in 1656, 
describes the constitutional mechanisms he believes can save England and 
bring back not only the legitimacy of the government, but her former glory 
(Worden, 1994b: 83). While much of this work is grounded in the broad 
principles of Machiavelli's civic republicanism, Oceana represents a marked 
departure in that Harrington is more Ciceronian in nature when it comes to the 
desire for harmony and tranquillity within a country. Harrington's Oceana sought 
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to establish harmony and tranquillity by two means. First, the commonwealth 
would heavily regulate the `balance' of the land with an agrarian policy that 
prohibited the inheritance of land worth in excess of a pre-determined figure a 
year (Harrington, 1992: 12). By regulating the ownership of land, Harrington 
believed that the differential between the rich and poor would be narrowed which 
would thus have the effect of spreading responsibility around. The ultimate 
effect of such a law, in Harrington's thoughts, would be to limit the amount of 
private interests people would exhibit which in turn would decrease the 
likelihood of political corruption. Another important aspect of his agrarian 
proposal is the realisation that along with political responsibility, governments 
also had to consider economic realities in policy making. He was quite aware 
that England's current crisis was due in large part to the "disproportion between 
that new distribution of wealth and the limited powers of the House of 
Commons... in which it was represented" (Worden, 1994b: 87). By heavily 
regulating land, he believed that economic power would be perfectly balanced 
with political power, thus ushering in a period of economic and political stability. 
Harrington's second principle to ensure the success of Oceana was to 
create an elaborate constitutional mechanism based primarily on the Venetian 
model scorned by Machiavelli. Harrington firmly believed that by creating such 
a perfectly balanced constitution, men's appetite for corruption and avarice 
would be kept at bay by instituting rotating representative bodies (Harrington, 
1992: 33). Harrington also modifies the republican belief in a mixed constitution 
by eliminating the role of the monarchy, or principality, within it. Instead, his 
constitution is based on representative bodies from the aristocracy and the 
people due to his belief that the role of the monarchy was one of mere executive 
administration (Harrington, 1992: 10). The balance that Harrington sought was 
designed to ensure that self-interest was re-directed into the public interest. In 
many ways, Machiavelli and his contemporaries had always sought to repress 
self-interest in favour of a new way of thinking that began with the promotion of 
the common good. Blair Worden has argued that by moving away from the 
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conventional thinking on self-interest, Harrington's pragmatism acknowledged 
Hobbes' challenge (Worden, 1994b: 91). Self-interest, as understood by 
Harrington, was not necessarily undesirable and could be redirected by 
constitutional machinery to ensure that people were constrained and the 
common good served. This point is best illustrated by Harrington's metaphor of 
two girls dividing a cake, both of them driven by self-interest for their common 
benefit. "Divide, says one unto the other, and I will choose; or let me divide, and 
you shall choose" (Harrington, 1992: 22). This principle served two main 
purposes. Firstly, it was designed to eliminate the tumults of Rome and instead 
emulate the tranquillity of Venice. Secondly, it had the effect of shifting the 
focus away from the priority of the common good to one that was more 
pragmatic in its approach and only advocated that the common good was 
served, either directly or indirectly. 
As in Machiavelli's time, the issue of tumults or tranquillity haunted the 
English republicans. Marchamont Nedham, like Machiavelli, believed that civil 
discord could serve to keep the citizenry involved in public debates, which would 
thus help keep them attuned to the public good (Nedham, 1652; as cited in 
Worden, 1994b: 93). Nedham's republicanism came in a different form from 
Harrington's. Nedham's republican thoughts appeared in his weekly newspaper 
Mercurius Politicus that covered the Rump parliament beginning in 1650. While 
Nedham can be said to have been a political chameleon as his allegiance 
oscillated with whoever was in power, his republicanism was well articulated and 
founded on classical conceptions (Worden, 1994a: 60-1). Nedham's 
republicanism was not as constitutionally based as that of Harrington, but was 
consistent in its advocacy of republican remedies for the maladies of the English 
political crises. Nedham supported the further development of classical models 
to break the cycle of `corruption' that he discerned within English politics and 
that he thought the new government in the form of the Rump parliament would 
end. Nedham had been influenced by John Milton whose republican sympathies 
were far less public than his own and certainly less systematic than Harrington's. 
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According to Worden, Milton's political interests centred more on his belief that 
he was on a divine mission' than on the practicalities of government. He was 
an avid supporter of the Italian city-states and believed that political questions 
revolved around the classical images of virtue and liberty and conflict between 
private interests and the common good (Worden, 1994a: 57). These three 
writers all played important, but somewhat different roles, in the early 
development of English republicanism that would be furthered by at least two 
others who would emerge later in the seventeenth century. 
Henry Neville and Algernon Sidney became the heirs apparent to their 
predecessors. However, their writings demonstrate just how far republicanism 
had developed during the political crises of the mid-seventeenth century and, 
more importantly, give us an idea of how republicanism would move from 
England into the `New World'. Although Sidney's major work, Discourses 
Concerning Government, was published posthumously, his republicanism was 
well known and, like that of Milton, centred on the classical conflict between 
liberty and license and the role of public versus private interests in resolving and 
shaping political issues (Sidney, 1990). Central to Sidney's political beliefs was 
his view of mankind as an imperfect being still capable of displaying virtue 
(Worden, 1994c: 173). Sidney believed that mankind could still find a balanced 
civil life with honourable institutions promoting the common good. Civil discord 
and internal tumults were for Sidney, as they were for Milton, "not impediments 
to our virtue but tests of it and incitements to it" (Worden, 1994c: 172). 
Accompanying his belief in mankind's ability to recover from the Fall, Sidney 
believed in a combination of liberty and responsibility that mirrors Machiavelli's 
belief in the necessary interdependent connection between an active civic life 
and freedom. Neville, on the other hand, was more action oriented and used his 
proximity to government to promote republican remedies. His best known work, 
Plato Redivivus, published in the early 1680s, was a re-assessment of 
Harrington's earlier Commonwealth of Oceana with the aim of restoring ancient 
constitutional principles to the current debate (Worden, 1994c: 146; also see 
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Pocock, 1975: 417-9). This neo-Harringtonian tract in the form of a dialogue 
centres on the constitutional crisis that had enveloped England and had 
spawned many other republican sentiments. Neville's solution to the crisis is 
throughly republican in nature and features many of the same elements found 
in Machiavelli's and subsequently the English republicans' works such as a 
mixed constitution, the superiority of public interest to those of private 
individuals, democracy, among others. Neville, like Harrington before him, is 
sceptical about the desirability of internal conflict and instead prefers a system 
that promotes domestic concord (Worden, 1994c: 147-152). 
Pocock argues that even though the location and circumstances of the 
English constitutional crisis of the mid-seventeenth century were different than 
those of the Italian crisis in the fifteenth century, a discernible parallel is present 
to link these two periods together under the guise of the `Machiavellian Moment' 
(Pocock, 1975: 401). According to Pocock, Machiavelli's original contribution 
to civic republicanism broke free from its temporal and geographic moorings to 
influence definitively the English republicans. Even though at times the 
approaches of the two time periods were different, at the centre of both of them 
is the need to secure republican liberty and combat, in the words of Machiavelli, 
licenza, or freedom exploited by unrestrained narrow self-interest. From this 
central proposition, the English republicans adapted the classical models to fit 
their specific needs. Harrington's belief in a well disciplined mixed constitution 
underlined the need for extensive constitutional machinery to balance properly 
the many competing interests of the time. 
Although a marked departure from Machiavelli's original principles, 
Harrington's most innovative contributions to civic republicanism were two-fold: 
first, he believed that a successful government had to consider equally 
economic issues along with political issues and second, he proposed a 
fundamental re-evaluation of the nature of the relationship between self-interest 
and the common good. These propositions further served to ensure internal 
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prosperity and stability as Harrington spurned Machiavelli's belief in the utility 
of tumultuous internal politics. Harrington, however, served another important 
function within the history of the civic republicanism in that he also served to re- 
legitimise Machiavelli as a serious and influential thinker as opposed to a 
`teacher of evil' (Viroli, 1990: 144; also see Strauss, 1958). By relying on the 
broader theoretical implications of Machiavelli's thought, the English republicans 
furthered the cause of civic republicanism by rendering it a real and powerful 
approach capable of survival. In the face of the myriad of failed republics, the 
English republicans further developed republican thinking by exploring the more 
practical aspects of the actual machinery of government. Indeed, as I will 
explore in the next sub-section, Harrington's, Nedham's, and Neville's advocacy 
of republican remedies to combat the maladies of their time combined with 
Milton's, and subsequently Sidney's, belief in the redeemability of mankind to 
influence the further development of neo-Roman ideals in the creation of the 
American republic. 
2.2 - the American experience 
For Pocock, "a debate between virtue and passion, land and commerce, 
republic and empire" had taken place both in Italy in the mid-fifteenth century, 
and in England in the mid-seventeenth century. During the eighteenth century 
in America, it was no different. Pocock posits that the American revolution and 
the debate surrounding the development of the American constitution "form the 
last act of civic Renaissance" and that the exploration of these ideas during this 
period are representative of the tension between individual self discovery on 
one side and the consciousness of "society, property, and history " on the other 
(Pocock, 1975: 462). James Madison, John Jay, and Alexander Hamilton, 
collectively known as Publius and authors of the much studied Federalist 
Papers, will be the primary focus as I explore how the language and discourse 
of civic republicanism emerged during the American struggle for independence. 
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Prior to this emergence though, civic republicanism had also become a focus of 
such writers as Montesquieu and Rousseau. 
Of these two, Montesquieu emerges as a more central figure and his The 
Spirit of the Laws would become extremely influential in the American 
experience (Montesquieu, 1989). 4 This work, appearing in the mid-eighteenth 
century, was a monumental re-think of civic republicanism and has led some to 
posit that it represented a clear break with Machiavelli and the past (Pangle, 
1988). By the time of Montesquieu's work, the dynamic shape of the modern 
polity had undergone a fundamental shift away from the small Italian city-states 
and had become a large culturally diffuse entity increasingly dependent on the 
emergence of commerce and credit as powerful political and economic forces 
(Shklar, 1990: 266). As it did in Harrington's time, commerce began to play an 
increasingly unsettling role in political affairs and it became evident that it was 
as fickle as fortuna had been in Machiavelli's time. As the realities of the ever- 
changing ebbs and flows of international commerce became more apparent, 
virtue was called upon to counter the growing corruption fuelled by self-interest 
in the modern state (Pocock, 1975: ix). The growing influence and power of the 
monarchy also fuelled republican sentiment as democracy became a topic of 
interest among political figures. It was against this backdrop that Montesquieu's 
'Broadly speaking, Rousseau does not fit neatly into the neo-Roman 
Machiavellian republican approach for two main reasons. Firstly, Rousseau's 
conception of liberty is closer to that of the civic humanists in that for him true 
liberty is realised as some sort of human flourishing within a society 
characterised by self-government (Rousseau, 1947: 19). For the most part I will 
set aside Rousseau's republicanism and instead concentrate on Machiavelli. 
As will become clear in later chapters, Rousseau's republicanism is not entirely 
compatible with Machiavelli's. As mentioned above, Rousseau held a more 
positive conception of liberty that was tied to life in a specific kind of society. 
Furthermore, Rousseau was adamantly opposed to any type of faction or 
division within society. Unlike Machiavelli who believed that positive features 
could emerge from a tumultuous society, Rousseau maintained that it was only 
a unified community that could secure liberty, and thus the General Will 
(Rousseau, 1947: 14-6). Fora further discussion on Rousseau's republicanism, 
see Oldfield (1990: 50-77). 
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work can be said to represent a decisive move away from Machiavelli's 
republicanism and toward a new formulation based on the groundbreaking work 
of the English republicans and their intense focus on using the machinery of 
democratic government to promote virtue and thus control the forces of fortuna 
in the guise of commerce. According to Judith Shklar, Montesquieu believed 
that the only way to rescue the modern state from monarchy was to 
"demonstrate that republican virtue was possible only in genuinely popular non- 
monarchial republican regimes... " (Shklar, 1990: 266). 
However, Montesquieu's death sentence for classical republicanism was 
not as extreme as its sounds. His main focus of ridicule was the republican 
account of history and he sought to deny the mythology that had surrounded 
various historical 'republics'. Montesquieu's main purpose in The Spirit of the 
Laws was to assess the successes and failures of various regimes and from 
their experiences "construct a comprehensive theory of comparative law" 
(Shklar, 1990: 268). By contrasting ancient and modern regimes alike, 
Montesquieu sought to demonstrate certain timeless principles that, if 
incorporated correctly in the laws and institutions of the modern polity, would 
create a permanent new republican ideal based on separation of powers and 
democracy. In book 11, chapter 6, Montesquieu outlines his view of the English 
constitution and how it promotes political liberty for its citizens which, for him, " 
is that tranquillity of spirit which comes from the opinion each [citizen] has of his 
security... " (Montesquieu, 1989: 157). Furthermore, Montesquieu increasingly 
realised that, in the eighteenth century, Britain's constitutional arrangements 
combined well with its commercial success and superiority. (Montesquieu, 1989: 
325-33, esp. 329). In America, all sides would continually invoke the authority 
of Montesquieu when advocating a mixed constitution and other technological 
features of republics. 
However, Machiavelli's republican influence on the American founders is 
not as apparent as Pocock argues. As I have discussed above, Pocock's main 
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thesis is to posit that the nature of the Machiavellian debate was played out not 
only in Machiavelli's time, but later in the seventeenth century when the English 
were faced with the crisis of civil war and the resulting Interregnum. His thesis 
climaxes with a discussion of the American revolution and the struggle to write 
and implement the American Constitution. This grandiose theory of American 
republicanism and its intellectual and historical roots takes place within a larger 
debate that suggests that this Machiavellian influence was not as significant as 
Pocock would have us to believe. Instead, critics of Pocock's work suggest that 
the works of Montesquieu and John Locke were far more influential than 
Machiavelli's (Pangle, 1988: 28-39). This critique, however, fails to 
acknowledge an important feature in Pocock's two pronged thesis. First, Pocock 
argues that what made the 'Machiavellian Moment' was the struggle between 
virtue, corruption and fortuna and humanity's ability to seize control of their own 
fate via republican institutions. Although the time and setting had changed, the 
fundamental propositions of this phenomenon repeated itself in England in the 
mid-seventeenth century. The second prong of Pocock's thesis maintains that 
within this debate on humanity's ability to connect self-understanding with self- 
determination, the theories of Machiavelli and his contemporaries remain 
relatively applicable not only in his time, but later in England. In the form of 
James Harrington and the other English republicans, republican thought was 
recovered and enhanced by theories that had adjusted to their time and place. 
In both of these senses, then, Pocock maintains that the so-called 
`Machiavellian Moment' is central to the debate surrounding the formulation of 
the American constitution. 
In order to demonstrate this, Pocock compares and contrasts his approach 
with that of the American historian Gordon Wood who had outlined in convincing 
fashion the influences and patterns of thought inherent in America's founding 
(Wood, 1969). Wood believed that while the Americans were heavily influenced 
by classical republicanism's language and thought in 1776, by 1787 when they 
began to write the Constitution they had realised that the rules of the game had 
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changed fundamentally. According to Wood, the founders realised that nations 
could no longer be founded on organic principles but rather, were "an 
agglomeration of hostile individuals coming together for their mutual benefit to 
construct a society" (Wood, 1969: 607). Wood seems to endorse the Lockean 
view that governments are born from highly contentious states of natural 
sociability and thus centred on individual desires. 
Thus for Wood, if virtue was equated with the people forming a common 
interest, American virtue had been lost to individuals seeking personal interests. 
That is, the people had become self-interested and saw government as a means 
to fulfilling their appetites. Madison seems to endorse this analysis in the oft 
referred to Federalist No. 10. 
Complaints are everywhere heard from our most considerable and virtuous 
citizens, equally the friends of public and private faith and of public and 
personal liberty, that our governments are too unstable, that the public 
good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties, and that measures are 
too often decided, not according to the rules of justice and the rights of the 
minor party, but by the superior force of an interested and overbearing 
majority.... These must be chiefly, if not wholly, effects of the unsteadiness 
and injustice with which a factious spirit has tainted our public 
administration. By a faction I understand a number of citizens, whether 
amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and 
actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to 
the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of 
the community (Hamilton, A., Madison, J., Jay, J., 1961: 77-8). 
Wood believed that the founders were thoroughly versed in republican ideals 
and rhetoric at the beginning of their crusade and that they also endorsed the 
idea that republicanism was more than simply the elimination of the monarchy 
and its institutions (Wood, 1969: 47). Americans knew of the ancient republics 
and their greatness, but they also knew that they had not survived and were 
ultimately destroyed. They understood that the death of republics had been 
from within and not from external threats or invading forces. Above all else 
however, the Americans intelligently and progressively combed the annals of the 
great republics and discovered the foundation of a coherent and useful ideology 
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that provided them with enough inspiration to put these ideals of polity into 
action and thus create a new world in their own unique image (Wood, 1969: 53). 
Because the American experience became a reaction to, and not an emulation 
of, the ancient republics, Wood believed that ultimately their republican zeal 
transformed itself into something different from classical politics, but not wholly 
detached from it. With no natural aristocracies to cultivate virtue, it declined and 
was accompanied by, not surprisingly, the assent and subsequently the triumph 
of self-interested individuals which signalled for Wood, the `end of classical 
politics' (Wood, 1969: 606). 
The debate between Pocock and Wood is important to my argument 
because it demonstrates how certain features of neo-Roman republicanism 
developed over time. Pocock agrees with Wood to the extent that the American 
experience was not so much an emulation of the traditional classical model of 
the republic, but rather a dynamic and fresh solution to the many problems of 
antiquity (Pocock, 1975: 524). That the realisation of self-interest and the 
decline of virtue was endorsed by the founders does not, for Pocock, signal the 
`end of classical politics' however. Pocock asserts that while this `thread' may 
have ended, the `web' did not wholly disappear (Pocock, 1975: 526). Pocock 
believes that although the so-called natural aristocracies and their virtue had 
indeed declined, the spirit of Machiavellian virtue and thus American virtue lived 
on and thrived at first in Jeffersonian agrarian virtue and later in the frontier. 
Where Wood refers to this type of virtue as `romantic', Pocock asserts that 
frontier expansionism, amplified by the myth of Andrew Jackson's America and 
witnessed by Tocqueville's now famous journey, was essentially Machiavellian 
virtue which extends virtue without corrupting it (Pocock, 1975: 537-9). That is, 
even though the dynamic feature of the natural aristocracies where virtue 
resided had ceased to exist, Machiavellian virtue continued to live on in the 
frontier and the myths that accompanied the expansion of America westward. 
This battle, where virtue vanquishes corruption, resided in the agricultural and 
frontier myths and became a powerful moral force that, according to Pocock, still 
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resounds within and haunts the culture of present day America (Pocock, 1975: 
545). For Pocock, then, America was founded, and today survives, on 
Machiavellian republicanism and its focus on civic virtue continuously fighting 
corruption at the expense of Locke and his flight into nature for meaning and 
reason. In the next sub-section, I will bring together the themes of this chapter 
by first taking a closer look at some key features of the American experience, 
especially the role of conflict in the constitution of government. 
2.3 republican technology and tumults in America 
The debate between Wood and Pocock, however, ignores what I have 
argued is one of Machiavelli's most original contributions to republican thought: 
the endorsement of the tumults of Rome over the tranquillity of Venice. As I 
argued above, three main factors influenced Machiavelli's belief that internal 
conflict and tumults could have positive effects for republics. Machiavelli 
believed that internal conflict and tumults were inevitable given the nature of 
republics; could be positive if the resulting activity was properly channelled 
through appropriate republican institutions; and provided a positive educative 
function which, along with expansion, increased the potential options available 
when coping with the many complex problems facing republics. On its face, it 
seems difficult to interpret Madison's Federalist 10 as being consistent with 
Machiavelli's thoughts on factions. 
However, on a deeper, and more fundamental level, I believe that it is 
possible to take a Machiavellian view of Federalist 10. While advocating a 
mixed constitution characterised by strong checks and balances, Madison had 
become convinced that self-interested individuals and factions were everyday 
facts within society and that to proceed as if they were not was tantamount to 
killing the republic before it had actually began. In response to this threat, 
Madison argued that a federal government made up of representative bodies 
was the most appropriate way to cope with the threat that arose from factions. 
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For Madison, a faction was "... a number of citizens. .. who are united and 
actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the 
rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the 
community" (Hamilton, A., Madison, J., Jay, J., 1961: 78). They were, for 
Madison, the root cause of every "instability, injustice, and confusion" present 
in government and had led to the destruction of republics everywhere, and were 
ultimately the most dire threat to the future of America (Hamilton, A., Madison, 
J., Jay, J., 1961: 77). 
The first convergence between Madison and Machiavelli is their similar 
view that factions were inevitable. For Madison, factions were inherent in the 
fundamental fabric of humanity (Hamilton, A., Madison, J., Jay, J., 1961: 79). 
Furthermore, since no realistic method of dissolving them existed, Madison 
suggests that the only way to counteract their debilitating effects was to ensure 
that the republic was comprised of a federal representative system made up of 
as many interests as possible (Hamilton, A., Madison, J., Jay, J., 1961: 83). 
This proposal leads us to the second similarity between Madison and 
Machiavelli. While it is true that Machiavelli certainly did not advocate anything 
like a federal system to counteract the debilitating effects of factions, he did 
maintain that the best way of coping with them was through properly constituted 
inclusive and open republican institutions. 5 Therefore, both Madison and 
Machiavelli maintained that factions had to be controlled in an open and 
inclusive manner utilising republican technologies. For Madison, the effects of 
such a system would be that no one faction or group gained too much influence 
without being exposed as doing so and that this type of system would ensure 
that people from all classes, societies, regions, and commercial interests would 
be represented at the federal level. This would safeguard the republic by 
5lt is important to note that the primary focus of Machiavelli's proposals was the 
maintenance of one city-state whereas Madison was concerned with several 
states. 
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diffusing power among the various interests so that each one could check and 
balance the other (Hamilton, A., Madison, J., Jay, J., 1961: 83). 
The third similarity between Madison and Machiavelli centres on the belief 
that open and inclusive public institutions in a large republic would not only bring 
republics more options, but would also safeguard liberty against the threat of 
factions. Unlike Machiavelli, Madison does not claim that factions can have an 
educative effect on society. However, in other ways, Madison does follow 
Machiavelli's belief that even though a large and expansive republic would 
contain strong factions, some positive effects of such a republic would actually 
be beneficial. Using Rome as his example, Machiavelli maintained that a large 
republic which wished to expand would be better positioned to secure liberty 
(Machiavelli, The Discourses, 1965: 210-1). This allows a republic to adapt 
itself more readily to threats to liberty and gives them more options when doing 
so. Likewise, Madison believed that large republics had a distinct advantage 
over smaller ones because they amalgamated more interests which, when 
subjected to properly constituted republican institutions, would safeguard liberty 
and secure the citizenry (Hamilton, A., Madison, J., Jay, J., 1961: 83-4). 
To be sure, in each of these three areas there are differences between the 
positions of Madison and Machiavelli. However, it is my contention that implicit 
within each of their approaches are certain similarities that remain constant. 
The neo-Roman republican influence can be seen in other areas as well, 
especially in the motivations surrounding the republican constitution of 
government. Within the overriding sentiment driving the desire to have a 
codified system of checks and balances there are distinctive neo-Roman 
republican overtones. As I have pointed out repeatedly, neo-Roman inspired 
republicanism contains a firm commitment to the principles of a mixed 
constitution characterised by checks and balances to ensure that no one group 
or governmental entity can exercise too much power. In the Federalist Papers, 
Publius defends certain republican technologies relying heavily on 
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Montesquieu's work which, as I have argued above, was itself influenced by 
Machiavelli through the work of the English republicans. The main thrust of 
Federalist 47-51 is to explicate fully the constituent parts of the greater federal 
government and to discuss how each part provides a check and balance on the 
others (Hamilton, A., Madison, J., Jay, J., 1961: 300-325). Montesquieu is 
eloquently evoked early in Federalist 47 as Madison attempts to answer 
criticisms from the Anti-Federalists who claim that, according to the theories of 
Montesquieu, the system proposed by the Federalists would lead to tyranny 
(Hamilton, A., Madison, J., Jay, J., 1961: 301). 
The Federalists had advocated a system of checks and balances that 
spread political power and responsibility out among the various components of 
government but did not do so exclusively. By overlapping some areas of 
responsibility, the Anti-Federalists claimed that the Federalists wanted to 
combine some political power in one branch while leaving the other without its 
equal share. Instead, the Anti-Federalists advocated a system of complete 
separation. Madison's attempt to interpret Montesquieu was to counter this 
argument. He maintained that this system of overlapping responsibility would 
further ensure that each branch would closely watch the others (Manin, 1994: 
47). In Federalist 48, Madison admits that the legislative branch will be more 
powerful than the executive or judiciary but it too has sufficient checks. For 
Madison, the legislative branch was, after all, the branch closest to the most 
important source of republican legitimacy - the people (and their pockets) - 
which makes them, in real terms, the ultimate check and balance within the 
republic (Hamilton, A., Madison, J., Jay, J., 1961: 310). Federalist 49-50 are 
marked by another suggested check and balance on the power of the branches 
of government in the form of additional constitutional conventions which he 
argues are not very effective. This discussion culminates in Federalist 51 where 
Madison once again returns to the larger question of how to secure liberty for 
individuals in the face of vicious self-interested factions. Consistent with his 
earlier advocacy of a large republic, Madison maintains that the only way to 
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provide security and liberty to citizens is to embrace the principles of a self- 
governing republic characterised by a mixed constitution containing checks and 
balances (Hamilton, A., Madison, J., Jay, J., 1961: 324). Madison seems to 
advocate the people as the ultimate check and balance in a republic who, as 
interested citizens, desire security and liberty and wish to be free to exercise 
their rights. Implicit in each of these areas is the influence of Machiavelli and 
his neo-Roman republican ancestors. A properly constituted republic that 
sought to balance out competing interests through strong laws and institutions 
was the one the most likely to secure republican liberty for its citizens. Conflict 
and civic virtue combined with republican institutions and laws to preserve 
liberty. 
Conclusion 
The American experience once again highlights how Machiavelli's thought 
broadly influenced the development of American republicanism. To be sure, 
Machiavelli was not explicitly recognised by the Americans as their republican 
exemplar. However, my argument in this chapter has centred around the belief 
that the fundamental motivation behind both the English and American 
republicans is thoroughly Machiavellian in nature. This chapter has explored 
the various components of civic republicanism and suggested that because of 
the convergence of several phenomena, Machiavelli sits at the centre of this 
tradition. In the temporal and geographical location of sixteenth century Italy, 
the principles of a distinctive neo-Roman civic republican approach emerged in 
the thought of Machiavelli as he sought to understand and conquer the first of 
several confrontations between virtue, corruption, and fortuna. It is at its core 
a consistent ideal of polity that seeks to ensure security, procure and enhance 
liberty, and encourage an active citizenry characterised by high levels of civic 
virtue. Understanding Machiavelli's thought as not necessarily the culmination 
of this process but rather the foundation, I want to argue that as civic 
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republicanism evolved over time, a coherent ideology emerges that can once 
again meet the challenges before the modern polity. 
At the centre of Machiavelli's approach was a distinctive conception of 
liberty that emphasised the necessity of strong laws and institutions to ensure 
that the citizenry was not dependent on others for their liberty. Paramount to 
Machiavelli was how to achieve and maintain this ideal of liberty. To that end, 
republican forms of mixed constitutions and other technological devices such as 
checks and balances and open and inclusive institutions were designed to 
secure republican liberty for the citizenry. However, institutions and laws alone 
could not secure liberty for these writers. Robust forms of civic virtue and 
citizenship had to be cultivated so that citizens could resist corruption and 
understand their role in creating the common good. Civic virtue and citizenship 
also had to cultivate and reflect the intimate interdependent relationship 
between citizens and the laws and institutions that governed them. For 
Machiavelli, and to a lessor extent Sidney and Madison, the role of conflict 
played a central role in the maintenance of liberty. Conflict that occurred within 
properly constituted republican institutions could be controlled and did not 
represent a fatal threat to liberty. By creating balanced laws and institutions that 
encouraged a life of virtue, the structural foundations of the republic promised 
individuals security and liberty so that they were left free to pursue their own 
ends. 
Central to my argument, then, is an understanding that there is a direct 
lineage between contemporary republicanism and Machiavelli. The focus of 
contemporary republicanism is to secure and enhance a distinctive form of 
liberty for its citizens. As in Machiavelli's time, in order to do this, certain ideals 
and institutions must be present within society. In the next chapter, I will further 
develop and explore the republican conception of liberty, and later in the thesis 
will continue to examine the necessary ideals and institutions that must 
accompany it. Each of the central themes of this chapter will appear repeatedly 
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throughout this thesis and taken together they form a relevant and powerful 
basis for a contemporary republican public philosophy. 
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Chapter 2- Republican Liberty as Non-domination: An 
Alternative Conception of Liberty 
In the last chapter, I argued that one of the central features that distinguished 
neo-Roman republicanism from its neo-Athenian counterpart was its alternative 
conception of liberty. For Machiavelli and his contemporaries, to be free was to 
not be dependent on the will of others. Furthermore, freedom was tied closely 
to the presence of certain necessary republican institutions and laws (Viroli, 
1998: 5). For these republicans, properly constituted republican liberty secured 
individuals from both external and internal threats to their freedom. This 
conception of liberty required a high level of commitment from its citizens and 
the presence of strong laws and institutions. Machiavelli maintained that 
citizens must be prepared to take part in an active civic life and respect the laws 
and institutions of the republic so that they could pursue those things that were 
important to them within the scope of republican liberty (Viroli, 1998: 6). 
However, this distinction is often blurred and many theorists are split on where 
to place the neo-Roman republican tradition within contemporary political 
thought and whether or not it holds a negative or positive conception of freedom. 
Some, like Charles Taylor, maintain that it is essentially a positive 
conception of freedom, whereas others, such as John Rawls believe that it is 
consistent with liberal negative approaches (Taylor, 1991; Rawls, 1993). This 
chapter will explore the neo-Roman republican conception of liberty in depth by 
contrasting it with Isaiah Berlin's famous two conceptions of liberty (Berlin, 1969: 
118-172). In doing so, I will briefly explore positive and negative conceptions 
of liberty while arguing that there does indeed exist enough conceptual space 
for an alternative and distinct form of liberty -- republican liberty as 
nondomination. Utilising the recent work of Philip Pettit, this chapter examines 
republican liberty as nondomination and explores the necessary institutions and 
ideals that accompany it and their intimate connection to the citizenry. To this 
end, I have divided this chapter into two main sections. Section 1 will examine 
Berlin's original analysis of liberty and will consider several important objections 
that have helped define the conceptual landscape. Section 2 will focus on the 
republican alternative conception of liberty and its relationship to certain ideals 
and institutions that constitute the liberty enjoyed by republican citizens. As a 
whole, this chapter seeks to build on the argument offered in chapter 1 by 
further distinguishing a distinct neo-Roman republican tradition that does not fit 
comfortably within Berlin's negative/positive scheme. Furthermore, I will argue 
that because republicans have an alternative conception of freedom, important 
distinctions can be made between republican and liberal approaches. These 
distinctions will be the focus of the next part of the thesis where I will contrast 
republican liberty as nondomination with liberal neutrality in chapter 3, and with 
political liberalism in chapter 4. A word of caution first, though. This chapter is 
not meant to be an exhaustive review of the various debates surrounding the 
different conceptualisations of liberty, but rather should be viewed as an attempt 
to outline broadly the major arguments within those debates and demonstrate 
that the neo-Roman republican approach holds a distinct and alternative 
conception of liberty to the traditional positive and negative dichotomy. 
Section 1- Berlin's `Two Concepts' 
Isaiah Berlin's work on the two concepts of liberty is a useful and 
compelling starting. Borrowing and conditioning a distinction made famous by 
Benjamin Constant, Isaiah Berlin has argued that positive liberty is similar to that 
of the ancients and negative liberty is equated with the liberty of moderns 
(Constant, 1988: 307-28). For Constant, ancient liberty was characterised by 
a collective enterprise that consisted of individuals acting together to form a 
community. Within this community, an individual's freedom was secondary to 
the liberty and authority of the community. The liberty of the moderns was 
centred around individual freedom and independence from the community 
(Constant, 1988: 311-2). In other words, modern liberty meant "being left to the 
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rule of your own private will [whereas] ancient liberty is sharing in the rule of a 
public, democratically determined will" (Pettit, 1997: 18). 
1.1 - positive liberty 
For Berlin, positive liberty was said to describe a relationship where the 
subject acts as master: "[they] wish to be the instrument of [their] own, not of 
other men's, acts of will. " Liberty as self-mastery suggests that agents who 
realise that they are free are free because they desire "to be a subject, not an 
object" (Berlin, 1969: 131). That is, agents wish to be the source of their 
freedom and to act consciously upon their will as opposed to reacting to the will 
of others (Berlin, 1969: 131-2). For Berlin, the agent who possesses self- 
mastery is fully conscious of what it is that she wants and understands that in 
addition to possessing the ability to act, she possess the will to act. In other 
words, the agent is the source of her will. 
I wish to be somebody, not nobody; a doer-deciding, not being decided 
for, self-directed and not acted upon by external nature or by other men 
as if I were a thing, or an animal, or a slave incapable of playing a human 
role, that is, of conceiving goals and policies of my own and realizing 
them (Berlin, 1969: 131). 
However, as Berlin points out, this conceptualisation of liberty in the positive 
sense has inherent difficulties because, if this formula is going to be successful, 
the agent must enjoy a high level of self-realisation. That is, agents must not 
realise only that they are free, they must understand themselves and their 
freedom to take advantage of it. In other words, they must be a conscious 
master of themselves and their activity. For Berlin, positive liberty so conceived 
is problematic, however, because it is dependent inextricably on the agent 
having achieved some sort self-realisation, realising the degree of their liberty, 
and finally acting upon it. Another fear for Berlin is that it also lends itself to 
control by agents who may `force' the subject to be free by manipulating them 
into acting in ways that they themselves have not chosen consciously. These 
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agents can be other agents, classes, institutions, or even states and, for Berlin, 
raises the haunting spectre of totalitarianism (Berlin, 1969: 134). 
Contemporary proponents of positive liberty argue that despite Berlin's 
warnings, freedom conceived of positively captures the essence of freedom itself 
because it is an essential moral ideal. Broadly based upon Aristotelian claims, 
these positive theories of liberty often argue that it is only individuals' search for 
who they really are that allows them to be free. Thus, agents can be only truly 
at liberty if they engage in the very activities that are consistent with their 
eudaimonia or `human flourishing' which embodies their deepest meanings and 
purposes (Skinner, 1990b: 296). 1 That is, by solving the internal riddle of the 
sphinx, the self-realised agent is free to act in the sense that the agent 
understands not only what her actions are, but can also be who she understand 
herself to be. Thus, freedom consists in agents realising their deepest 
meanings and then acting accordingly within these meanings. Freedom in this 
manner is a two step process. The first step is an agent's self-mastery whereas 
the second step is an agent using that self-mastery to flourish within a particular 
type of community like that of self-government. In the words of Charles Taylor, 
"[d]octrines of positive freedom are concerned with a view of freedom which 
involves essentially the exercising of control over one's life. " To this end, an 
agent can be only truly free if they have realised who they are and control their 
own life according to their self-realisation. "The concept of freedom here is an 
exercise concept" (Taylor, 1991: 143). For Taylor, however, we must not take 
only this first step to discovering who we truly are, but we must also realise who 
we are within a "society of a certain canonical, form incorporating true self- 
government" because it is only within such a society that we ourselves can be 
free. "It follows that we can only be free in such a society, and that being free 
is governing ourselves collectively according to this canonical form" (Taylor, 
1991: 148; emphasis in original). 
'Skinner specifically refers to Alasdair Maclntyre's work. See Maclntyre 
(1985: 146-164). 
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1.2 - negative liberty and its critics 
Negative liberty, for Berlin, is best understood "in this sense [as] simply 
the area within which a man can act unobstructed by others" (Berlin, 1969: 122). 
Thus, agents are free negatively insofar as there are no interferences with, or 
external constraints on, their activity. Interference, in this sense, should be 
viewed as a deliberate attempt to influence or impede agents by coercion or 
other methods. Berlin attributes this conception of liberty to "classical English 
philosophers" such as Hobbes, Bentham, and Mill among others. For Hobbes, 
"liberty or freedom signifieth (properly) the absence of opposition" (Hobbes, 
1968: 261). In this way, negative theories of liberty are often viewed as 
opportunity concepts because they consist of those things that agents can do, 
not what they actually do (Taylor, 1991: 143-4; also see Skinner, 1990b: 297). 
Liberty conceived in this fashion constructs a cordon around an agent within 
which she has the opportunity to act or not act according to her wishes (Berlin, 
1969: 123). Any interference with agents' actions or any attempt to coerce them 
into acting in a certain way is viewed as intrusive, and thus limiting their ability 
to act. To that end, many like Hobbes consider laws to be obstacles to being 
able to act freely and are thus thought to represent `interferences' to those who 
seek to be free (Hobbes, 1968). If freedom in the negative sense seeks to carve 
out a sphere within which agents can act unimpeded by others, we are led to 
inevitable questions concerning the scope of this area and how to achieve and 
maintain it. Proponents, then, of negative liberty have traditionally focussed 
their concerns on the area insulating the agent from interference and how far it 
should extend to guarantee a just and basic set of liberties. Other negative 
conceptions of liberty follow an argument put forth by S. I. Benn and W. L. 
Weinstein who contend that liberty should not be necessarily viewed as a lack 
of interference to act, but instead should be conceived of as the non-restriction 
of options (Benn and Weinstein, 1971: 194-211). Gerald MacCallum has 
offered another influential critique of negative liberty. MacCallum argues that 
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Berlin's scheme is flawed fundamentally and that it is impossible to divide liberty 
into two concepts (MacCallum, 1991: 100-22). 
MacCallum's contribution to this important debate has served two main 
purposes. First, it questioned Berlin's original dichotomy and argued that 
freedom should not be understood as being necessarily negative or positive, but 
instead should be considered "as one and the same triadic relation" 
(MacCallum, 1991: 100). For MacCallum, freedom is "always of something (an 
agent or agents), from something, to do, not do, become, or not become 
something; it is a triadic relationship" (MacCallum, 1991: 102; emphasis in 
original). Different conceptions of liberty, then, are born not from distinctive 
concepts of liberty - such as positive or negative - but rather by the degree 
to which the ranges differ between agents, constraints, ends. This is based on 
his understanding of the dyadic characterisation of positive freedom as'freedom 
to' and negative freedom as 'freedom from'. MacCallum argues that "this 
characterisation, however, cannot distinguish two genuinely different kinds of 
freedom; it can serve only to emphasize one or the other of two features of every 
case of the freedom of agents" (MacCallum, 1991: 106; emphasis in original). 
If MacCallum is correct, the differences between the two conceptions of liberty 
can be found in the differing interpretations of just what the ranges are between 
the agents, constraints, and ends. Put another way, the differences between 
positive and negative notions of liberty are due to the various ways in which 
theorists construe or understand the relationships between the three variables. 
Furthermore, these differences are exacerbated by various interpretations of 
what constitutes an agent, a constraint, and an end. 
Second, MacCallum's critique has led to other important reconsiderations 
of liberty that reject the claim that the positive/negative dichotomy is 
fundamentally flawed. Tom Baldwin, for example, has argued that MacCallum's 
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critique of positive liberty is itself flawed (Baldwin, 1984: 125-42). 2 Using a 
theory of positive freedom developed by T. H. Green, Baldwin argues that 
MacCallum's formulation fails to secure itself against Green's conceptualisation 
of moral freedom because it does not account for the importance of the 
reasoning behind an agent acting in a certain way. He bases this conclusion on 
an interpretation of Green's moral theory that holds that an agent must not only 
be at liberty to be free, but must actually realise herself to be free. Baldwin 
argues that within Green's moral theory - as is typical of most positive theories 
of liberty - the agent "who is free does not merely have an opportunity for 
virtue, he must be virtuous" (Baldwin, 1984: 134-5). Thus, moral freedom 
cannot just be an opportunity concept, like that of negative liberty, but rather the 
agent must realise their freedom and actually exercise it to be free. 
With these various conceptualisations of liberty outlined above, and the 
many others that I have not discussed, it would seem as if the conceptual 
landscape were filled to capacity. However, I believe that this is not so. Without 
making judgements or claims about the various `conceptions' mentioned above, 
it seems to me that there is indeed enough space for more than one or even two 
conceptions of liberty. Whether or not versions of positive liberty, such as 
Green's above, or negative liberty, such as Benn's and Weinstein's above, 
survive the criticisms of MacCallum and others is less important for my purposes 
here than the fact that all of these different conceptualisations occupy some 
space within theories of liberty. I believe that Tom Baldwin is right to assert that 
there are different levels upon which liberty can be evaluated, each of them 
thoroughly worthy of investigation and debate (Baldwin, 1984: 141). Within the 
negative and positive debate, then, I maintain that there is enough conceptual 
space to have an alternative conception that does not fit comfortably within 
Berlin's, or even Constant's, distinctions. If it is true that positive and negative 
liberty do indeed operate at many different levels, shouldn't it follow that liberty 
2For other important critiques of MacCallum, see the Benn and Weinstein 
article above; Parent (1974) and Oppenheim (1981). 
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itself can be conceived of on many different levels? As mentioned earlier, Philip 
Pettit argues that republican liberty is distinct from either of the two conceptions 
of liberty in Berlin's taxonomy. In the next section, I will explore this claim and 
try to draw out the distinctions between republican liberty as nondomination and 
the positive and negative senses of liberty presented above. 
Section 2- Republican Liberty 
As mentioned above, contemporary theorists are split on where to place 
the republican theory of liberty within Berlin's dichotomy. Some argue that 
republicanism is best understood as a doctrine of positive liberty because it 
necessarily connects freedom with flourishing and democratic self-government 
(Pettit, 1997: 27; also see Sandel, 1996 and Taylor, 1991). Others argue that 
republicanism is best understood within the context of negative liberty as it 
relates to agents acting unimpeded by others (Skinner, 1984; also see Patten, 
1996). Building on the argument from the last section that there are different 
senses of liberty and enough conceptual landscape for the republican account, 
I will argue in this section that republican liberty as nondomination does not fit 
comfortably within Berlin's narrow dichotomy. Furthermore, I will argue that the 
republican conception of liberty is accompanied by distinctive institutions and 
a robust account of civic virtue which constitute the liberty experienced by 
republican citizens. To be sure, I am not arguing that the above conceptions of 
liberty are necessarily inherently impoverished or mistaken, but rather that as 
they have been advanced they are too narrow to accommodate republican 
liberty as nondomination. I will argue that republican liberty as nondomination 
contains elements of both positive and negative senses of liberty and is, 
therefore, an alternative conception of liberty. To this end, I will first explore the 
foundations of republican liberty before focussing on Philip Pettit's contemporary 
conceptualisation of this unique approach to liberty. 
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2.1 - republican liberty: an instrumental approach? 
From the confines of Berlin's narrow dichotomy, republicans seek to 
understand their liberty in a broader and alternative manner that challenges the 
status quo by questioning how individuals conceive of freedom itself. For 
Quentin Skinner, neo-Roman republican liberty was inextricably tied to a view 
of freedom intertwined with virtue and public service (Skinner, 1984: 199). 
Skinner has argued that historically republican liberty has been ill considered 
by some, mostly due to its early critics, like Hobbes, fundamentally 
misunderstanding its essence. For Skinner, Hobbes' account of liberty in the 
Leviathan is purely negative in that liberty was signified by the absence of 
opposition (Hobbes, 1968: 261). Later in the eighteenth century, this line of 
thought became embedded in the discourse of contemporary debates on liberty 
and subsequently eclipsed republican thinking (Pettit, 1997: 42). Jeremy 
Bentham, for example, was known to have argued for liberty conceived of 
negatively when he stated that the idea of liberty "was merely a negative 
one... and [is] accordingly defined [as] the absence of restraint" (Bentham, 1776, 
as cited in Pettit, 1997: 44). According to Skinner, contemporary contractarian 
theorists of liberty, like Hobbes before them, have failed to account for a 
conceptualisation of liberty that argues that liberty be understood in the way that 
the Romans understood it. Using Machiavelli as his archetype and authority on 
civic republican liberty, Skinner believes that the "Roman stoic way of thinking 
about political liberty" provides an alternative and encouraging approach to the 
way we view liberty that fully exposes a distinct republican conception of liberty 
(Skinner, 1984: 204). For many classical writers, it is important to note, any 
account of political liberty in the classical republican tradition "was generally 
embedded in an analysis of what it means to speak of living in a `free state'. 
[Furthermore, ] ... this approach was largely derived from Roman moral 
philosophy, and especially from those writers whose greatest admiration had 
been reserved for the doomed Roman republic: Livy, Sallust, and above all 
Cicero" (Skinner, 1991: 193). 
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Subsequent writers like Machiavelli adopted their language and 
approached their subjects by illustrating the tension and conflicts over traditional 
liberties between the different classes of citizens comprising the emerging city- 
republics and their leaders. These writers were known to take very seriously the 
metaphorical representation of the body politic. Just like a natural body, the 
body politic, was said to be truly at liberty if, and only if, it was not subjected to 
internal or external constraint. Central to republican liberty, for Skinner, is that 
it guarantees "personal liberty, understood in the ordinary sense to mean that 
each citizen remains free from any elements of constraint (especially those 
which arise from personal dependence and servitude) and in consequence 
remains free to pursue his own chosen ends" (Skinner, 1990b: 302). 
Republican liberty, as explained by Machiavelli, is best understood in an 
account of the important relationship between two groups of citizens in ancient 
Rome, the grandi -- the rich and powerful -- and the popolo -- the ordinary 
citizens (Skinner, 1984: 205). The grandi, driven by ambizione, aspire to be free 
to pursue power, glory, and honour for themselves while the popolo simply wish 
to live a secure life, "without anxieties about the free enjoyment of their property, 
without any doubts about the honour of their womenfolk and children, without 
any fears for themselves" (Machiavelli, The Discourses, Book 1.16, as cited in 
Skinner, 1984: 205). It follows that this ambizione must be tempered if a 
community is to be free or else it will be governed by uncontrollable freedom or 
licenza in which the narrow private interests of the few are placed above those 
of the many. Central to an understanding of republican liberty is that these 
social agents are not only concerned about being unfettered in pursuing their 
own ends, but rather they also desire the security to do so. Skinner argues that 
so understood, republican liberty can be accommodated within ordinary theories 
of negative liberty. For republicans, then, the state must be maintained in such 
a way that guarantees its citizens the ability to act without interference by 
others, whether that interference is internal or external (Skinner, 1984: 213). 
Were a community to be enslaved, either externally or internally, the citizens 
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would inevitably lose their individual liberty. Thus, it follows that citizens who 
wish to be secure in their liberty must live in a community that is itself free from 
either external or internal constraints. For these citizens, the cultivation of civic 
virtue and the ability to place the common good above an individual's own 
narrow interests was closely related to the maintenance of their liberty in the 
republican sense. For these republicans, if individuals sought to undermine the 
ideals and institutions of the republic by ignoring the common good and placing 
their own interests above that of the community corruption would increase and 
liberty would be lost. 
Therefore, if the community were to be overwhelmed by a loss of civic 
virtue and rising ambizione it would inevitably fall into a state of corruption as 
individuals sought to place their narrow self-interests above that of the city and 
liberty would be lost (Skinner, 1991: 198). If we are to believe that the grandi 
and popolo sought this type of freedom, then, for Skinner, it can be understood 
in terms of, and within, contemporary theories of negative liberty. The 
interference that these citizens experience, which comes in the form of civic 
virtue and republican institutions, is simply instrumental to the attainment of 
greater liberty. In other words, the demands placed on individuals by the 
republican state served to secure a more complete and equal system of liberty. 
For liberals such as Alan Patten and John Rawls, republican liberty so 
conceived by Skinner is essentially a negative form of freedom that is not 
significantly different to the sense of negative freedom within liberal approaches 
(Patten, 1996: 25; Rawls, 1993: 205). 
Patten maintains that despite some differences, there are no significant 
divergences between the two approaches because both contain instrumental 
accounts of certain ideals and virtues that have the effect of enhancing the 
overall system of freedom for individuals (Patten, 1996: 25). For Patten, political 
institutions, including forms of citizenship and civic virtue, are not intrinsically 
valuable themselves, but rather serve as a means to an end. Patten accepts 
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Skinner's contention that the republican conception of liberty is essentially 
negative in nature, but he maintains that the republican commitment to civic 
virtue and active political participation discussed in the last chapter is 
nevertheless an instrumental good, and thus republicanism does not deviate 
significantly from liberal approaches. According to Patten, it does not follow that 
"citizenship and public service are goods because they contribute to the 
realisation of negative liberty" (Patten, 1996: 26). For Patten, republicans are 
wrong to maintain that individuals are motivated by a commitment to the 
common good and a high degree of civic virtue. Instead, Patten believes that 
republican citizens, like liberal citizens, are motivated by a sense of self-interest 
which sees them adopt certain distinctive virtues and ideals to maintain their 
liberty (Patten, 1996: 28). For Patten, then, republican virtues and ideals are 
instrumental to the maintenance of liberty. Thus, Patten asserts that the 
republican approach is essentially an instrumental approach that promotes civic 
virtue and versions of citizenship as preconditions for the realisation of social 
justice. 
In many ways, up to a point, Skinner seems to endorse this reading, 
although he does attempt to draw distinctions between the two approaches. 
Skinner argues that contemporary theorists place too much emphasis on rights 
and not enough on liberty. For Skinner, critics of republican liberty should not 
view each citizen's rights as `trumps' over `interfering' social duties (Skinner, 
1992: 215). 3 On this point, Skinner's argument centres on his belief that simply 
accepting that individuals are self-interested and then regulating their interests 
by instrumental values and ideals is not enough to maintain republican liberty. 
Approaching rights and duties in this manner is undesirable for republicans 
because it allows some to opt out, or use their rights as trumps, from a broader 
commitment to the maintenance of liberty. Instead, Skinner maintains that 
republican liberty requires more than to control narrow self-interested individuals 
through instrumental values. Indeed, for republicans, when narrow self-interest 
3Skinner specifically refers to Ronald Dworkin (1977: xi, 170-7) 
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is placed above the interests of the community, corruption will increase and 
liberty is at risk. 
For republicans, narrow self-interested individuals must be moulded and 
conditioned in a manner that opens up the possibility that they can receive 
certain benefits and goods that are not necessarily attainable by instrumental 
values and ideals. Thus, the maintenance of republican liberty needs more than 
instrumental ideals and values to counter the effects of narrow self-interest. 
However, Skinner does not do enough to defend this position and his argument 
leaves supporters of republican liberty open to objections like that of Patten. 
What is needed is a defence of republican ideals and values as being 
constitutive of individuals' freedom, and not merely instrumental. If these so- 
called instrumental ideals and values were viewed constitutively, citizens would 
understand their freedom in a different and more significant way which would 
help them maintain their virtue and prevent them from falling into a life of self- 
interested corruption while reaping other benefits such as public honours and 
glory. Furthermore, if republican liberty is indeed an alternative conception of 
liberty from Berlin's dichotomy, it must diverge significantly from the sense of 
negative liberty within liberalism or else it faces the charge, as Patten has 
alleged, of collapsing into just another liberal approach. In the next two sub- 
sections, I will attempt to fill out Skinner's argument in ways which I believe he 
would approve. 
2.2 - beyond Skinner: Pettit's republicanism 
As we observed above, in Machiavelli's account of republicanism, liberty 
is best understood as a question of being in a state of security so that agents -- 
in the case of Rome the grandi and popoli-- are unhindered or unimpeded in the 
pursuit of whatever ends they choose (Skinner, 1984: 205). Machiavelli 
believed that the different classes of people have different ends which they wish 
to pursue and that they desire only the security to be free. Philip Pettit's recent 
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work, Republicanism, is a bold attempt to move beyond Skinner's analysis of 
republican liberty, which is rooted in the history of ideas. Instead, Pettit chooses 
to rely on historical themes to establish the foundation of his conceptualisation 
of republican liberty but then attempts to move into more contemporary 
discourse. Pettit, who uses Berlin's equation of positive liberty with self-mastery 
and negative liberty as the absence of interference by others as his starting 
point, conjectures that republican liberty is an alternative conception of liberty 
(Pettit, 1997: 21-2). Pettit argues that because "mastery and interference do not 
amount to the same thing, " it is possible to combine each of these important 
conceptual elements and understand freedom as the "absence of mastery by 
others, " not an absence of interference as in the strictly negative conception 
(Pettit, 1997: 21). Pettit, like Skinner, draws this distinction from neo-Roman 
republican writers like Machiavelli and those later theorists he influenced, 
especially the seventeenth century English republicans discussed in the last 
chapter. For Pettit, the republican conception of republican liberty as 
nondomination is a negatively based conception of freedom that incorporates 
elements of positive conceptions because it focusses on mastery (Pettit, 1997: 
21-2). It is, for Pettit, an alternative conception of liberty that cannot be 
accommodated within Berlin's strict positive/negative scheme. 
For the Romans, and subsequently the neo-Romans, liberty was used 
frequently in the context of liber and servus, citizen and slave. For Pettit, "the 
condition of liberty is explicated as the status of someone who, unlike the slave, 
is not subject to the arbitrary power of another, that is, someone who is not 
dominated by anyone else" (Pettit, 1997: 31). Central to an understanding of 
Pettit is the relationship between interference and domination. Interference is 
thought to be when an agent's activities or choices are subject to some form of 
intentional intervention by another agent, whereas domination is understood to 
occur when an agent's activities or choices are subject to arbitrary interference 
by other agents (Pettit, 1997: 52-3). Under this conceptualisation, an act can 
be said to be arbitrary if it is "chosen or not chosen at an agent's pleasure" and 
80 
does not track their interests. Agents who have the power to choose, or not 
choose, to interfere with other agents without considering what their will or 
judgements are, interfere with those agents in an arbitrary manner. Put another 
way, agents who have the power to interfere arbitrarily with other agents can, or 
cannot, at their pleasure, act in a manner that does, or does not, consider or 
track the interests of other agents (Pettit, 1997: 55). These agents are 
dominators because they decide whether or not to regard other agents' 
interests, and thus they subject others to interference which is arbitrary and 
does not consider what their interests or opinions are. These agents have no 
regard for their actions other than how they may affect themselves; they do not 
necessarily consider how their actions affect others and they act without 
deference to the others' interests. It follows that agents whose interests are not 
accounted for and tracked are said to be in a state of domination, even if the 
arbitrary interference the agent experiences is not something that is harmful. 
The key to determining what is considered to be arbitrary, then, is not whether 
or not the arbitrary interference is beneficial or harmful. Rather, the key to 
determining what is arbitrary centres on whether or not the interfering agent 
consulted and tracked the opinions or interests of the agent subjected to the 
interference. For an act to be non-arbitrary, the onus is on the interfering agent 
to seek actively the opinions or interests of others before acting. 
In Pettit's formulation, then, what is considered to be an agent's interests 
plays a central role in determining whether or not the agent is subject to 
domination. I will discuss this point more thoroughly later in the thesis, but for 
now will briefly outline what Pettit takes an agent's interests to be, although he 
does not fully explicate his position. Pettit is concerned primarily with interests 
that are legitimate in nature in that they, for the most, take account of the 
interests of others (Pettit, 1997: 56; also see 198). An agent's interests are 
legitimate if they are ones that are shared in common with others or do not 
subject others to arbitrary interference. In other words, the type of interests that 
primarily concern republicans are those which exist on the macro level, not 
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necessarily those that exist on the micro level. For republicans, pure external 
preferences are not regarded necessarily as legitimate interests that individuals 
can demand be tracked, especially if those interests are not other-regarding. 
For example, if an agent's interests centre on his dislike of paying taxes, but yet 
he remains committed to a strong national defence force which is financed by 
tax revenue, he cannot maintain that his interests are not being tracked when 
he is coerced by the state into paying his tax bill. The agent's micro level 
interests - not paying taxes - is overwhelmed by his macro level interest - 
having a strong national defence force. An agent's legitimate interests cannot 
simply be his own personal external preferences, especially if those preferences 
involve dominating others. I may dislike driving on the left-hand side of the road, 
but I identify with and participated in the institutions and laws of the state which 
have determined that driving on the left is safer. If the rules and regulations 
make it illegal to drive on the right-hand side of the road, I am not subject to 
domination because my own external preferences were not tracked. On a 
deeper and more fundamental level, my commitment and consent to the rules 
and regulations of road safety mean that my interests were in fact tracked. In 
other words, my arbitrium - my will or judgement - was accounted for and 
considered in a manner in which I approve by institutions with which I identify 
regardless of the outcome. 
For Pettit, interference and domination are two different things. It follows 
then, in terms of the master - slave relationship, a slave may, or may not, be 
subjected to both domination and interference at the same time. If the slave has 
a kindly master there may be periods when the slave is not subjected to any 
interference. The slave may be allowed to pursue his own ends without any 
interference from the master. However, whether or not the slave experiences 
any interference is dependent solely on the whims of the master who may, or 
may not, choose to interfere with the slave. In this manner, a slave who does 
not experience any interference is still not free of domination in the republican 
sense of freedom because he is still subjected to domination because there is 
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always the potential of arbitrary interference. For Pettit, "what constitutes 
domination is the fact that in some respect the power-bearer has the capacity 
to interfere arbitrarily, even if they are never going to do so" (Pettit, 1997: 63). 
It follows that agents who are subjected to the capacity of others to interfere 
arbitrarily with them are in essence dependent on the will of others for their 
freedom and, therefore, are not free in the republican sense. Thus, for 
republicans, agents are free to the extent that they are not subjected to arbitrary 
interference. Returning to the master-slave analogy, then, a slave can only be 
free in the republican sense by not being a slave. A slave can only be free by 
being independent of the will of the master, interfering or not. In other words, 
under a system characterised by republican liberty as nondomination, agents 
can only be free to the extent that they are not subject to any interference which 
does not track their interests, whether that interference is actual, threatened, or 
even known. 
However, equally important for Pettit is the inverse: an agent can be 
interfered with and not subjected to domination. An interfering power can 
account for and track other agents interests without restricting their freedom. 
The interference that agents experience is not arbitrary, instead the interfering 
power considers what their interests and opinions are before acting, or not 
acting, with those interests in mind. Put another way, republican citizens do not 
consider any interference from other agents to be a restriction of their freedom 
if, and only if, the other agent has consulted with them, gauged their opinions 
and interests, and then acted with those interests in mind. Such interference is 
not arbitrary because it considers their own arbitrium. For Pettit, then, 
interference, or the absence of it, is not the primary measure of freedom for 
republicans. Instead, freedom is thought to be when an agent is free from any 
actual or threatened interference that does not consider and track her interests. 
In other words, for republicans, agents are thought to be free to the extent that 
they are free domination (Pettit, 1997: 23). Thus, for Pettit, the republican 
conception of liberty allows the possibility that interference which is not arbitrary 
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is not necessarily restrictive of an agent's freedom. From this alternative 
conception of liberty, republicans believe that certain interferences which track 
their interests and which are not imposed in an arbitrary fashion do not restrict 
their freedom. Rather these interferences help secure their liberty through 
strong laws, properly constituted institutions, and distinctive ideals in a resilient 
manner (Pettit, 1997: 28). This resilience helps them to be secure in their 
liberty. To sum up, for Pettit, individuals can be free from interference but still 
subject to the mastery of other agents, and are thus still unfree in the republican 
sense. It follows that individuals can be subjected to interference, but as long 
as that interference tracks their interests and is not arbitrary, their freedom is 
intact and secure in the republican sense so that they can pursue their chosen 
ends under the conditions of nondomination. 
By returning to Machiavelli, I will better illustrate this point. As we 
discussed above, Machiavelli tells us that above all else, the Romans "wish 
freedom in order to live in security" (Machiavelli, The Discourses, 1965: 237). 
Furthermore, Machiavelli states that 
... each man gladly 
begets those children he thinks he can bring up, 
without fear that his patrimony will be taken from him; he knows not 
merely that they are born free and not slaves but that by means of their 
abilities they can become prominent men. Riches multiply in a free 
country to a greater extent, both those that come from agriculture and 
those that come from industry, for each man gladly increases such things 
and seeks to gain such goods as he believes, when gained, he can 
enjoy. Thence it comes that men in emulation give thought to private and 
public advantages, and both kinds keep marvellously increasing 
(Machiavelli, The Discourses, 1965: 332-3). 
But security to do what? The Romans, for Machiavelli, had no singular goal that 
had to be realised for the people to be in full possession of their freedom. The 
grandi and the popoli had varying dispositions and different ends they sought to 
achieve. Thus, their individual freedom was used to achieve different ends that 
they themselves desired as the conception of the good life was an undefined 
ideal left to them to give it meaning (Skinner, 1990b: 302). However, as I 
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discussed in chapter 1, in order to enjoy this security the Romans had to endure 
certain interferences, in the form of the duties following from republican ideals 
such as citizenship and civic virtue, that helped to constitute their freedom. It 
follows that security in this case should be understood as a resilient core of 
protection that not only allows individuals to determine which ends they will 
pursue within the context of nondomination. Importantly, this type of security 
also frees them from the inevitable uncertainty, anxiety and fear of subordination 
that they experience as they constantly act and react against those who seek to 
interfere arbitrarily with them (Pettit, 1997: 90). 4 
To sum up Pettit's argument thus far, within republican thought, agents 
are free to the extent that they are free to act without being exposed to any 
actual or threatened arbitrary interference from another. In the words of Pettit, 
[t]he antonym of freedom for the republican conception is not restraint as 
such but rather slavery and, more generally, any position of subjection. 
A person is free, and a person acts freely, just to the extent that she is 
not exposed, in the way a slave is exposed, to the arbitrary interference 
of another: to the sort of interference that only has to track the arbitrium 
- the will or judgement - of the interfering power (Pettit, 1998: 84). 
For republicans, then, agents are free to the extent that they are not subject to 
the mastery of another. That is, they are free to the extent that they are not 
subject to any interference, or threat of interference, that does not account for 
and track their own arbitrium. It follows that for Pettit, nondomination consists 
primarily of two forms of power which secure agents against potential 
domination: a reciprocal form and a constitutional form. The reciprocal form of 
power comes with the realisation that agents can defend themselves against 
forms of domination. They realise that they too can act to interfere arbitrarily 
with another, just as other agents have the same realisation. "If each can 
defend themselves effectively against any interference that another can wield, 
'For a wider discussion of nondomination combating uncertainty, anxiety, and 
fear of subordination see Pettit (1997: 83-90). 
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then none of them is going to be dominated by another. None is going to be 
subject to the permanent possibility of interference on an arbitrary basis by 
another" (Pettit, 1997: 67). For Pettit, the reciprocal form of power is not ideal 
nor is it completely effective in eliminating domination. 
The real strength of republican liberty is in its constitutional provisions 
which seek to promote the ideals of non-domination and to secure the agent 
against any arbitrary interference. It does this not by compelling or enabling 
dominated agents to defend themselves against dominators, but rather by 
denying those who seek to dominate the necessary power to interfere arbitrarily 
with others. That is, these constitutional provisions, whether they appear in the 
form of a judicial, executive or other institution of the state, seek to prevent 
arbitrary interference before it can actually interfere with other agents. 
Furthermore, these constitutional provisions will be driven by the principles of 
non-domination and will therefore not dominate others in any way because they 
will be based upon the interests and ideals of those whom they seek to protect 
and "[are] suitably responsive to the common good" (Pettit, 1997: 68). State 
activity will be subjected to rigorous contestation in open and inclusive forums 
that seek to gauge the interests and opinions of individuals and groups in the 
republic so that they can be registered and tracked accordingly (Pettit, 1997: 
195). Another key feature of the republican approach is that republican citizens 
identify with and support the constitutional provisions of a republican state 
characterised by liberty as nondomination because they play a central role in 
their creation and maintenance. As I argued in chapter 1, republican citizens 
are asked to play an active role in the maintenance of the republic. The laws 
and institutions of the republican state that seek to promote and maximise 
nondomination are created or amended by the citizens according to their 
interests in open and inclusive forums. If the constitutional provisions of 
nondomination are to maximise nondomination and not become dominators 
themselves, then the citizenry must play a central role in keeping them in check 
so that they track their interests and opinions, even as these change (Pettit, 
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1997: 207). In both of these areas, it is essential that the citizens play an active 
and primary role in ensuring that the laws and institutions of the state do not 
interfere in their lives in an arbitrary manner. In this sub-section, I have tried to 
briefly sketch Pettit's general argument. Many of these issues are central to my 
arguments in later chapters and I will develop them further at that time. 
2.3 - nondomination: another instrumental approach? 
I believe that there are two fundamental weaknesses in Pettit's argument. 
First, like Skinner's conceptualisation above, Pettit's republican alternative 
seems to fall victim to charges of instrumentality. Indeed, Pettit himself 
maintains that nondomination can best be defended as an instrumental good 
that brings with it certain benefits. Although he allows that it may be defended 
as an intrinsic good, he chooses instead to argue that even as an instrumental 
good, it has certain advantages over liberal approaches (Pettit, 1997: 82-90). 
Second, Pettit fails to develop thoroughly the idea that nondomination contains 
some elements of positive liberty within it. To be sure, he equates those positive 
elements with the principle of mastery and derives the alternative republican 
conception of liberty as the absence of mastery. However, those theorists who 
promote a theory of liberty in the positive sense are not only concerned about 
mastery by others. A central concern of their's is self-mastery, and thus a 
degree of self-development. Pettit does briefly argue for some type of self- 
mastery in the form of personal autonomy, but I believe that this line should be 
pursued further, especially in the sense of nondomination's reciprocal form of 
power and the relationship between nondomination and certain necessary 
republican ideals and institutions (Pettit, 1997: 81). It is not my contention that 
Pettit has these issues wrong. Instead, I maintain that Pettit has simply not gone 
far enough in defending his project. Therefore, I will try to add more weight to 
Pettit's claims in ways that I believe he would accept. However, it is not my 
purpose to account exhaustively for these shortcomings in this chapter alone. 
In the next two sections of the thesis, the issues introduced here will be 
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examined more thoroughly and compared and contrasted with rival liberal 
approaches. 
Despite Pettit's admission that republican liberty as nondomination is an 
instrumental good, he maintains that there are some important differences 
between freedom as the lack of arbitrary interference and freedom as the lack 
of any interference which make republican liberty more attractive (Pettit, 1997: 
83-90). The first advantage that nondomination has over the ideal of freedom 
as non-interference is that under nondomination, agents are secured from any 
anxiety or uncertainty they may experience from those who seek to interfere 
arbitrarily with them. Because some interference agents may experience may 
be arbitrary, agents do not know when, or from whom it may come. This may 
lead to a high degree of uncertainty and anxiety as agents fret over being 
exposed to arbitrary interference. Maximising freedom as nondomination will 
lower the degree to which agents are subject to arbitrary interference and, 
because the interference that they experience tracks their interests and 
opinions, uncertainty and anxiety are reduced (Pettit, 1997: 85). The opinions 
and interests of nondominated agents have been consulted and tracked and any 
interference that they experience is not something that is unexpected. It follows, 
then, that nondominated agents do not experience a high degree of uncertainty 
or anxiety because the interference they experience tracks their interests. 
When nondomination is maximised, the uncertainty and anxiety that agents 
experience is minimised. The same does not hold under a system characterised 
by freedom as non-interference. If non-interference from the state is maximised, 
the interference that agents experience from others is likely to increase because 
they receive less protection from the state than from would be offenders. As the 
interference that they experience rises, so to will their uncertainty and anxiety 
(Pettit, 1997: 86). The interference that they experience from others does not 
necessarily track their interests. It is not necessarily something that they were 
consulted about which may cause them concern and may make them worry. In 
this case, the only way to reduce their uncertainty and anxiety would be to 
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reduce the non-interference that they experience, but this fundamentally 
undermines the ideal of freedom as non-interference. 
The second advantage republican liberty as nondomination has over the 
ideal of freedom as non-interference is that it reduces the degree to which 
agents have to be prepared to defend themselves against arbitrary interference. 
If nondomination reduces the uncertainty and anxiety that an agent might 
experience, it also reduces the degree which agents must anticipate arbitrary 
interference and protect themselves from its effects (Pettit, 1997: 86). An agent 
who lives in a state characterised by republican liberty as nondomination will be 
freed from this responsibility. The degree that agents have to plan strategically 
to cope with arbitrary interference is reduced the more nondomination is 
maximised. The interference that agents encounter is not unfamiliar to them 
because their opinions and interests were tracked prior to its manifestation. 
Under a system characterised by the ideal of freedom as non-interference, 
agents will have to plan strategically to avoid arbitrary interference because they 
will not know from where it may come or in what form it may be. This 
interference is unexpected because their interests were not consulted, nor were 
they asked to play an active role in its creation. In this manner, an agent's own 
choices will be curtailed and the range of options open to her reduced. Having 
to anticipate and plan to avoid interference will be a heavy burden on many 
agents who will likely respond by limiting their exposure to situations where the 
potential for interference exists (Pettit, 1997: 87). These agents will have to rely 
on their own cunning and strategic planning to enjoy their liberty as they attempt 
to anticipate arbitrary interference. The result is that their overall liberty has 
been reduced. Once again, as the degree to which agents are exposed to 
interference is minimised, there is a corresponding drop in the freedom they 
enjoy. The same is not true under a system characterised by nondomination 
because as arbitrary interference is minimised, agents are freed from having to 
anticipate arbitrary interference and strategically plan to avoid it if it does not 
track their interests. The range of options open to them increases as they feel 
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more secure in their liberty and do not have to protect themselves from the 
arbitrary interference of other agents. For Pettit, "a clear advantage of the ideal 
of freedom as nondomination [is] that in targeting arbitrary interference as the 
enemy, and in seeking to reduce the capacities of others to interfere arbitrarily 
in anyone's affairs, it presents a picture of the free life in which the need for 
strategy is minimised" (Pettit, 1997: 87). 
Finally, the third advantage that nondomination has over non- 
interference, is that agents who experience a decrease in their vulnerability to 
arbitrary interference from others will also experience subjective and 
intersubjective benefits. For Pettit, agents who live in a system characterised 
by nondomination will be more or less on equal footing with one another when 
it comes to the amount of freedom they enjoy and this will be common 
knowledge between them (Pettit, 1997: 87). This benefits both the way they 
view other agents and the way in which they view themselves. As the amount 
of arbitrary interference that an agent experiences decreases, their self-image 
increases as does the image that they project because it becomes common 
knowledge that agents stand on. equal footing secure in their freedom. In the 
words of Pettit, "they can look the other person in the eye: they do not have to 
bow and scrape" (Pettit, 1997: 87). The same cannot be said of agents who live 
in a system of freedom as non-interference. As non-interference rises, as the 
anxiety and uncertainty rises, as the need to anticipate and strategically prepare 
for arbitrary interference increases, the extent to which agents are subjected to 
interference from others affects how they view themselves. In other words, in 
a state characterised by the ideal of freedom as non-interference, vulnerable 
agents who suffer uncertainty and anxiety worrying about potential arbitrary 
interference and who have to protect themselves from it, will feel subordinate to 
others and, to a degree, dependent on the actions of others to enjoy their liberty. 
If I am a vulnerable agent dependent on the good will of others not to interfere 
with me, I will feel subordinate to others. The freedom that I enjoy is limited by 
my own subjective and intersubjective status as a weak and vulnerable agent 
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exposed to the whims of others. In a state characterised by the ideal of freedom 
as non-interference, agents will be engaged in a constant power struggle with 
one another either interfering arbitrarily with others or defending themselves 
from arbitrary interference. For Pettit, this power struggle will eventually be won 
by the stronger which exposes the weaker to an increased risk of arbitrary 
interference because they lack the capacity to defend themselves (Pettit, 1997: 
88). It follows that as the state maximises non-interference, the interference 
weaker agents experience from other agents increases which affects their 
subjective and intersubjective status. The subjective and intersubjective benefits 
brought about by nondomination are not necessarily available to agents who live 
in a system characterised by the ideal of freedom as non-interference. For the 
weak, their social status is constantly in a perilous situation because they suffer 
anxiety and uncertainty and have to anticipate arbitrary interference. They 
cannot look others in the eye knowing that they are on an equal footing because 
they are all too aware of their limitations and are exploited because of them. 
For Pettit, in each of these three areas, the instrumental benefits of 
nondomination improve upon the ideal of freedom as non-interference. 
However, it is my contention that these benefits are intrinsically valuable to 
republican citizens because they help cultivate certain ideal types of citizens 
and individuals. To the extent that individuals are free from any uncertainty, 
anxiety, and anticipation that accompanies the ideal of freedom as non- 
interference, their opportunity for personal self-development increases in 
several important areas. Moreover, the security that they enjoy performs a 
double function. First, it secures them in a protective sense from arbitrary 
interference and second, it promotes their social standing as full and equal 
citizens. They do not fear their fellow citizens because they can look them in the 
eye as equals; nor do they fear the consequences of arbitrary interference 
because any interference they experience tracks their interests. This 
interference is familiar to them because they were involved in its creation - for 
this interference not to be arbitrary, it must consult or track their interests and 
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opinions. In order for it to track their interests, their interests must have been 
registered and accounted for by the state and others. This idea connects to the 
republican emphasis on inclusive public forums and positive civic activity that 
I discussed in the last chapter. If the state is to track properly the interests of its 
citizens, then there must be a sufficient amount of virtue and participation in the 
forums of the state to register accurately just what those interests are (Pettit, 
1998: 87). In this way, the necessary virtues that make up the republican 
version of citizenship help individuals articulate their own interests to the state 
and to others who must account for and track them if they are to live truly 
nondominated lives. By promoting substantive forms of civic virtue and access 
to a common language of citizenship, the republican state prepares citizens to 
play the necessary active role in their own nondomination. 
As agents' need to defend themselves decreases and their ability to be 
secure in the enjoyment of their equal footing with others increases, the way in 
which they treat others will also be affected. Just as they know that they 
themselves are on equal footing with other agents, so too must they realise that 
other agents are on equal footing with them. Where Pettit draws the line of the 
reciprocal power of nondomination at defence, I maintain that it has offensive 
elements as well. If the essence of republican liberty is the realisation that in 
order for agents not to be in a position of domination, their interests must be 
accounted for and tracked, then it must follow that the converse is also true. 
Individuals must take account of and track other individuals' interests before 
they can act without dominating them. To this end, individuals must consider 
how their actions will affect others and vice versa. In this manner, the reciprocal 
elements within republican nondomination contribute to individuals' mastery over 
themselves in a way that theorists who conceive of liberty in a positive fashion 
would approve. Agents who desire the resilient nature of republican liberty as 
nondomination and the benefits which accompany it are more secure in their 
own freedom if they cast their ends in a manner that does not subject others to 
arbitrary interference. By consulting or tracking other agents' interests and 
92 
opinions, nondominating agents will not provoke or draw the rebuke of other 
nondominating agents. To not dominate others, agents must make an effort to 
discover what others' interests are, and then respond appropriately. In this 
manner, the equal footing that agents share is secure and common knowledge. 
However, this is not to endorse those theorists like Taylor whom I 
discussed in section 1, who maintain that such self-mastery can only be attained 
within a society of a certain canonical form incorporating self-government 
(Taylor, 1991: 148). Rather, my argument here is that if we accept that 
nondomination has reciprocal power as Pettit argues, we must also accept that 
this realisation is not purely defensive in that it singularly secures agents on a 
personal level from arbitrary interference through enforced equality (Pettit, 1997: 
67). If agents are freed from the uncertainty, anxiety, and anticipation of 
arbitrary interference and their social status of free and equal citizen is common 
knowledge, then it must follow that they realise the same about other citizens. 
In this way, the reciprocal power of nondomination is, in Taylor's words, an 
`exercise concept', but one with a difference. The exercise within the reciprocal 
power of nondomination is less robust than the type of self-mastery favoured by 
Taylor. It only carries with it certain internal specifications on how an agent 
should act to realise their freedom fully; it does not specify in a singular fashion 
the `true' ends that they should pursue with their freedom such as human 
flourishing or self-government. In order to further protect and maintain their 
liberty, they must be able to cast their ends in a manner that does not subject 
others to arbitrary interference because this would undermine their equal 
footing. If their equal footing is undermined, the pursuit of their ends will be also 
undermined because the uncertainty, anxiety, and anticipation of arbitrary 
interference will return. These benefits are related constitutively to agents' 
realisation of nondomination because they combine to create an improved status 
that is resilient to arbitrary interference. However, what if a dominator is strong 
or deceitful and does not cast their ends in a manner that does not track the 
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interests of others? How is it that they realise their freedom more fully if they 
choose to interfere arbitrarily with others? The answer comes in two parts. 
If agents express their ends in a manner that interferes arbitrarily with 
others, they risk not only the wrath of others who may seek to defend 
themselves, they also risk encountering the sanctions of the republican state 
through its constitutional and legal institutions. A republican state characterised 
by the ideal of freedom as nondomination is accompanied by constitutional 
forms which manifest themselves in the ideals and institutions of the state. 
Through these constitutional mechanisms, the state will not seek only to 
eliminate arbitrary interference by depriving "other parties of the power of 
arbitrary interference" (Pettit, 1997: 68). Importantly, the state can also punish 
or take action against the dominator because it can interfere with their activity 
as long as that interference tracks or consults their interests. As I argued 
earlier, even though the immediate interests of the dominator were not 
necessarily followed, as long as the state's constitutional provisions allow the 
dominator to register and contest the punishment in the open and inclusive 
forums of the republican state, their interests were indeed tracked. Furthermore, 
their interests do not pass the test of legitimacy because they seek explicitly and 
purposely to interfere arbitrarily with others. In this case, the dominator's 
interests failed two important tests. The first test they failed was that they 
sought to be the exception to the laws and institutions of the state which were 
created by, and for, society as a whole. Like the agent who does not want to 
pay their taxes but yet desires a strong national defence, the dominator's 
position is inconsistent and self-defeating. The dominator wants others to fund 
national defence through taxes, but refuses to do so himself. The second test 
the dominator failed was that by casting their interest in a manner that subjected 
others to arbitrary interference, they have forfeited their standing in the open 
and inclusive forums of the state. Instead, they have advanced their interests 
at the expense of others at will and with impunity without consulting others' 
opinions or tracking their interests. In many ways, the way the republican state 
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regulates agents is similar to liberal approaches. However, as I will argue in the 
next part of the thesis, the republican approach goes further. 
The second part of the answer to the question posed above is that the 
state will also educate individuals in the ways of republican politics and 
government through the promotion of substantive ideals and institutions that 
support liberty as nondomination. As I argued earlier, not to dominate others, 
individuals must learn to account for and track the interests of others so that 
they can respond properly to their demands without subjecting them to arbitrary 
interference. Certain substantive virtues will be cultivated in individuals 
necessarily by the republican state such as the ability to reflect critically on their 
own actions and how the expression of these actions affects others. For 
Machiavelli, the inculcation of certain virtues like courage, temperance, and 
worldly knowledge or prudence was necessary for the successful maintenance 
of republican liberty (Machiavelli, The Discourses, 1965: 290-294). 5 
Furthermore, these virtues help individuals learn how to communicate with 
others so that they can not only publicise their own interests, but also discover 
the interests of their fellow citizens. Once again, this ties in with the republican 
emphasis on civic virtue and activity discussed in the last chapter. Without 
widespread civic virtue and participation in public forums, arbitrary interference 
cannot be minimised. In this manner, civic virtue can be understood as 
individuals' ability to cast their ends in a manner that does not interfere 
arbitrarily with others and an appreciation of how their actions impact the whole 
of society. Republican citizens will have to listen to the other side and react in 
a manner that tracks the other side's interests if they are to act without 
dominating them (Pettit, 1997: 189; also see Skinner, 1996: 15-6). 
5There are many instances in The Discourses where Machiavelli discusses 
the qualities necessary to preserve republican liberty. A good summary of 
his argument is found from book 1 chapters 50-60 (Machiavelli, The 
Discourses, 1965: 298-320). Also see Skinner (1984: 208-212) for a further 
discussion of these qualities. 
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Republicans seek to take self-interested individuals and `educate their 
desires' so that they begin to identify their good with that of society (Burtt, 1990: 
27-9). The republican state will seek to mould and condition individuals' ends 
so that they cast them in a manner that does not subject others to arbitrary 
interference. This point ties in with my earlier discussion of the key differences 
between Skinner's and Patten's approaches. Where liberals take self-interested 
individuals and attempt to regulate their activity through certain instrumental 
processes, republicans take self-interested individuals and attempt to change 
them into individuals of a certain character type that can identify their good with 
that of the community. So in the case of the dominator, not only do they face the 
sanctions of the state, they also face the state's effort to re-educate them in a 
manner that affects how they cast their ends. In doing so, republicans expose 
self-interested individuals to certain goods that can only be attained in a 
communal setting (Taylor, 1995: 139). Moreover, as argued above, individuals 
have good reasons to adopt a republican outlook because they receive certain 
benefits. The self-interested dominator faces increased uncertainty and anxiety 
as they seek to dodge their responsibilities to others and the state. They also 
face the prospect of having to increase their strategic planning as they have to 
develop more complex ruses to subject others to domination. Finally, they also 
miss out on an improved subjective and intersubjective status because they 
know they are not on equal footing with others and that their position is perilous. 
Furthermore, being a dominator means missing out on certain goods that are 
only available to nondominators whose freedom is secure and resilient. As with 
the first part of my reply, this issue will be defended and developed further in the 
next part of the thesis. 
Another blow against the instrumental charge is the unique relationship 
between republican liberty as nondomination and the ideals and institutions that 
support it. As I argued above, republican liberty as nondomination comes in two 
forms of power, reciprocal and constitutional. Consequently, in order for these 
forms to be truly effective, they must be accompanied by the necessary ideals 
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and institutions that inform and track the common good, which is essential to 
maintaining republican liberty. In other words, these forms, which come in the 
aforementioned ideals and institutions of the republican state constitute the 
liberty realised by the citizenry. These forms help to make up the essence of 
republican liberty and are recognised as such. To contrast this with the type of 
negative liberty discussed above and exemplified by Hobbes, we need to look 
no further than how different republicans view institutions and laws. For Hobbes 
and his followers, laws and institutions were seen as restrictions of liberty 
because they represented a coercive force within society which constrained 
freedom (Hobbes, 1968: 165-6; also see Pettit, 1997: 37). In this way, laws and 
institutions are always a restriction of freedom to some degree for those who 
accept the basic thrust of Berlin's conceptualisation of negative liberty. 
Alternatively, for republicans, properly constituted laws and institutions - laws 
and institutions which are made by and track the interests of those they govern 
- are not restrictive of citizens' freedom. Rather, they are viewed as 
components of it: taken together, they serve to make up and form their freedom. 
A common reply to this charge is that republicans mis-characterise or 
exaggerate the extent to which liberals accept a strictly negative conception of 
liberty (Patten, 1996). For example, Rawls maintains that in certain situations 
liberty should be restricted, but only for liberty's sake (Rawls, 1971: 201-5; 
Rawls, 1993: 294-9). In other words, justice is served when the restriction of 
some liberty is likely to enhance the overall system of liberty. Even though 
Rawls qualifies this by maintaining that in this case, liberty was not, strictly 
speaking, restricted but regulated, the conclusion is unaffected. In order to 
secure and enhance a greater system of liberty, liberals maintain that some 
restrictions or regulation is likely to take place. Nevertheless, these restrictions 
are allowable because they are instrumental to the creation of a more just and 
fair overall system of liberty. However, the same cannot be the case when 
considering the republican alternative. For republicans, the laws and institutions 
do not represent a restriction of liberty in any sense because they were created, 
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and are supported, with the full consent of the governed and track their 
interests. In other words, they are not arbitrary. There is no trade off between 
a restriction here and a benefit there because such causal sequences are 
unnecessary for republicans. 
For Pettit, unlike the instrumental nature of laws and institutions that 
support a negative conception of liberty, republican laws and institutions 
constitute the liberty enjoyed by its citizens (Pettit, 1997: 106-9). There is no 
"one step backwards in order to take two forward" for republicans (Pettit, 1997: 
35-6). In other words, liberty does not have to be restricted for liberty's sake. 
The nondomination experienced by republican citizens is formed by the 
constituent parts of the overall system of liberty which come in the 
aforementioned ideals and institutions of the republic. Without properly 
constituted laws and institutions, republican citizens are in a state of domination 
because they are exposed to arbitrary interference and thus their liberty is lost. 
The same cannot be said of those who accept the broad implication of Berlin's 
negative conception of liberty because, strictly speaking, the less interference 
in the form of laws and institutions that individuals experience, the greater their 
liberty. Even though the basic system of liberty may be enhanced by reasonable 
restrictions in the form of laws and institutions, these restrictions do not 
constitute individuals' freedom in the same manner as in the republican 
approach. These restrictions are instrumental to their freedom and help to 
enhance the overall basic liberties: they are a means to an end. However, for 
republicans, properly constituted laws and institutions are more than simply 
instrumental to the overall system of nondomination, they are the essence of 
their freedom and area necessary part of it. In other words, they constitute their 
freedom. And so constituted, the interference that citizens experience due to 
the presence of these ideals and institutions is not viewed as a restriction of 
their freedom because this interference is not arbitrary. Instead, these ideals 
and institutions are viewed as the components that combine to make republican 
liberty as nondomination realisable. 
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Conclusion 
Throughout this chapter I have sought to challenge the narrow confines 
of Berlin's two conceptions of liberty approach and instead have suggested that 
republican liberty conceived of as non-domination is a distinct alternative. If, as 
Tom Baldwin has argued, liberty has many different senses, each with their own 
unique emphases, then the conceptual landscape can accommodate an 
alternative conception. By limiting ourselves to either an exclusively positive or 
negative conception of liberty as put forth by Berlin, I maintain that we are 
ignoring a rich and potentially rewarding way of understanding our freedom that 
has important implications for contemporary political philosophy. Republican 
liberty as nondomination, based on the classical models of the Romans and on 
the work of contemporary theorists such as Quentin Skinner and Philip Pettit 
supersedes Berlin's original dichotomy. It combines some elements of both 
positive and negative liberty to form an alternative conception of liberty that is 
distinctively neo-Roman republican in nature. It is positive in the sense that it 
is an exercise concept and negative in that it requires the absence of something. 
In a system characterised by the ideal of freedom as nondomination, agents are 
free to the extent that no other agent can interfere with them in an arbitrary 
manner. They are free to the extent that they are not subject to the domination 
of either the state or other agents. 
I have argued in this chapter that several key differences emerge 
between republican liberty as nondomination and the more traditional 
conceptions outlined in Berlin's scheme. Furthermore, I have argued that 
Pettit's contemporary conceptualisation of republican liberty as nondomination 
can be defended in a more robust manner than he chooses to do. For Pettit, 
republican liberty as nondomination is an improvement on the ideal of freedom 
as non-interference in three crucial areas. First, it frees citizens from the 
uncertainty or anxiety that they may experience from any actual or threatened 
interference which does not track their interests. Second, it frees citizens from 
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having to anticipate arbitrary interference and to defend themselves against it. 
Finally, it places citizens on an equal footing because they are secure in their 
nondominated status and do not have to fear either the state or others who may 
subject them to interference which does not track their interests. In each of 
these three areas, then, republican liberty as nondomination holds out the 
prospect that individuals' freedom is enhanced and more secure than liberty in 
a system characterised by the ideal of freedom as non-interference. 
Furthermore, I have argued that republican liberty as nondomination can 
be defended as an intrinsically valuable good because it cultivates agents in a 
distinct and compelling manner that yields citizens and individuals of a certain 
ideal republican character type. To buttress this claim, I have argued that 
inherent within the advantages of freedom conceived in the republican manner 
as put forth by Pettit are certain elements which share some commonalities with 
the ideal of freedom as self-mastery. Where Pettit argues that liberty as 
nondomination is most readily understood as an instrumental good, albeit one 
that has advantages over other instrumental approaches, I maintain that within 
the reciprocal power of nondomination is an element of self-mastery that shares 
some commonalities with liberty conceived of in a positive manner. If the 
essence of republican liberty is the realisation that in order for agents not to be 
in a position of domination, their interests must be accounted for or tracked, then 
it must follow that individuals must take account of and track other individuals' 
interests before they can act without dominating them. If, as Pettit argues, a key 
advantage of republican liberty as nondomination is that it places agents on 
equal footing which has important subjective and intersubjective benefits, it must 
also follow that they realise that other agents are on equal footing with them. 
Furthermore, if individuals are freed from the uncertainty, anxiety, and 
anticipation of arbitrary interference and their social status as free and equal 
citizen is common knowledge, then it must follow that they realise the same 
about other citizens. To this end, individuals must consider how their actions 
will affect others so that they can recast their ends into ones which do not 
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subject others to arbitrary interference. Republicans will confront dominators 
and give them good reasons why their own freedom is more secure if they cease 
to interfere arbitrarily with others. Additionally, being a nondominator brings with 
it certain goods which individuals have good reasons to embrace. 
Nondomination also comes in a constitutional form which secures and enhances 
freedom for citizens within a legal and institutional framework. Civic virtue, 
citizenship, and other republican ideals and institutions not only protect 
individuals from arbitrary interference, they also help citizens to cast their ends 
in a nondominating fashion. However, these ideals and institutions are not 
simply instrumental to the attainment of republican liberty. Instead they 
constitute that liberty. They are constituent components of the greater good of 
nondomination and are, therefore, a necessary part of it. 
However, to argue that republican liberty as nondomination is an 
alternative conception of liberty is one thing. It is quite another to argue that it 
is an improvement on the liberal ideal of freedom as it appears in contemporary 
liberal approaches. Although I have laid the foundation for this argument in this 
chapter, it remains to be seen if the promise of republicanism's alternative 
conception of liberty can be fulfilled in a way that represents a convincing 
improvement on the liberal standard. In the next part of the thesis, I will explore 
this issue in detail by examining two prominent liberal accounts to define and 
distinguish further a contemporary republican approach that can cope with the 
many problems confronting the modern polity. In particular, chapter 3 will 
consider Will Kymlicka's liberal neutralist approach and chapter 4 will examine 
the political liberalism of John Rawls. 
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Part 2 
Nondomination, Liberal Neutrality, and Political 
Liberalism 
Questions that surround the state's proper role in the lives of its citizens are 
some of the most important and enduring that confront contemporary political 
philosophy. Many liberal theorists maintain that the state's proper role in the 
lives of individuals should be restricted to establishing the just and fair 
conditions that enable them "to pursue their own conceptions of the good" 
(Jones, 1989: 9). In other words, the state should not promote or pursue any 
version of the good life itself, and instead should ensure that its citizens have 
the capacity to choose, question, and revise their life plans without any 
unnecessary state interference. In this manner, the principle of liberal neutrality 
holds that the state should only minimally regulate the choices available to its 
citizens. Moreover, when regulating the availability of life choices, these liberals 
maintain that the state should do so without appealing to any version of the 
good. In other words, when justifying the use of public power, liberals believe 
that the state should not appeal to the good. Thus, the primary function of the 
state, for these liberals, is to ensure that individuals have the necessary 
conditions and context in which to choose those things that are important to 
them. ' Critics of liberalism argue that state neutrality undermines citizens' 
commitment to the common good because it stresses their individuals rights and 
not their common duties (Sandel, 1996: 25). By not acknowledging an over- 
riding public philosophy that recognises that self-government, and the values 
and virtues that it requires, help to contribute to the realisation of the highest 
human ends, these critics argue that liberal neutrality is self-defeating. 
'See Goodin and Reeve (1989) and de Marneffe (1990) for two very good 
overviews of liberal neutralism. 
However, within liberalism there are different approaches, each with their 
own distinctive features and ideals. On one side, liberals such as Will Kymlicka 
advocate an approach that seeks to remain neutral among competing ideas of 
the good and does not publically rank the intrinsic worth of life plans. For 
Kymlicka, "the role for the state is to protect the capacity for individuals to judge 
for themselves the worth of different conceptions of the good life, and to provide 
a fair distribution of rights and resources to enable people to pursue their 
conception of the good" (Kymlicka, 1998b: 133). In other words, Kymlicka 
believes that individuals should have the necessary freedom and capacity to 
choose, question, and revise their life choices rationally. 
On the other side, inspired by the recent work of John Rawls, some 
liberals have proposed a freestanding conception of justice that asks individuals 
to bracket off their closely held comprehensive moral and philosophical claims, 
and instead embrace a more limited political conception of justice. In doing so, 
the state's aims remain neutral among competing ideas of the good (Rawls, 
1993: 191-4). In other words, like Kymlicka's approach above, these liberals 
believe that the state should not itself pursue a singular version of the good. 
Although distinct, both of these approaches hold that in order to maximise the 
liberty of citizens, given a myriad of competing moral traditions, the state should 
not publicly rank or endorse particular versions of the good. Instead, the state 
should concentrate on guaranteeing its citizens a just political system and equal 
rights under the law so that they can pursue and revise their chosen life plans 
without unnecessary state interference. By constructing institutions and 
procedures aimed at securing individual liberty and justice, the liberal polity 
avoids having to make any substantive moral claims other than those that are 
required to ensure its citizens the necessary rights that help form their capacity 
to pursue their chosen paths in life. 
Even though both of these liberal approaches hold that the state should 
remain neutral toward competing conceptions of the good, within their respective 
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strategies there are significant differences in their underlying principles that 
deserve a thorough review. Over the next two chapters, I will explore how the 
republican approach outlined in the first part of the thesis copes with these 
differences. So that each approach can be explored fully, chapter 3 will 
examine Will Kymlicka's defence of liberal neutrality before developing and 
defending a republican response to his concerns. To the extent possible, I will 
set aside questions related to the second of these approaches, John Rawls' 
political liberalism, so that they can be examined thoroughly in chapter 4. 
104 
Chapter 3- The Challenge of the Cultural Marketplace: 
Republican Liberty as Nondomination and the Neutral 
State 
Responding to Michael Sandel's thoughtful work, Democracy's Discontent, Will 
Kymlicka has recently argued that despite the philosophical differences between 
liberalism and republicanism, the two approaches should be allies in addressing 
the problems confronting the modern polity (Sandel, 1996; Kymlicka, 1998b). 
Kymlicka maintains that because both approaches share important philosophical 
principles, supporters of each approach should work together to combat the 
discontent that citizens feel towards today's polity (Kymlicka, 1998b: 131). 
Despite this convergence, however, Kymlicka maintains that Sandel's call to 
abandon liberal neutrality is misplaced, and that it is only within such a liberal 
system that citizens can be treated equally and fairly by the state. By focussing 
on the type of republicanism associated with the civic humanists, Kymlicka 
ignores the alternative version of republicanism as nondomination. As I argued 
in part 1 of the thesis, this approach shares many liberal attributes in that it 
espouses an essentially negative conception of liberty. ' However, this neo- 
Roman version of republicanism is not simply a re-write of liberalism because 
its alternative conception of liberty measures freedom by the extent that 
individuals are not exposed to any actual or threatened arbitrary interference. 
To this end, then, the republican approach that I advocate is distinct from 
Sandel's in that it does not endorse a singular version of human flourishing 
grounded in self-government, and distinct from the kind of liberalism favoured 
by Kymlicka because it abandons state neutrality by promoting certain 
intrinsically good values and virtues that support its conception of liberty. 
'For the purposes of this chapter, I will set aside Michael Sandel's republican 
arguments against liberal neutrality because I maintain that the republican 
approach that I espouse is fundamentally different from his approach. For a 
further discussion on these differences see Pettit (1997) and Skinner (1997). 
In this chapter I will argue that neo-Roman republicanism is non-neutral, 
does not endorse a singular version of the good, and contains non-instrumental 
values and virtues that are quasi-perfectionist in nature. Despite these 
differences, I will argue that liberals like Kymlicka have good reasons to accept 
this republican approach. Ultimately, this chapter will argue that Kymlicka is 
right to assert that liberalism and republicanism should be allies in combatting 
the many problems facing the modern polity. However, before these 
approaches can join forces, I will argue that Kymlicka's principle of liberal 
neutrality must be abandoned in favour of a more substantive approach that 
countenances the intrinsic value of the ideals and virtues that accompany 
republican liberty as nondomination. My argument against Kymlicka's state 
neutrality will focus on three crucial areas. The first of these is his belief that 
liberty, and the virtues and values that support it, must be instrumental in nature 
so that individuals are not asked to endorse certain substantive moral and 
philosophical doctrines that are promoted by the state. The second concerns 
Kymlicka's belief that the state should not appeal to the intrinsic value of some 
versions of the good in its ideals and institutions. Finally, the third centres on 
Kymlicka's belief that the state should not promote any perfectionist values, and 
instead that these ideals should be transmitted to individuals and groups by non- 
state structures and forums. In addressing these issues, I will develop and 
defend an account of republicanism that can cope with the many problems 
facing the modern polity without sacrificing several key liberal aims. In other 
words, I will argue that by abandoning liberal neutrality, republican liberty as 
nondomination offers a richer and more robust account of freedom than the 
liberal approach. 
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Section 1- Liberal Neutrality 
1.1 - an instrumental approach 
As I discussed in the last chapter, many liberals measure freedom by the 
extent that individuals are free from external interference. Within this negative 
conception, the limits that are placed on individuals are aimed at securing justice 
and enhancing the overall system of freedom (Rawls, 1971: 201-5; Rawls, 1993: 
294-9). Additionally, the values and virtues that support this view of liberty are 
justified in an instrumental manner in that they are not viewed as intrinsically 
good themselves. Rather they help maintain the overall system of freedom so 
that individuals can pursue their own conception of the good. In defending his 
liberal approach, Kymlicka relies on instrumental values and virtues to support 
his claims of liberal neutrality (Kymlicka, 1998b: 135). In this sense, the liberty 
that individuals experience is purely instrumental to the projects that are 
important to them. These projects are ones that free individuals choose with 
their freedom and it is this process which allows them to question and revise 
their choices as they make the necessary determinations as to how they want 
to live their lives. Individuals' liberty, then, is merely a conduit which they utilise 
as they evaluate the many different life plans available to them (Kymlicka, 1990: 
209-10). What is valuable about freedom for many liberals, is that it serves as 
a means to an end. In other words, the real value of freedom for liberals is that 
it allows individuals to pursue their own chosen ends and determine their own 
conception of the good. Beyond this, liberals generally make no value 
judgements on the ends being pursued. 2 Thus, for Kymlicka, it is individuals' 
capacity to choose, question, and revise freely their final ends that have value 
and not the instrumental ideals and institutions that help them attain these ends. 
To support this effort, Kymlicka maintains that the state should remain neutral 
2However, liberalism is not a monolithic doctrine and there are many different 
variations. For example, Joseph Raz's liberal approach abandons liberal 
neutrality and advocates state perfectionism (Raz, 1986). For the purposes of 
this chapter, I will concentrate on liberal neutralists like Kymlicka. 
107 
among these competing conceptions of the good so that individuals can choose 
and pursue those ends that are valuable to them without unnecessary state 
interference. 
Furthermore, certain values and ideals which help individuals to 
determine the value of their life choices are also instrumental goods, and their 
promotion does not violate state neutrality. Kymlicka describes these goods as 
secondary values that may help individuals to achieve better life choices in 
certain circumstances, but that nevertheless remain instrumental to their final 
ends. For Kymlicka, the important factor is why the state promotes such values. 
It may be that the state has good reasons to promote some values, such as 
liberal citizenship and liberal virtues, because they make it more likely that 
individuals will fulfill their obligations to liberal justice. However, for the state not 
to violate its own neutrality, these ideals must be defended without recourse to 
any intrinsic goods or substantive ideals. In other words, for Kymlicka, while 
liberalism may have a commitment to certain "conception[s] of individual agency 
and social justice, it has no similar intrinsic or foundational commitment to a 
particular conception of communal identity or civic virtue" (Kymlicka, 1998b: 
135). Thus, the motivation behind the state's promotion of these values is to 
enhance the overall system of liberal justice, and not to promote a version of the 
good life. 
It all depends on why one is promoting a conception of civic virtue. If the 
state promotes certain virtues on the grounds that possessing these 
virtues will make someone's life more worthwhile or fulfilling, then clearly 
it is promoting a particular conception of the good. However, if the state 
is promoting these virtues on the grounds that possessing them will make 
someone more likely to fulfill her obligations of justice, then it is not 
promoting a particular conception of the good. It has made no claim 
whatsoever about what makes her life go better, or about what ends in 
life are rewarding or fulfilling (Kymlicka, 1998b: 136; emphasis in 
original). 
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Importantly, then, for Kymlicka, the state can promote certain values and virtues 
without violating its neutral position. Keeping in mind that for Kymlicka, the state 
is neutral in that it does not publicly rank or make value judgements on the 
various choices that individuals make. Certain instrumental ideals are promoted 
by the liberal state because they enable individuals to "achieve liberal principles 
of individual agency and social justice" and not because they are intrinsically 
valuable final ends (Kymlicka, 1998b: 136). In this manner, then, the 
instrumental virtues and values promoted by a liberal state are purposely `thin' 
so that they allow individuals to identify with them in a sense that does not 
endorse a conception of the good or publicly rank the intrinsic worth of their 
choices. These `thin' identities are promoted only because they make it more 
likely that individuals will fulfill their obligations to liberal justice. These virtues, 
then, are not a reflection of a certain conception of the good, but rather are 
instrumental duties and serve as a "precondition of justice to others" (Kymlicka, 
1998b: 136-7). 
Republicans who conceive of liberty as nondomination, however, will 
object to the instrumental reading of liberty because they value liberty, and the 
virtues and values that support it, as essential goods that constitute their liberty. 
As I briefly discussed in chapter 2, some liberals maintain that the virtues and 
values of republican liberty share liberalism's instrumental approach (Patten, 
1996: 22-45). Alan Patten has argued that despite some differences, there are 
no interesting or significant divergences between the liberal and republican 
approaches to liberty because both accounts are instrumental in nature (Patten, 
1996: 25). Patten endorses the view that political institutions, including forms 
of citizenship and civic virtue, are not intrinsically valuable themselves, but 
rather serve as a means to an end. Patten believes that the republican 
commitment to civic virtue and active political participation are instrumental 
goods and are not necessarily intrinsically valuable because the republican 
conception of liberty is essentially negative in nature. Republicans, according 
to Patten, are wrong to maintain that "citizenship and public service are goods 
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because they contribute to the realisation of negative liberty" (Patten, 1996: 26). 
Patten dismisses the republican claim that the ideals and values that comprise 
republican versions of citizenship and civic virtue are necessary conditions of 
the maintenance of a free state. Patten maintains that republicans mistakenly 
hold that individuals are motivated by a commitment to the common good and 
a high degree of civic virtue. Instead, Patten believes that republican citizens, 
like liberal citizens, are motivated by a sense of self-interest which sees them 
adopt certain distinctive virtues and ideals in order to maintain their liberty 
(Patten, 1996: 28). Thus, the republican approach, for Patten, is essentially an 
instrumental approach that holds that civic virtue and citizenship are 
preconditions for the realisation of social justice. Similarly, for Patten, liberal 
conceptions of freedom are like republican conceptions in that they too 
"recognise that unless individuals have a sense of justice and recognise a duty 
to support just institutions" the state will fail to protect liberty. Furthermore, 
liberals and republicans both believe that the "coercive powers of the state may 
occasionally need to be employed to ensure that individuals do what is required 
to preserve their own liberty" (Patten, 1996: 36). For Patten, unless republican 
liberty can be shown to be constituent of individuals' liberty, then the republican 
account of liberty must be instrumental. 
Recently, however, Patten has modified his earlier position and accepted 
that republican liberty as nondomination may be significantly different from 
liberalism's instrumental approach due to its focus on arbitrary interference 
(Patten, 1998: 808-10). As I argued in the last chapter, unlike liberal citizens 
who value their liberty, and the virtues and values that accompany it, in an 
instrumental manner, republican citizens have a closer, more intimate, 
relationship with the ideals and institutions that support nondomination. In other 
words, the virtues and values of republican liberty as nondomination are 
constitutive of the liberty experienced by republican citizens. Those ideals and 
institutions of the republic are a necessary part of individuals' freedom and their 
lives are enriched as they begin to realise their nondomination. These ideals 
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and institutions embody republican freedom and characterise a distinct mode of 
realising liberty because they constitute an individual's empowerment and 
protection from would be offenders (Pettit, 1997: 108). To that end, then, 
republicans maintain that certain substantive goods must be connected with our 
freedom. These goods, such as civic virtue and republican versions of 
citizenship, come in the form of republican values and virtues that constitute the 
ideals and institutions of the republic. These goods are substantive because 
they enhance the lives of republican citizens by securing them from actual or 
threatened domination. In addition to securing them from domination, these 
ideals and institutions help individuals to cast their own choices and final ends 
into ones that do not dominate others. In subsequent chapters, I will develop 
this idea more thoroughly. However, for the purposes of this chapter, my 
argument is that republican citizens value the ideals and institutions that help 
to constitute their liberty as nondomination as intrinsically valuable non- 
instrumental goods. 
1.2 - republican liberty is not instrumental 
In the last chapter, I argued that republican citizens have a unique 
relationship between their liberty as nondomination and the ideals and 
institutions that support it. On a theoretical level, republican liberty as 
nondomination is accompanied by two interdependent forms of power, reciprocal 
and constitutional. These forms of power are constituent parts that comprise the 
essence of republican liberty and are recognised as such. The reciprocal form 
of power manifests itself in certain values and ideals such as civic virtue and 
citizenship. This form of power carries with it certain substantive benefits that 
mould and condition how individuals exercise their freedom and cast their final 
ends. The reciprocal form of power is supported in a legal and institutional 
manner by the constitutional form of power which may emerge in the form of 
strong laws or a legislative, executive, judicial, or other institution of the 
republican state. It follows that both the reciprocal and constitutional forms of 
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power are constituent components and are necessarily interdependent on one 
another. Without certain substantive goods that accompany the reciprocal 
power of nondomination that inform and track the common good, the ideals and 
institutions of the state will not be able to sustain republican liberty as 
nondomination. On the one hand, civic virtue and citizenship help transmit 
certain substantive values to individuals which help them both realise and 
maintain their republican liberty as nondomination. On the other hand, properly 
constituted laws and institutions - ones which were made by and track the 
interests of the citizenry - are not seen as restrictions of citizens' freedom. 
Instead, taken together, they serve to make up and form their freedom. In other 
words, civic virtue and citizenship, together with properly constituted laws and 
institutions, are interdependent component parts of republican citizens' freedom 
and represent the realisation of nondomination in their lives. Republican 
citizens have a close and intimate relationship with these constituent parts 
because they are their freedom and bring with them certain substantive benefits. 
The nondomination experienced by republican citizens is formed by the 
constituent parts of the overall system of liberty which come in the 
aforementioned reciprocal and constitutional ideals and institutions of the 
republic. Without properly constituted laws and institutions, republican citizens 
are in a state of domination because they are exposed to arbitrary interference. 
For republicans, properly constituted laws and institutions are more than simply 
instrumental to the overall system of nondomination, they are the essence of 
their freedom and area necessary part of it. In other words, they constitute their 
freedom. These ideals and institutions are viewed as the components that 
combine to make republican liberty as nondomination realisable. They do not 
relate to liberty in an instrumental manner in that the adherence to them will 
make it more likely that individuals will fulfill their obligations to justice. 
For many liberals, as I discussed briefly above, individuals have an 
instrumental duty to observe the necessary virtues and values that secure their 
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freedom. In other words, for liberals certain virtues and ideals are essential not 
because they themselves are necessarily valuable, nor is their cultivation an 
intrinsically valuable exercise. Rather, these virtues and ideals, which can come 
in the form of certain rights or duties, are valuable because practising or 
cultivating them will make it more likely that individuals will fulfill their obligations 
of justice. For Kymlicka, liberal institutions like mandatory education are 
examples of instrumental goods because they ensure "that children acquire the 
capacity to envisage alternative ways of life and rationally assess them" 
(Kymlicka, 1996: 87). In other words, these types of institutions are not 
necessarily goods themselves, but rather help to cultivate certain virtues that 
make it more likely that individuals will fulfill their obligations to social justice. 
Republicans, however, do not view institutions or duties in the same manner. 
According to Quentin Skinner, Machiavelli argues that individuals' commitment 
to republican institutions and ideals is not based on a belief that it is their `duty' 
to support or cultivate them. Rather, the commitment to republican ideals and 
institutions represents the only way for individuals `to do well' on their own 
behalf, and the only way to secure republican liberty as nondomination (Skinner, 
1984: 219). Machiavelli argued that living a nondominating life and participating 
actively in the maintenance of republican liberty was more than an instrumental 
obligation, it was something that could bring the individual `glory' (Machiavelli, 
The Discourses, 1965: 509). Therefore, republicans view these ideals and 
institutions as something of value themselves because they are not only the 
guarantor of their personal freedom. They also help to enrich their lives, to `do 
well' as individuals, and may even bring them glory or other honours. 
Additionally, adherence to, and cultivation of, these ideals and institutions helps 
to serve the common good by maximising nondomination and securing 
individuals from arbitrary interference. Put another way, these ideals and 
institutions that help republican citizens cast their own ends into ones that do 
not dominate others not only secure and maintain republican liberty as 
nondomination. They also enable individuals to live a life of glory and 
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experience other goods associated with upholding the principles of republican 
liberty. 
If citizens fail to understand the intrinsic value in the republican ideals 
and institutions that accompany nondomination, liberty may be lost. Individuals 
who do not develop the necessary virtues that accompany liberty as 
nondomination, or ignore its institutional arrangements, will undermine the 
necessary conditions that enable nondomination to be maximised. For 
republicans, when individuals view their freedom as merely a conduit through 
which they can achieve their own narrowly tailored ends, it is likely that 
individuals will seek their own narrow interests and thus interfere arbitrarily in 
the lives of others (Skinner, 1991: 198). For Kymlicka, individuals value their 
liberty because it allows them to choose their own narrowly tailored conceptions 
of the good. The values and virtues associated with their liberty are duties and 
preconditions for social justice, and thus are not necessarily intrinsically 
valuable themselves. However, as I have argued, the same is not necessarily 
true for republicans because the ideals and institutions associated with 
republican liberty as nondomination constitute their liberty. Through the 
reciprocal and constitutional forms of power, distinctive republican ideals and 
institutions not only secure individuals from arbitrary interference, they cultivate 
certain intrinsically valuable ideals that enable individuals to `do well' on their 
own behalf. In the next section, I will argue that despite republicanism's non- 
instrumental conception of liberty, and the virtues and values that support it, 
nondomination is compatible with Kymlicka's belief that individuals must be free 
to revise rationally their conceptions of the good. 
Section 2- Autonomy, Individualism, and Civic Virtue 
Given that Kymlicka views liberty, and the virtues and values that support 
it, as instrumental goods in that they serve as necessary preconditions for social 
justice, it is individuals' capacity to choose those ends that they find valuable 
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which is a primary concern of the liberal state. For Kymlicka, then, an essential 
aspect of being free is individuals' capacity rationally to choose, question, and 
revise their conceptions of the good. In this section, I will argue that republicans 
agree with Kymlicka's contention that an important aspect of liberty is 
individuals' capacity to revise their life choices rationally. Similarly, republicans 
believe that for individuals to be truly in a position to evaluate and question their 
life plans, they must be in a situation where they have the freedom necessary 
to make such judgements. However, as I argued in the last section, republicans 
maintain that it is only by viewing liberty as nondomination, and the ideals and 
institutions that accompany it, as constitutive goods that ensures that individuals 
are in a meaningful position to question and revise rationally their life choices. 
If individuals lose the close and intimate relationship with their liberty and view 
it solely in instrumental terms, they may well create the conditions that 
undermine their liberty which may negatively affect their capacity to revise 
rationally their life choices. The goods that are associated with republican 
liberty as nondomination play an important role in not only the maintenance of 
freedom, they also interact with individuals in a substantive manner that affects 
the choices that they make. In this section, I will further develop this point and 
argue that the virtues and ideals of republican liberty as nondomination are not 
hostile to liberal aims such as autonomy and individuality. Furthermore, I will 
argue that the state must play a central role in the cultivation of these virtues 
and ideals associated with republican liberty. I will first present Kymlicka's 
defence of liberal neutrality as the best way to ensure that individuals have the 
capacity to revise rationally their life choices. I will then argue that 
republicanism can accomplish these same goals in a distinctive and non-neutral 
manner that enhances individuals' liberty by securing for them a distinctive 
republican context for choice. 
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2.1 - Kymlicka's `context for choice' 
In addition to Kymlicka's instrumental view of liberty is his belief that 
individuals should be free from unnecessary external interferences as they seek 
to define and redefine their life plans. Kymlicka does not accept that individuals 
have fixed or unchangeable conceptions of the good (Kymlicka, 1990: 212). As 
individuals' lives change, so will the given circumstances in which they find 
themselves change. Liberal neutrality enables them to go back and question 
their prior judgements. It follows that each individual should have the capacity 
to reflect rationally on her ends and change them if she deems them no longer 
valuable. For its part, the state acknowledges and maintains "a sphere of self- 
determination" that must be respected by others, including itself, so that 
individuals are free from unnecessary interferences which may distort both the 
context in which individuals make choices, and those choices themselves 
(Kymlicka, 1998b: 133; also see Kymlicka, 1990: 200). Kymlicka believes that 
when left to their own devices, individuals will seek to find those things that are 
rewarding given their view of life. They will seek to investigate and compare 
different ways of life while constantly subjecting their choices to vigorous 
revision and questioning. Through this process, individuals are able to judge 
between competing versions of the good life and choose the one that suits them 
the best. Invasive state interference would be harmful to individuals and has the 
potential to take the value and meaning out of their self-determination as they 
seek to find the good life (Kymlicka, 1990: 203-4). Furthermore, intrusive state 
intervention has the potential to threaten the development of autonomy and 
individuality and to distort the context for meaningful choice that is necessary for 
individual agency (Kymlicka, 1998b: 139). For Kymlicka, no authority should be 
allowed such broad control over individuals' life choices. Ultimately, what is 
important is that individuals have the capacity and ability to make their own 
judgements, which in turn enables them to make and revise the necessary 
choices for their life plans free from state interference. In other words, for 
Kymlicka, it is the choosing that is important, not necessarily what is chosen. 
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Republicans also believe that individuals desire liberty to pursue their 
own chosen ends. Machiavelli maintained that different people will wish to 
pursue varying ends and that republican liberty as nondomination provided them 
with the security to do so. In his account of republican liberty we learn that 
some people will wish to pursue honour and power, while others will wish to 
enjoy a life of security and pursue more modest ends (Machiavelli, The 
Discourses, 1965: 204; also see Skinner, 1991: 196). These ends are not 
specified and do not appeal to some singular version of human flourishing. The 
substantive goods that constitute republican liberty secure individuals from 
external or internal threats to their freedom, which allows them to choose, 
question, and pursue their life choices as long as they do not cast their final 
ends in a manner that subjects others to arbitrary interference. Those who live 
under the conditions of republican freedom live their own lives according to the 
values and priorities that they set as long as these are consistent with 
republican liberty. On a wider scale, as a political body, the community will 
pursue those ends that ensure that the conditions of liberty as nondomination 
are maintained and enhanced so that individuals can make and question their 
own choices. Furthermore, as I argued in chapter 2, republican citizens who live 
in a state characterised by the ideal of freedom as nondomination experience 
certain benefits that enhance their ability to make choices and revise their life 
plans. Individuals are freed from the uncertainty and anxiety of any actual or 
threatened interference that does not track their interests. They do not have to 
plan strategically to defend themselves against potential dominators. It follows 
that they experience certain subjective and intersubjective benefits which 
enhance their ability to make choices. As Machiavelli argued, republican 
citizens make their choices knowing that they are safe to live their lives in their 
own manner and they seek the goods that they know they can enjoy 
(Machiavelli, The Discourses, 1965: 332). To this end, republicans believe that 
the institutions of government can be shaped in such a manner to provide the 
necessary security for individuals to pursue and revise their conceptions of the 
good while enhancing their liberty to do so. 
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2.2 - the republican `context for choice' 
In many ways, liberals would endorse such republican moves as long as 
they were instrumental and did not advocate violating liberal neutrality. 
However, as outlined above, republicans believe that inherent within the wider 
theory of nondomination are necessary and intrinsically valuable virtues and 
ideals that accompany liberty as nondomination. Like liberal virtues, these 
virtues can and do aid in the development of the self by exposing individuals to 
different ways of life and alternative dimensions of personal identities (Pettit, 
1997: 257). It is inevitable that as individuals interact with the ideals and 
institutions of the republic they will encounter ideas and values that are 
distinctively republican and may be alien to their way of life. Kymlicka maintains 
that liberal neutrality helps ensure a "free and fair context" for individuals to 
make the necessary judgements associated with rationally revising their life 
choices (Kymlicka, 1998b: 139). Republicanism too, helps to ensure such a 
`context for choice', albeit a distinctively republican one. For republicans, the 
constant action and reaction to life in civil society helps to form an important 
context for choice for those citizens who know themselves to be free from any 
actual or threatened domination. The republican context for choice will regulate 
the availability of some comprehensive moral traditions and may even challenge 
or distort some individuals' final ends. It does this because the wider, and more 
pervasive, role assigned to nondomination makes it impossible for ends that 
dominate to exist within the republican state without being challenged. This 
context for choice is not, however, overtly coercive or determinate, but rather is 
a guarantee to those citizens who know themselves to be free from arbitrary 
interference and have the necessary security to choose, question, and revise 
their life plans within a republican state characterised by liberty as 
nondomination. The republican context for choice serves to regulate and 
educate those citizens who understand their freedom as nondomination. For 
republicans, then, by understanding their liberty as the lack of arbitrary 
interference in their life choices, citizens know themselves to be free to pursue 
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their own ends according to whatever conception of the good they may have in 
light of the regulative nature of nondomination. The republican state will seek 
to ensure that individuals are free from any actual or threatened arbitrary 
interference so that they themselves can decide those things that are valuable, 
and those things that are not, as long as their choices are consistent with others 
enjoying liberty as nondomination. 
In this manner, republicanism is not hostile to the autonomy and 
individuality supported by Kymlicka. Republicans recognise the importance of 
autonomous choice in the development of individuals' various life plans. So 
where do the two approaches differ? For republicans, the key question is not 
whether or not autonomy and individuality are compatible with republican or 
liberal concepts, but rather what role the state should play in cultivating the 
ideals and values that accompany republican liberty as nondomination and why. 
Kymlicka's belief that the state should not publicly rank the intrinsic worth of the 
various conceptions of the good that are found in today's modern polity seems 
to suggest that the state should play no role in an individual's formulation of the 
good, but should play a role in the cultivation of autonomy. Indeed, Kymlicka 
maintains that without violating liberal neutrality, the state plays a central role 
in the development of these capacities and abilities through certain basic civil 
rights. 
For Mill and other liberals, a basic argument for civil rights is that they 
help ensure that individuals can make informed judgements about the 
inherited practices of the community. For example, mandatory education 
ensures that children acquire the capacity to envisage alternative ways 
of life and rationally assess them. Freedom of speech and association 
(including the freedom to proselytize or dissent from church orthodoxy) 
ensures that people can raise questions and seek answers about the 
worth of the different ways of life available to them (Kymlicka, 1996: 87). 
Thus, certain character traits and skills are promoted by the liberal state to 
ensure that individuals have the capacity and ability to revise their life choices. 
Because the state does not publicly rank the choices available to its citizens, it 
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does not violate liberal neutrality. Even though it seeks to instil certain skills and 
traits within the lives of its citizens, Kymlicka maintains that because this effort 
does not publicly rank the various life choices available to its citizens, liberal 
neutrality remains intact. Furthermore, as I will explore in Section 3, Kymlicka 
maintains that this effort must be free from any form of state perfectionism. 
2.3 - the republican 'psychologies' of civic virtue 
As discussed above, republicanism is not hostile to Kymlicka's belief in 
the importance of autonomy and individuality for individuals. However, 
republicanism approaches autonomy in a different manner than liberals that 
violates the type of neutrality endorsed by them because it favours a substantive 
version of civic virtue that places certain demands on individuals that are not 
purely instrumental. Instead, the republican state seeks to regulate the ends 
that individuals value and how they are expressed. To explore this issue further 
and develop a republican ideal of civic virtue that is not hostile to the kind of 
autonomy and individualism supported by Kymlicka, but yet is distinctively non- 
neutral, I will utilise Shelly Burtt's useful typology of the three different 
`psychologies' of civic virtue found in the republican tradition. Burtt maintains 
that there are three related, but yet distinct, republican conceptions of civic 
virtue: the education of desires; the accommodation of interests; and finally the 
compulsion to duty (Burtt, 1990: 23-38). Briefly, the education of desires 
approach is characterised by the attempt of the state to mould and condition the 
private desires of the individuals for public aims. Similarly, the accommodation 
of interests approach finds republicans structuring the institutions of government 
in such a way that the private interests of its citizens are fused with the public 
good. Finally, the compulsion of duty approach finds virtuous citizens serving 
their country "because of a rational understanding that it is their duty to do so" 
(Burtt, 1990: 25-6). 
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Although Burtt divides the psychological sources of civic virtue in the 
republican tradition into three different senses, most useful for my purposes here 
is a combination of the first two approaches as best represented by Machiavelli 
and the English republican theorists? Quentin Skinner has argued that 
Machiavelli believed that republican citizens understand the law in such a way 
that their private interests are channelled in a manner that benefits the public 
good (Skinner, 1983: 10). By educating individuals' desires and by 
accommodating their private interests within the political institutions and 
constitution, republicans strive to regulate individuals' ends in such a way that 
the expression of those ends reflects a robust commitment to civic virtue. Burtt 
argues that Machiavelli believed that a properly constituted republican education 
would instil the necessary virtues in individuals so that they resisted corruption, 
and instead sought goods that supported liberty and the common good (Burtt, 
1990: 28). Machiavelli maintained that if education could not instil any good in 
the citizens, the republic risked falling into corruption (Machiavelli, The 
Discourses, 1965: 496). Machiavelli believed that individuals had to be taught 
certain substantive values, such as prudenza (prudence), animo (courage), 
temperantia (temperance), which would help them secure and maintain 
republican liberty by informing and channelling their narrow self-interest 
(Machiavelli, The Discourses, 1965: 290-294). Thus, for Machiavelli, civic virtue 
had to be cultivated actively so that individuals would identify their own good 
with that of the republic. This would serve to keep corruption at bay by ensuring 
that individuals' narrow private interests did not take priority. 
Furthermore, as Burtt informs us, the writers of Cato's Letters believed 
that citizens were capable of fusing their interests with that of the public good 
'Although Burtt classifies Machiavelli with a tradition associated solely with the 
education of desires approach, I understand Machiavelli's account to be closer 
to that of Quentin Skinner. Skinner maintains that Machiavelli promotes a 
combination of the accommodation of interest approach and the education of the 
desires approach. See Burtt (1990) p. 26, fn 9 for further discussion on this 
point. 
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because they saw the connection between the protection of their liberty and the 
promotion of a politics based on the common good. For these writers, personal 
liberty is secured and enhanced when citizens understand their common fates 
with one another, and thus their private interests find expression in a way that 
promotes civic virtue (Burtt, 1990: 37). For Burtt, Harrington's Oceana 
demonstrates that if constitutions are constructed in an appropriate manner, 
individuals' common interests will have priority over narrowly tailored private 
interests (Harrington, 1992: 172). Harrington advocates a political structure that 
serves to channel the various private interests of those found within the 
community so that they play off one another and become `public' in nature once 
they are exposed to the political (Harrington, 1992: 416; also see Burtt, 1990: 
26). In other words, Harrington believed that individuals' private interests had 
to be exposed publicly and then channelled so that they cancelled one another 
out or at least led to a more legitimate balance of power. This type of thought 
demonstrates that the republican state must play an active role in channelling 
an individual's private, and sometimes, narrow interests into something that is 
more collective and aimed at a wider audience through its distinctive institutions. 
Similarly, Machiavelli believed that unless properly constituted, republican 
institutions would fall into the hands of those who sought to promote their own 
narrowly tailored private ends above those of the common good. An example 
of this is Machiavelli's belief that when Florence was faced with divisive factions 
and conflict, instead of using the public institutions to secure the common good 
for all, individuals sought to promote their own private interests at the expense 
of other individuals' liberty (Machiavelli, The History of Florence, 1965: 1145- 
1148, esp. 1146). 
Thus, by combining the two senses of Burtt's typology, republicans 
understand and accept that individuals have narrowly tailored private ends that 
are important and valuable to them. Moreover, as argued above, republicans 
understand that individuals will wish to pursue those ends that they themselves 
decide are important and valuable. However, without an active effort to shape 
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these ends and properly constituted republican institutions for them to manifest 
themselves, individuals will pursue their own narrowly tailored ends without 
deference to what is best for the community, which may put liberty at risk. By 
creating public structures that allow individuals to express their own self-interest 
without subjecting others to arbitrary interference, republican ideals seek to 
regulate the way in which individuals' private interests manifests themselves by 
moulding and conditioning those ends. Furthermore, republican forms of civic 
virtue and citizenship help to cultivate and shape individuals' desires in a 
particular republican fashion so that they value and express their ends in a 
manner that does not dominate others. It follows that republican forms of civic 
virtue and citizenship, when combined with distinctive republican institutions, 
help individuals to acquire the necessary skills that must accompany republican 
liberty as nondomination. Moreover, the cultivation of these skills and character 
traits is not instrumental in the creation or maintenance of social justice like in 
the liberal approach. They help form the essential component parts that 
constitute the freedom experienced by republican citizens and are intrinsically 
valuable because they help individuals live better lives that do not dominate 
others. 
Many liberals, including Kymlicka, will object to the regulation of 
individuals' life plans in this way because it requires the public ranking of the 
intrinsic worth of individuals' conceptions of the good by the state. Republicans 
seek to regulate the ends that people value, whereas liberals seek to regulate 
simply how individuals behave in expressing their ends. Liberals, like Kymlicka, 
do not seek to go beyond that distinction. However, republicans do because not 
only will leading a nondominating life enhance individuals' overall position to 
pursue their chosen goals, certain valuable goods are available to them that will 
enhance their life. Thus, some individuals' life plans will be more successful 
than others in upholding the principles of nondomination. Those life plans that 
subject others to arbitrary interference will be challenged by the republican state 
in two important ways. In the first way, a dominator will be forced to account for 
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their domination and may face the sanctions of the state if they do not cease to 
interfere arbitrarily with others. Like the liberal approach, the republican state 
will regulate how individuals act and insist that they abide by the principles that 
govern social justice. In the second way, the republican state will seek to 
interact and inform individuals' conceptions of the good so that they not only 
develop an ability to cast their ends in a nondominating manner, but they also 
have the opportunity to enrich their lives and attain certain goods that can make 
their lives better. Where liberals distinguish between an individual qua citizen 
and qua individual, republicans make no similar distinction. 
Without a determined effort by the republican state to create suitable 
institutions and to instil a rich sense of civic virtue in the lives of the citizenry, 
individuals, when pursuing their own narrowly tailored self-interest, may not 
recognise the necessary wider commitment that they must have in order to cast 
their life choices into ones that do not dominate others. These institutions, when 
combined with a robust account of civic virtue and citizenship, help individuals 
find a way in which they can publicly express those things that they have chosen 
for themselves without interfering arbitrarily with others. Moreover, in doing so, 
their lives are enriched. Thus, republican institutions cultivate specific forms of 
civic virtue and citizenship which seek to inform and shape the private interests 
of the citizenry. The republican state, through its institutions, seeks to 
accommodate the private interests that individuals express in a manner that 
channels it into the common good. In this manner, civic virtue, citizenship, and 
republican laws and institutions combine to help citizens formulate a politics of 
the common good that contains within it their own narrowly tailored needs and 
desires that can be revised in ways that are consistent with republican liberty as 
nondomination. Based on the principles of non-domination, republican ideals 
help to secure the necessary conditions of republican liberty for individuals so 
that they can successfully choose their own life choices free from any arbitrary 
interference. When combined with republican liberty as nondomination, civic 
virtue becomes more than the ability to place the common good above that of 
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individuals' own narrowly tailored self- interest. Civic virtue becomes the ability 
of individuals to cast their own ends in manner that does not subject others to 
arbitrary interference. In direct confrontation with liberal neutrality, then, 
republicanism believes that the state must necessarily play a distinctive 
regulative role in the lives of individuals as they develop and use their autonomy 
to revise their life choices. This regulation goes beyond how individuals act, and 
instead seeks to affect what they value. In later chapters, I will explore further 
how republican liberty as nondomination regulates the choices available to 
individuals without restricting their liberty, and the resulting distinctive version 
of civic virtue. 
The republican state abandons liberal neutrality in favour of substantive 
values and ideals that constitute the liberty experienced by republican citizens. 
In the section above, I have argued that although republicanism does violate 
liberal neutrality, liberals have good reasons to accept this approach because 
it is not hostile to autonomy and individuality, nor does it prevent or deny 
individuals the ability to revise their life choices rationally. Instead, republican 
institutions and the civic virtue and citizenship that support them, regulate and 
channel the private desires of citizens in a manner that secures society as a 
whole from arbitrary interference and enhances individuals' lives. It does so 
through distinctive and substantive ideals that regulate individuals' final ends in 
a manner that is consistent with the maximisation of liberty as nondomination. 
However, liberals will still object to the republican project because it contains 
elements of state perfectionism. In the next section, I will explore this objection 
and develop a republican account of state perfectionism that liberals have good 
reasons to endorse. 
Section 3- Social or State Perfectionism? 
Thus far, I have argued that the republican project characterised by 
liberty as nondomination is not instrumental in its ideals or approach, and 
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violates liberal neutrality because it regulates the available life choices available 
to individuals by publicly ranking the intrinsic value of conceptions of the good. 
It does so through distinctive and substantive ideals and institutions that seek 
to instil republican versions of civic virtue and citizenship in the lives of 
individuals so that they can recast their final ends into ones that do not subject 
others to domination. In this manner, then, the state plays a more active and 
substantial role in the lives of its citizens than in Kymlicka's liberal approach. 
This type of state interference does not, however, curtail the liberty enjoyed by 
republican citizens because republicans believe that any interference that tracks 
their interests is not arbitrary, and thus does not dominate them. Closely related 
to Kymlicka's objection to the public ranking of values is his belief that any 
approach that abandons state neutrality raises the spectre of state 
perfectionism. This section will explore this objection and develop an account 
of state perfectionism that does not undermine the liberal approach. 
3.1 - against state perfectionism 
As discussed above, in addition to the instrumental approach and the 
liberal context for autonomous choice which keeps the state from unnecessarily 
interfering in individuals' capacity to revise their life choices, Kymlicka maintains 
that the liberal state must be free from any elements of state perfectionism. For 
Kymlicka, state perfectionism favours some life choices over others by publicly 
ranking their intrinsic value. In other words, state perfectionism promotes 
certain choices available to liberal citizens over others which potentially may 
threaten the development of autonomy and individuality and restrict liberty. 
The state should be neutral amongst conceptions of the good, in the 
sense that it should not justify its legislation by appeal to some ranking 
of the intrinsic worth of particular conceptions of the good. The role of 
the state is to protect the capacity for individuals to judge for themselves 
the worth of different conceptions of the good life, and to provide a fair 
distribution of rights and resources to enable people to pursue their 
conception of the good (Kymlicka, 1998b: 133). 
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Thus, in being neutral, the liberal state does not publicly rank the intrinsic value 
of the choices that individuals make, but instead relies on a vibrant cultural 
marketplace where individuals can choose, question, and revise the choices that 
they have made. A vibrant cultural marketplace will ensure that a liberal society 
has a rich and diverse culture that provides the necessary options for 
meaningful and rewarding self-determination for its citizens. For Kymlicka, any 
state which actively intervenes in the cultural marketplace to encourage or 
discourage any particular conception of the good irreparably damages the 
capacity for true self-determination (Kymlicka, 1990: 217). 
However, this is not to say that perfectionist values do not have an 
important role in the cultural marketplace. Kymlicka argues that the choice is 
not between perfectionism and neutrality, but rather between social 
perfectionism and state perfectionism. The cultural marketplace, which for 
Kymlicka should be free from state perfectionism, will be saturated with social 
perfectionism. Individuals will be able to determine for themselves how they 
rank the intrinsic value of each of the conceptions of the good in the cultural 
marketplace and choose, question, or revise their choices. Kymlicka has faith 
in the cultural marketplace to create and maintain the social conditions 
necessary for individuals to judge, choose, and revise their life plans according 
to their own preferences (Kymlicka, 1990: 219). In this manner the survival of 
different ways of life will depend on their relative merits or failures as judged by 
rational and autonomous individuals, rather than by the state. It is only within 
such a system of liberal state neutrality that individuals can evaluate fairly, and 
without undue state coercion, the various life plans available to them. For 
Kymlicka, perfectionist ideals are important, but are better situated in the realm 
of civil society free from any state coercion (Kymlicka, 1990: 219). In other 
words, the state is an inappropriate forum for the sort of genuinely shared 
deliberation and commitments necessary for the reflective capacities of 
individuals to flourish, because it represents a coercive apparatus with immense 
authority and the capacity to force the public ranking of values of different ways 
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of life on unwilling or unsuspecting individuals. State perfectionism will "serve 
to distort the free evaluation of ways of life, to rigidify the dominant ways of life, 
whatever their intrinsic merits, and to unfairly exclude the values and aspirations 
of marginalised and disadvantaged groups within the community" (Kymlicka, 
1992: 178-9). 
In the presence of state perfectionism and the public ranking of values, 
individuals may be forced against their will to defend publicly the various 
choices that they make as they seek to formulate their life plans. Kymlicka's 
objection centres on his belief that state perfectionism may require individuals 
to acquire the skills and rhetoric necessary to articulate positions which are 
often deeply personal and sometimes controversial given prevailing public 
sentiments. If people failed to account for their choices publicly, Kymlicka 
maintains that they may be subject to state action which may force them to 
abandon their chosen ends against their will. In other words, to be compelled 
to defend certain ways of life may force unwilling individuals out of their chosen 
paths and into ones that have no real value to them (Kymlicka, 1992: 179). 
Thus, Kymlicka believes that many valuable ways of life may be limited severely 
which has the potential to lead to a tyranny of the majority as some life styles are 
eliminated because individuals either cannot or will not defend them publicly. 
This "dictatorship of the articulate", as Kymlicka calls it, inherently discriminates 
against those who are inarticulate or come from backgrounds that do not value 
the publication of their own conceptions of the good. This could be true 
especially given today's pluralistic society where many different social groups 
are either not understood by the majority or are denied appropriate forums in 
which to articulate fully their positions. This would stifle open and free 
evaluation of various life choices and reinforce the position of dominant ways of 
conceiving the good (Kymlicka, 1992: 179). 
Another objection Kymlicka has to the public ranking of the value of 
different forms of life is that disadvantaged groups may have to change 
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fundamentally their way of life as they seek to explain certain cultural 
understandings that may be in conflict with some views held by the state. They 
would have to explain themselves using a language and discourse that may be 
alien to them and any adjustment that they make to be intelligible may force 
them to shift their way of life in a manner to which they object (Kymlicka, 1992: 
180). This type of state hegemony would make it difficult for many of today's 
diverse groups to survive if they did not adopt some, or all, of the conceptions 
of the good put forth by state perfectionism and the public ranking of values 
forced on them by the coercive apparatus of the state. However, Kymlicka 
admits that these threats may also take place in a cultural marketplace free from 
state interference. "Insensitivity and prejudice will be problems no matter which 
model we choose, since both models reward those groups who can make their 
way of life attractive to the mainstream" (Kymlicka, 1992: 180). Kymlicka 
maintains that the state's power will likely complicate interactions in the 
marketplace because it will be in a dominant position to choose the forums and 
timing for any minority view to be aired. 
In his view, the neutral liberal state gives culturally diverse groups more 
latitude when it comes to promoting or defending their life plans in the cultural 
marketplace. A cultural marketplace free from state coercion will allow minority 
groups to select the forum and time that suits their way of life best when they 
seek to engage others. Importantly, Kymlicka's position on state perfectionism 
in the cultural marketplace does not maintain that the state should be absent 
completely from the cultural marketplace. For Kymlicka, the state has a 
responsibility to interfere in the cultural marketplace to counteract any biases 
against minority views, especially when doing so redresses any historical or 
social bias (Kymlicka, 1992: 181). Furthermore, the state has a positive duty "to 
protect the cultural conditions which allow for autonomous choice" among 
diverse groups. This positive duty does not mean that the state abandons 
liberal neutrality, in fact, quite the opposite. In seeking to protect culturally 
diverse groups, the state is enforcing its neutrality by not forcing them to accept 
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dominant viewpoints. It does so because the over-riding goal of the state is to 
ensure that the conditions exist for meaningful autonomous choices which occur 
within a marketplace that is free from any state coercion through perfectionism 
or the public ranking of values (Kymlicka, 1992: 183). 
As mentioned above, in many ways, republican liberty as nondomination 
has perfectionist qualities that would seem to violate liberal neutrality. At its 
most basic, perfectionism begins with a prior ideal of human excellence. It 
follows that it is the responsibility of a perfectionist state to promote that ideal 
so its citizens are assisted in their endeavours as they seek this excellence. For 
some, autonomy or eudaimonia are forms of excellence that are representative 
of perfectionists views. Indeed, some liberals, for example, Joseph Raz, believe 
that it is the responsibility of the state to "create morally valuable opportunities, 
and to eliminate repugnant ones" as it promotes autonomous choice (Raz, 1986: 
417). The state, then, abandons any claim to neutrality and promotes those 
ideals and values that reflect a certain belief in what is valuable and what is not. 
However, for other liberals, like Rawls, human perfection should be pursued by 
individuals using their basic liberties to their own ends without any undue 
coercion from the state (Rawls, 1971: 328-9). 
3.2 - republican state perfectionism 
As for republicanism's perfectionism, earlier I discussed how republican 
liberty as nondomination manifests itself in the lives of individuals in two 
interdependent forms of power, reciprocal and constitutional. Inherent within 
these forms, which serve to protect and secure individuals from any actual or 
threatened arbitrary interference, are ideals and values that may challenge or 
distort some individuals' final ends. On the one hand, the reciprocal form of 
power relies on the realisation that agents can defend themselves against any 
form of domination because they realise that they too can act to interfere 
arbitrarily with others, and vice versa (Pettit, 1997: 67). Within the reciprocal 
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form of power, individuals can exercise their capacity for autonomous choice 
and choose those ends with which they identify while realising that others have 
the right and capacity to do the same. They understand that their commitment 
to republican liberty as nondomination means that those ends that they choose 
must not be cast in a manner that interferes arbitrarily with others. In other 
words, the common knowledge that they are on equal footing with others affects 
how they cast their ends. Individuals' final ends are chosen and pursued 
according to their own conceptions of the good under the realisation that these 
ends must be cast in a manner that does not subject others to domination. 
Furthermore, republican citizens recognise that casting their ends in this manner 
is connected to the realisation of other goods as well. As I argued earlier, the 
republican state cultivates certain intrinsically valuable goods that enables 
individuals to `do well' on their own behalf (Skinner, 1984: 219). For Machiavelli, 
actively participating in the maintenance of republican liberty as nondomination 
was something that could bring individuals `glory' and respect (Machiavelli, The 
Discourses, 1965: 509). As I argued above, Machiavelli believed that 
individuals had to be taught certain substantive values, such as prudence, 
courage, temperance, which would help them secure and maintain republican 
liberty by formulating their life plans in ways which do not subject others to 
domination (Machiavelli, The Discourses, 1965: 290-294). Nevertheless, 
individuals' ends remain open to rational revision within the scope of republican 
liberty for them to choose, question, and revise. 
From a legal and institutional standpoint, the constitutional power of 
republican liberty seeks to promote the ideals of nondomination and secure the 
agent against any arbitrary interference. Once again, the state plays an active 
role in interfering in the lives of individuals by promoting certain perfectionist 
values that regulate individuals' ends. In many ways, however, these elements 
are not wholly perfectionist in that while they do require individuals to attain 
certain substantive values and virtues, like the ones discussed above, they also 
secure them from any actual or threatened arbitrary interference and thus 
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enhance the choices available to them. Therefore, at most they can be said to 
be quasi-perfectionist because they secure a vast range of final ends which are 
consistent with republican liberty that individuals can pursue while securing 
them from any interference that does not track their interests. Within 
republicanism, being a nondominator, that is, being an individual who can cast 
her ends in a manner that does not interfere arbitrarily with others, is valuable 
and individuals have good reasons to pursue it. For republicans, individuals 
should not pursue solely nondominating ends in order to fulfill their obligations 
to social justice. Rather, they should pursue these ends because their lives will 
be enriched and the full range of benefits that accompany republican liberty as 
nondomination will be available to them to utilise. Upholding the values and 
virtues associated with republican liberty as nondomination and abiding by its 
legal and institutional framework will free individuals from any actual or 
threatened arbitrary interference which will enhance their position to make their 
own informed decisions. Each of these benefits increases the range of options 
open to republican citizens because their liberty is more secure and they have 
an improved subjective and intersubjective status. Furthermore, as Machiavelli 
argued, the successful cultivation of republican versions of civic virtue and 
citizenship not only made the citizenry more secure in their freedom, it also 
made republics increase in wealth and opportunity (Machiavelli, The Discourses, 
1965: 329). It follows, then, that those elements that appear perfectionist within 
republican thought are not as strict as some perfectionist accounts in that a wide 
range of final ends is available to individuals as long as those final ends cannot 
be said to dominate others. They secure a vast range of permissible final ends 
for individuals to pursue while maintaining the necessary commitment to 
republican liberty as nondomination. 
Where Kymlicka's approach limits the state's role in the cultural 
marketplace to one of maintenance and promotion of instrumental values, the 
republican approach requires the state to interfere in the available life choices 
within the cultural marketplace in a distinctive manner. Thus, the key difference 
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between the liberal and republican approach is not over whether or not the state 
will play some type of regulative role in the lives of individuals because in both 
approaches the state does play a regulative role. What separates the two 
approaches is the scope of that role. The liberal state regulates the cultural 
marketplace in two main ways to ensure that individuals and groups are treated 
fairly and that justice prevails. In the first way, the liberal state relies on social 
perfectionism between individuals and groups. Within the liberal cultural 
marketplace, the relative success of life choices will in large part depend on 
whether or not they are rewarding and attractive to individuals and can attract 
and sustain adherents. In the second way, liberals believe that the state should 
play a limited and instrumental role in regulating the cultural marketplace. This 
role does not endorse actively any conception of the good, nor does it tell 
individuals what to value. Instead, the state regulates the behaviour and actions 
of individuals to ensure that they fulfill their obligations to social justice. 
The republican state by contrast seeks to interfere, albeit nonarbitrarily, 
with individuals' choices in both of these areas by first, promoting certain 
substantive ideals and values that constitute individuals' understanding of the 
reciprocal power of nondomination, and second by regulating the available life 
choices through the constitutional power of nondomination in the cultural 
marketplace by challenging values and ways of life that are not consistent with 
republican liberty because they interfere with others arbitrarily. At the heart of 
these differences is republicanism's alternative conception of liberty as 
nondomination which holds that interference which tracks individuals' interests 
does not restrict their freedom. Therefore, through its perfectionism and the 
public ranking of values, the republican state abandons state neutrality without 
restricting the liberty enjoyed by its citizens. The republican state seeks to 
interfere, albeit nonarbitrarily, in individuals' conception of the good because 
doing so enhances their position to pursue their own choices and maximises 
nondomination. Moreover, as nondomination is maximised, individuals receive 
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certain substantive benefits which enrich their lives and allow them greater 
liberty to pursue their goals. 
3.3 - Kymlicka's objections 
But what of Kymlicka's objections that this type of state interference may 
negatively affect some individuals and groups. The first of these objections 
centres around Kymlicka's belief that state perfectionism may force some 
individuals to defend the various choices that they make publicly as they seek 
to formulate their life plans. This may force these individuals to acquire the 
skills and rhetoric necessary to articulate deeply held, and sometimes 
controversial, positions. Kymlicka's fear is that by forcing people to account 
publicly for their life choices they may be subject to state action which may force 
them to abandon their chosen ends against their will (Kymlicka, 1992: 179). 
Thus, some valuable life styles may be eliminated because individuals either 
cannot or will not defend them publicly. Kymlicka is especially concerned about 
the effects this type of state perfectionism may have on today's multicultural and 
pluralistic society where many different social groups are either not understood 
by the majority or are denied appropriate forums in which to articulate fully their 
positions (Kymlicka, 1992: 179). The second of Kymlicka's objections, and 
related to his first, centres around his belief that state perfectionism and the 
public ranking of the value of different forms of life may force disadvantaged 
groups to change fundamentally their way of life as they seek to explain and 
account for certain cultural understandings that may be in conflict with some 
views held by the state or other dominant forces within the cultural marketplace. 
To do this, Kymlicka fears that these individuals and groups may have to explain 
themselves using a language and discourse that may be alien to them, and any 
adjustment that they make to be intelligible may force them to shift their way of 
life in a manner in which they object. For Kymlicka, "there would be an 
inevitable tendency for minorities to describe and debate conceptions of the 
good in terms of dominant values, which then reinforces the cultural 
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conservatism of the dominant group itself' (Kymlicka, 1992: 180). Such 
interference by the state, for Kymlicka, would make it difficult for many of today's 
diverse groups to survive if they did not adopt some, or all, of the conceptions 
of the good put forth by state perfectionism and the public ranking of values 
forced on them by the coercive apparatus of the state. 
In many ways, Kymlicka's concerns are well placed. However, for 
republicans, his solution is undesirable because it would fundamentally 
undermine republican liberty as nondomination. Kymlicka believes that minority 
and other traditionally disadvantaged groups should not be forced to account for 
their way of life to the state or others. Instead, they should be armed with the 
principles of social justice, protected in an instrumental fashion from would be 
interferers, and then allowed to pursue their conception of the good free from 
state coercion. However, cultivating and instilling instrumental values like 
autonomy and individuality that make it more likely that they will fulfill their 
obligations to social justice may fundamentally undermine their way of life and, 
thus, their conception of the good. For some, the principles of autonomy and 
individuality are incompatible with their chosen way of life and practising them 
qua citizen is undesirable, if not impossible. Asking these individuals and 
groups to fulfill their obligations to social justice will inevitably affect their 
conception of the good, especially if their conception of the good is incompatible 
with liberal principles. As they fulfill their obligations to social justice, they are 
asked by the liberal state to attain, and abide by, certain values and ideals, 
albeit instrumental ones. The effects on minorities or traditionally 
disadvantaged individuals or groups that prompted Kymlicka's concerns remain 
in a system characterised by liberal neutrality. When fulfilling their obligations 
to social justice, these individuals and groups will nevertheless have to embrace 
values and ideals that may be incompatible with their chosen conception of the 
good and way of life. They may be forced to adopt an identity qua citizen that 
fundamentally undermines their identity qua individual. If they suspect that they 
have been treated unfairly in the cultural marketplace they may have to embrace 
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alien values when representing their demands or grievances to the state. 
Republicans believe that Kymlicka's concerns are genuine and that every care 
must be taken to minimise any potential negative affects on minorities and other 
traditionally disadvantaged individuals and groups. However, the state must be 
able to communicate on some level with these individuals and groups through 
its ideals and institutions so that their interests can be accounted for and 
tracked. 
The republican state must take seriously claims by minority and other 
traditionally disadvantaged groups and must seek to find a common ground 
upon which to communicate. However, if these groups or individuals are to reap 
the benefits of republican liberty as nondomination and be secure to pursue their 
chosen way of life, they must make an effort to be heard in a way that allows the 
state and others to track their interests. Likewise, the republican state must be 
able to listen and register these demands in a manner that respects individuals' 
or groups' method of communication. For republican liberty to secure 
individuals and groups from the domination of others, they must be willing to 
articulate and register just what their interests are so that they can be tracked 
by the state and others. If individuals and groups do not let others and the state 
know what their interests are, how can their interests be tracked and responded 
to appropriately without subjecting themselves to domination? To this end, fair 
and open access to republican institutions and a common language of 
citizenship and civic virtue helps to ensure that individuals and groups are not 
subjected to arbitrary interference, whether it comes from other individuals orthe 
state itself. For the state and others to track the interests of all citizens, there 
must be a sufficient amount of virtue and participation in the forums of the state 
to register accurately just what those interests are (Pettit, 1998: 87). In other 
words, without a rich sense of republican civic virtue and properly constituted 
republican institutions, the maintenance of republican liberty as nondomination 
is imperiled. The necessary virtues that make up the republican version of 
citizenship help individuals articulate their own interests to the state and to 
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others who must account for and track them if they are to live truly 
nondominated lives. Republican citizenship helps to provide a common 
discourse for individuals to voice clearly and accurately their concerns and 
demands so that the state and others can register their interests and respond 
appropriately. 
By promoting civic virtue and access to a common language of 
citizenship, the republican state prepares citizens to play the necessary active 
role in their own nondomination. To ensure that all individuals and groups have 
a fair and just opportunity to register accurately their interests to others, the 
state will seek aggressively to ensure that minorities and other traditionally 
disadvantaged individuals and groups are secured from the arbitrary 
interference of others and itself. Republicans understand that today's 
multicultural and diverse society will contain individuals and groups who hold 
minority or controversial conceptions of the good, and it will seek actively to 
secure these citizens from arbitrary interference. However, republicans also 
believe that these conflicting conceptions of the good exist within a marketplace 
that must resolve disputes and conflict in a conversational method (Skinner, 
1996: 15-6; also see Pettit, 1997: 189). To this end, republican versions of 
citizenship promote the necessary substantive virtues that help individuals not 
to dominate others, which means that they must learn to account for and track 
the interests of their fellow citizens so that they can respond appropriately to 
their demands without dominating them. They must learn to listen and to 
attempt to understand why these individuals and/or groups have different values 
from themselves, just as others must learn to listen and attempt to understand 
their own viewpoints. 
In subsequent chapters, I will defend this position more thoroughly, but for 
our present purposes my argument is that the republican state will seek 
aggressively to end the domination of all of its citizens, especially when certain 
citizens have been traditionally discriminated against. Furthermore, if my 
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argument is correct, because republican liberty as nondomination has tools that 
are not available to those liberal approaches characterised by neutrality, the 
republican state will be in a better position than Kymlicka's liberal approach to 
secure and protect these individuals and groups from arbitrary interference, 
which makes it more likely that their ways of life will flourish under 
republicanism. The benefits that accompany republican liberty as 
nondomination will enhance the position of minorities and other traditionally 
disadvantaged groups so that they can live their lives free from any interference 
that does not track their interests. They will be freed from any uncertainty or 
anxiety that they may experience from any actual or threatened interference that 
does not track their interests. Likewise, they will not have to plan strategically 
to defend themselves from arbitrary interference. Importantly, they will also 
have an improved subjective and intersubjective status. They will know that it 
is common knowledge that they are on equal footing with others and will feel 
confident in their position. They not only have the reciprocal power of 
nondomination on their side, they have an aggressive and strong constitutional 
power that protects their liberty from an institutional and legal standpoint to 
ensure that any interference they encounter tracks their interests. 
To be sure, the republican state will confront those individuals or groups 
whose expression of their life choices or conceptions of the good causes the 
domination of others. The state's constitutional provisions will ask these 
individuals and groups to account for their domination, and may force sanctions 
on them if they do not recast their ends in a nondominating manner. To avoid 
the sanctions of the state, or possible retaliation from those they seek to 
dominate, individuals and groups must learn to account for and track the 
interests of others so that they can respond appropriately without dominating 
them. Once again, the substantive elements of republican citizenship and the 
virtues that accompany it help individuals and groups to do this. Not 
surprisingly, like the liberal approach, some conceptions of the good will fare 
better than others in a state characterised by republican liberty as 
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nondomination. However, it is only those moral doctrines that seek to dominate 
others who will be confronted by the state. Certain conceptions of the good that 
fundamentally seek to deny justice and liberty to others must be challenged 
aggressively by the republican state. By subjecting all life choices to evaluation 
and exploration, the republican state seeks to ensure that domination is 
minimised and that individuals and groups are free from any interference that 
does not track their interests. 
Furthermore, in most cases, this process will not subject minority or other 
traditionally disadvantaged individuals or groups to unfair scrutiny by the state, 
but rather will serve to secure and protect them from more dominant viewpoints 
that do not track their interests. Those groups who hold more mainstream or 
prevailing conceptions of the good will also find their practices subject to 
scrutiny to ensure that they do not interfere arbitrarily in the lives of others, 
especially minority viewpoints. If they cast their ends in a manner that interferes 
arbitrarily with others, these individuals and groups will be challenged by the 
republican state as it protects those who are vulnerable to domination. Kymlicka 
is right to argue that this type of state perfectionism may eliminate or distort 
severely some individuals' and groups' final ends. However, if the republican 
state eliminates certain viewpoints that are so rooted in the domination of others 
that to change how they are cast would undermine fundamentally their viability, 
then so be it. The republican state must protect its citizens, especially the most 
vulnerable, from any actual or threatened arbitrary interference. If such 
lifestyles were allowed to flourish in the cultural marketplace and cause the 
domination of others, the multiculturalism and diversity found in today's modern 
polity would be at great risk. Republicanism seeks to challenge and root out 
dominating conceptions of the good in a more robust manner than liberalism. 
This is not to say that liberals will ignore certain individuals and groups who do 
not abide by the principles of justice. Kymlicka argues that without violating 
liberal neutrality, the state must intervene in the cultural marketplace to eliminate 
bias and other forms of discrimination (Kymlicka, 1992: 181). However, where 
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state intervention in a system characterised by liberal neutrality stops at 
regulating how individuals and groups behave, the republican state continues 
by challenging how individuals or groups cast their ends. If they cast their ends 
in a manner that subjects others to any real or threatened domination, they will 
be aggressively confronted. 
While Kymlicka argues that the intervention by a state characterised by 
liberal neutrality is necessary to ensure that the cultural marketplace is free from 
bias and discrimination, he argues that any other regulation must take place 
below the level of the state. In other words, the state must playa minimal, albeit 
important, role in maintaining the viability of the cultural marketplace. The state 
makes no value judgements on the beliefs held in the cultural marketplace. 
Kymlicka maintains that individual autonomy is best promoted when judgements 
about different life plans are removed from any political influence from the state. 
According to Kymlicka, these "opportunities for collective inquiry simple occur 
within and between groups and associations below the level of the state - 
friends and family..., churches, cultural associations, professional groups and 
trade unions, universities, and the mass media" (Kymlicka, 1990: 220-1). 
Ultimately, for Kymlicka, liberal "neutrality requires a certain faith in the 
operation of non-state forums and processes for individual judgements and 
cultural developments and a distrust of the operation of state forums for 
evaluating the good. " Although he admits that nothing he has said "shows that 
this optimism and distrust are warranted, " he still maintains that the cultural 
marketplace must remain free from unnecessary state intervention because the 
state itself may suppress freedom, which in turn may deny individuals and 
groups the opportunity to choose, question and revise their life plans (Kymlicka, 
1990: 222). Kymlicka believes that before the state is brought into the cultural 
marketplace, the forums of civil society for non-political debate should be 
improved to ensure that all groups have real equality and free access to the 
marketplace. According to Kymlicka, "culture which supports self-determination 
requires a mix of both exposure and connection to existing practices, and also 
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distance and dissent from them. Liberal neutrality may provide that mix but it is 
not obviously true.... " (Kymlicka, 1990: 223). My contention is that Kymlicka's 
faith in the operation of non-state forums and processes and his scepticism 
about state interference is misplaced because it weakens the ability of the state 
to intervene meaningfully in the cultural marketplace. I believe that the 
republican approach that I have defended in this chapter provides the necessary 
mix he desires in a more vigorous and robust manner than an approach which 
remains neutral. Without sacrificing key liberal aims, republican liberty as 
nondomination secures individuals and groups from arbitrary interference 
through its distinctive and substantive ideals and institutions. Individuals are 
free to revise their conceptions of the good rationally while being protected from 
any actual or threatened arbitrary interference from others. 
Conclusion 
In each of the three areas discussed above which characterise Kymlicka's 
liberal neutrality, the republican approach that I have proposed is non-neutral. 
First, republican liberty as nondomination, and the ideals and institutions that 
accompany it, cannot be said to be instrumental. Instead, republican forms of 
civic virtue and citizenship, when combined with properly constituted republican 
institutions constitute the liberty experienced by republican citizens. They are 
intrinsically valuable and are a necessary part of individuals' freedom. Second, 
the republican state plays a distinctive regulative role in the lives of individuals 
as they develop and use their autonomy to revise their life choices. Those 
conceptions of the good that interfere arbitrarily with others or require the 
domination of others will be confronted by the republican state. To this end, 
liberal neutrality is abandoned in favour of substantive values and ideals that 
constitute the liberty experienced by republican citizens. Finally, the republican 
approach that I have put forward is characterised by certain quasi-perfectionists 
features that mould and condition the way in which individuals express their own 
chosen conception of the good. By promoting those values and virtues that help 
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individuals to cast their ends in a manner that does not subject others to 
arbitrary interference, republican liberty as nondomination abandons the kind 
of neutrality favoured by comprehensive liberals. 
Kymlicka is right to suggest that liberals and republicans should be allies 
in confronting the many problems facing the modern polity. However, if these 
approaches are indeed to be allies, Kymlicka must embrace a more substantive 
approach that abandons liberal neutrality. However, my argument is that 
Kymlicka has good reasons to embrace the republican approach that I have 
presented because it is not hostile to autonomy and individuality, nor does it 
prevent or deny individuals the ability rationally to revise their life choices. 
Instead, republican institutions and the civic virtue and citizenship that support 
them, regulate and channel the private desires of citizens in a manner that 
secures society as a whole from arbitrary interference. It does so through 
distinctive and substantive ideals that regulate individuals' final ends in a 
manner that is consistent with the maximisation of liberty as nondomination. My 
argument is that the republican approach outlined above is more successful 
than the liberal approach characterised by neutrality in confronting the difficult 
issues experienced by the modern polity. In the next chapter, I will further 
explore this conception of republicanism to see if the same can be said when 
compared with the political approach of John Rawls. 
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Chapter 4- Without Regret: The Comprehensive Nature 
of Nondomination 
A striking feature of John Rawls' political liberalism is his surprising contention 
that his theory of `justice as fairness as a form of political liberalism' is 
compatible with classical republicanism (Rawls, 1993: 205). Rawls is careful, 
however, to draw a firm line between republicanism and what he calls civic 
humanism. For Rawls, civic humanism is that strain of thought often associated 
with forms of Aristotelianism which maintains that individuals are social or 
political beings whose essence is only fully realised in democratic societies that 
have widespread political participation. This participation in the democratic 
process is seen by Rawls as a form of the good life itself and is thus a 
comprehensive moral doctrine (Rawls, 1993: 206). This is not true, however, of 
his view of classical republicanism which he takes "to be the view that if the 
citizens of a democratic society are to preserve their liberties which secure the 
freedoms of private life, they must also have to a sufficient degree the `political 
virtues' (as I have called them) and be willing to take part in public life" (Rawls, 
1993: 205). Rawls believes that because republicanism does not presuppose 
any partially or wholly comprehensive philosophical, religious, or moral doctrine 
then it is not in `fundamental opposition' to political liberalism. 
This chapter seeks to challenge Rawls' contention that there is no 
fundamental opposition between political liberalism and republicanism. 
Furthermore, by exploring the differences between Rawls' approach and that of 
republicanism, this chapter argues that republicanism does presuppose certain 
comprehensive values which support republican liberty as nondomination 
without being classed as the sort of civic humanism which Rawls derides. 
Furthermore, if republicans were to restrict their approach only to the political, 
as does Rawls, liberty as nondomination could not be realised. In order to 
demonstrate that the two approaches are incompatible, I have divided this 
chapter into two sections. In section 1,1 briefly outline Rawls' project and his 
conception of republicanism. In section 1, I also broadly outline a liberal critique 
of Rawls' approach to highlight my overall strategy. Section 2 is divided into five 
sub-sections, each focussing in detail on crucial points in my argument against 
Rawls' claim. In sub-section 2.1, I explore how the republican conception of 
liberty differs from Rawls' in that it presupposes certain comprehensive values 
and virtues. In sub-section 2.2, I develop a substantive theory of republicanism 
that relies on certain inherently valuable ideals and institutions that constitute 
the liberty experienced by republican citizens. In sub-section 2.3, I argue that 
republican liberty as nondomination regulates the permissible ends available to 
individuals without restricting their liberty. It does so by securing individuals 
from arbitrary interference. Sub-section 2.4 examines how republicanism 
recognises the close and intimate relationship between the right and the good. 
Finally, in sub-section 2.5, I argue that republican liberty as nondomination 
differs from Rawls' political liberalism because it is not neutral in its aims. The 
gist of my argument is that in each of these five areas, republicans have good 
reason to stand back from Rawls' political project and instead develop their own 
account of how the modern polity can respond to the challenges facing it in a 
distinctively republican manner. 
Section 1- Political Liberalism 
1.1 -a `political' theory of justice 
In Political Liberalism, Rawls attempts to move away from a conception 
of justice that relies on any wholly or partially comprehensive moral or 
philosophical doctrines. Instead he argues for a theory of justice that is more 
limited in scope and is freestanding "starting from the fundamental ideas of a 
democratic society and presupposing no particular wider doctrine" (Rawls, 1993: 
40). In making this move, Rawls attempts to strengthen the stability of his theory 
of justice in the face of many incompatible conceptions of the good (Muthall and 
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Swift, 1996: 175). The three distinguishing features of a political conception of 
justice for Rawls are 
that it is framed to apply solely to the basic structure of society, its main 
political, social, and economic institutions as a unified scheme of social 
cooperation; that it is presented independently of any wider 
comprehensive religious or philosophical doctrine; and that it is 
elaborated in terms of fundamental ideas viewed as implicit in the public 
political culture of a democratic society (Rawls, 1993: 223). 
Thus, the scope of the political conception of justice must be general and limited 
in nature. It must not seek to affirm or rely on any comprehensive doctrines 
which fall outside of the `political'. Furthermore, the political conception of 
justice must be founded on ideas that are embedded within the political culture 
of the modern democratic polity. Rawls argues that once the political conception 
of justice is widely shared it can help obtain an `overlapping consensus' which 
it can then be embedded within. Rawls' attempt to recast his earlier work is 
based on three important assumptions about the political culture of modern 
democratic society. Firstly, Rawls maintains the "diversity of reasonable 
comprehensive religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines" is a permanent 
feature of today's democratic culture (Rawls, 1993: 36). This `fact of reasonable 
pluralism' leads us to Rawls' second assumption that "a continuing shared 
understanding on one comprehensive religious, philosophical, or moral doctrine 
can be maintained only by the oppressive use of state power" (Rawls, 1993: 37). 
Finally, since no one reasonable comprehensive doctrine can be affirmed by all 
citizens, the theory of justice affirmed by today's democratic society must be 
limited to what Rawls calls "the domain of the political" and the values that 
support it (Rawls, 1993: 38). The upshot of Rawls' project is an effort to 
construct a theory of justice that is free from any reliance on reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines so that today's democratic society, which is 
characterised by a `fact of reasonable pluralism', can be stable and secure 
justice. The benefit of this move, according to Rawls, is that by recognising that 
there are many reasonable, but yet incompatible, comprehensive doctrines 
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present in today's democratic society, and constructing a theory of justice that 
is free from any reliance on any comprehensive doctrines, individuals will be 
able to affirm a more limited and freestanding conception of justice that, as 
outlined above, only applies to the basic structure of society. 
In unpacking Rawls' approach, several key points emerge that have a 
crucial bearing on my argument in this chapter. The first point concerns what 
Rawls means when he speaks of a comprehensive doctrine. As I discussed 
earlier, for Rawls, "a doctrine is fully comprehensive when it covers all 
recognized values and virtues within one rather precisely articulated scheme of 
thought; whereas a doctrine is only partially comprehensive when it comprises 
certain (but not all) nonpolitical values and virtues and is rather loosely 
articulated" (Rawls, 1993: 175). Thus religious, moral, and philosophical 
doctrines are comprehensive when they inform and permeate the ideas and 
values of either the whole or part of an individual's life. The next important point 
Rawls makes is in qualifying the type of individual in which he is interested as 
one that is `reasonable'. For Rawls, persons can be said to be reasonable 
"when, among equals, they are ready to propose principles and standards as fair 
terms of cooperation and to abide by them willingly, given the assurance that 
others will likewise do so" (Rawls, 1993: 49). Furthermore, for Rawls, "the 
reasonable is an element of the idea of society as a system of fair cooperation 
and that its fair terms be reasonable for all to accept is part of its idea of 
reciprocity" (Rawls, 1993: 49-50). It follows, for Rawls, that reasonable 
individuals must also be prepared "to recognize the burdens of judgement and 
to accept their consequences for the use of public reason in directing the 
legitimate exercise of political power in a constitutional regime" (Rawls, 1993: 
54). Thus reasonable individuals will have a political identity that embraces the 
`political' principles of justice, and a nonpolitical identity that affirms some 
religious, moral or philosophical comprehensive doctrine. Accepting the 
burdens of judgement and the ideals which govern the idea of public reason, 
these individuals will interact in the political sphere qua citizens. These 
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individuals recognise the 'fact of reasonable pluralism' and accept that others 
may hold different, but equally legitimate, comprehensive doctrines. 
Broady speaking, Rawls' argument thus far is that, given the fact of 
reasonable pluralism, in fundamental issues concerning justice and in matters 
affecting the basic structure of society, reasonable individuals who have 
accepted the idea of public reason and embraced the burdens of judgement, will 
affirm a `political' theory of justice which is embedded within the public political 
culture of democratic society. This `overlapping consensus', as Rawls calls it, 
helps to ensure that the polity remains stable because the political conception 
of justice does not affirm any comprehensive religious, philosophical, or moral 
doctrine. It follows, then, that reasonable individuals will bracket off their 
nonpolitical comprehensive doctrines when engaging in 'political' issues 
because any reliance on those doctrines would be tantamount to giving them 
priority over other reasonable comprehensive doctrines. Thus individuals 
embrace one set of values qua citizen and may embrace another set of values 
qua individual. On the one hand, in individuals' nonpolitical lives, they are free 
to follow their own religious, philosophical, or moral comprehensive doctrines 
and these inform and guide this part of their lives (Rawls, 1993: 215). On the 
other hand, because these individuals are reasonable and accept the 
requirements of public reason and the burdens of judgement, they can embrace 
a set of `political virtues' which are for the most part instrumental in nature and 
aimed at supporting only "a political conception of justice for the main institutions 
of political and social life, [and] not for the whole of life" (Rawls, 1993: 175). In 
other words, for Rawls, the justification of the use of political power must be in 
terms that uphold the idea of public reason. It follows that individuals must 
engage in the political domain as citizens who have bracketed off their 
comprehensive identities. 
For Rawls, within a reasonable political conception of justice, ideas of the 
good must be political in nature and "... are, or can be, shared by citizens 
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regarded as free and equal; and... do not presuppose any particular fully (or 
partially) comprehensive doctrine" (Rawls, 1993: 176). It follows that within 
Rawls' approach, in debates about issues of fundamental justice and in matters 
concerning the basic structure of society, the right is prior to the good (Rawls, 
1993: 173). Thus, within political liberalism, reasonable individuals only bring 
their `political' persona to bear on fundamental issues that deal with justice and 
concern the basic structure of society. The use of political power is limited and 
narrow in scope so that it can only be directed at fundamental questions of 
justice, and not at validating or legitimating any single reasonable 
comprehensive doctrine or version of the good (Rawls, 1993: 60). Rawls' 
approach, then, put simply, is a freestanding approach derived from ideas 
implicit in the public culture of a democratic society. It asks individuals to lay 
aside their comprehensive claims when it comes to matters of fundamental 
justice and instead embrace a reasonable non-comprehensive 'political' 
approach. Any claim made by the state will be based on a limited, or political, 
doctrine and not on ideals whose origins and legitimacy are dependent on any 
partially or wholly comprehensive doctrine. For the most part, as outlined 
above, individuals in Rawls' political state are asked to bracket off their own 
comprehensive moral doctrines when they enter the political sphere. ' Thus, in 
order to secure justice as fairness, the structures and institutions of the state are 
governed and informed by the non-comprehensive political values and ideals of 
political liberalism. 
'According to Rawls' proviso, which he calls the "wide view of public reason, " 
individuals may also bring in their own reasonable comprehensive claims to the 
public sphere "provided that in due course public reasons, given by a reasonable 
political conception, are presented sufficient to support whatever the 
comprehensive doctrines are introduced to support" (Rawls, 1996: li-Iii) Thus, 
Rawls believes that reasonable individuals should make every effort to embrace 
public reasoning based on political ideals. However, comprehensive ideals may 
be introduced insofar as they are backed up by political ideals and, at some 
point, these ideals begin to merge with political values. 
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Not surprisingly, Rawls' project is not as straightforward as it seems at 
first glance and it has been the focus of much criticism. It is not my intention to 
go into these critiques in painstaking detail. Instead I want to focus on Rawls' 
claims about republicanism and criticise him from that vantage point. To that 
end, I will not question in depth the viability of Rawls' shift to the political except 
where it has a direct bearing on my argument. Before proceeding, though, I will 
outline briefly the general case against Rawls' shift to the political because this 
critique's strategy is similar to my own. I will then take up my argument 
beginning with Rawls' conceptualisation of republicanism. 
1.2 -a general critique of Rawls' move to the political 
Although there is much within Rawls' political liberalism to criticise, the 
general direction of these critiques centres on one broad point: as he presents 
it, Rawls cannot completely remove the nonpolitical comprehensive elements 
from his `political' conception of justice. Indeed, Rawls himself admits as much, 
albeit with `regret' (Rawls, 1993: 200). The upshot of this critique is that Rawls' 
purely `political' conception of justice is unattainable as he presents it. An 
example of this general critique is found in Eamonn Callen's recent work where 
he suggests that the political virtues that support the fair terms of cooperation 
in the idea of public reason have the effect of bringing "autonomy through the 
back door of political liberalism" (Callen, 1997: 40). Callen's argument is that the 
active acceptance of the burdens of judgement will necessitate the attainment 
of certain reflective skills and character traits that will require agents to assess 
critically certain conceptions of the good which lie outside of the basic structure 
of society. For Callen, "future citizens must be taught to think in particular ways 
about doctrines that properly lie outside the scope of public reason: they must 
become critically attuned to the wide range of reasonable political disagreement 
within the society they inhabit and to the troubling gap between reasonable 
agreement and the whole moral truth" (Callen, 1997: 40). In other words, in 
securing active agreement on the fair terms of cooperation, and in accepting the 
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burdens of judgement and the associated understanding of reciprocity, agents' 
nonpolitical beliefs will either intentionally or unintentionally be affected in a 
profound manner by the state. The mere acceptance of the burdens of 
judgement in agents' political lives will affect their view of the good in their 
nonpolitical lives. In accepting the burdens of judgement individuals must also 
accept a particular version of autonomy which cannot be separated from their 
nonpolitical beliefs. To accept Rawls' burdens of judgement "enjoins us to be 
ethically autonomous to a substantial degree and, given the requirement of 
reciprocity, to respect the autonomy of others when we cooperate politically with 
them" (Callen, 1997: 40). Moreover, for Callen, the benefits of Rawls' argument 
have profound, and welcome results for individuals faced with the fact of 
reasonable pluralism (Callen, 1997: 41-51). These benefits concern individuals' 
ability to develop the virtues associated with autonomy such as critical reflection, 
mutual respect, and toleration. In other words, Callen maintains that under his 
version of liberal civic education, individuals are exposed to certain (partially) 
comprehensive goods that have a profound and beneficial effect on their 
nonpolitical lives. 
However, Rawls' defence against the type of argument put forth by Callen 
is remarkably straightforward. For Rawls, the restricted scope and generality of 
political liberalism means that its ideals and virtues can be separated out from 
other, more comprehensive, doctrines without undermining its primary goals 
(Rawls, 1993: 200). This is because even though the political virtues might, in 
some cases, contain certain substantive ideals that appear to be very close to 
the comprehensive ideals of autonomy and individuality, the restricted area in 
which they operate means that they do not come into conflict with individuals' 
reasonable comprehensive doctrines. Thus, for Rawls, the necessary virtues 
and skills required to help form the fair terms of cooperation and support the 
burdens of judgement are political in nature and restricted in scope so that they 
do not offend against reasonable comprehensive doctrines. In essence, then, 
it is a standoff between Rawls and critics like Callen. However, as I will argue, 
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there is no standoff between republicans and Rawls. I will argue that adopting 
Rawls' `political' limits would fundamentally undermine the republican project. 
Callen is certainly not Rawls' only critic, but the general shape of his 
critique is helpful to the presentation of my argument because it shows the 
general strategy that it will take. Furthermore, Callen's argument demonstrates 
that there are potential benefits to individuals when the state promotes or affirms 
certain comprehensive goods. For Callen, these goods come in the form of a 
partially comprehensive doctrine of ethical autonomy that affects the whole of 
individuals' lives (Callen, 1997: 41). I will argue that if Rawls wants to separate 
completely the political from the comprehensive, a republican state 
characterised by liberty as nondomination cannot support that move, especially 
if, as mentioned above, it is done with regret. 
1.3 - Rawls' republicanism 
Instead of regretting the potential effects that the political virtues might 
have on an individual's reasonable comprehensive doctrine, as Rawls does, 
republicans would not only welcome these effects, but would actively promote 
them. In other words, far from regretting the impact that the political virtues 
might have on an individual's conception of the good, republicans who support 
the ideal of liberty as nondomination would see this impact as good in that it 
helps cultivate a certain type of citizen. However, this is not true of Rawls' view 
of republicanism. In attempting to support and sustain his project, Rawls asserts 
that justice as fairness interpreted as a political doctrine is not in fundamental 
opposition to republicanism. For Rawls, republicanism, as opposed to civic 
humanism, is not based on any wholly or partially comprehensive doctrines and 
is thus available to be utilised within political liberalism. Moreover, Rawls' 
conceptualisation of republicanism is less straightforward than it appears at first 
glance. 
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Acknowledging the role played by Machiavelli in influencing republican 
thought, Rawls also names Alexis de Tocqueville as another republican 
exemplar (Rawls, 1993: 205, fn 37; de Tocqueville, A., 1969). Rawls maintains 
that a central feature of republicanism is the claim that a society that wishes to 
be free needs a widespread commitment to participate in democratic processes 
by an active and informed populace. Rawls stresses that unless a citizenry is 
prepared actively to engage one another in the political arena, then the political 
institutions will fall into the hands of those who seek "to impose their will" on 
others and thus liberty would be lost (Rawls, 1993: 205). Although Rawls 
invokes Tocqueville as a more appropriate representative of republican thought 
than Machiavelli, implicit in his reading of republicanism are ideals and values 
that read very much like the approach I outlined and defended in part 1 of the 
thesis. Therefore, based on what Rawls writes in the text (and not what he 
implies in the footnote) I take his account to be essentially neo-Roman. 2 Rawls' 
description of republicanism is neo-Roman in the same way that the conception 
of republicanism that I explicated in part 1 of the thesis is distinct from the type 
of civic humanism he derides. Rawls' conception of republicanism ties the 
2Tocqueville's thought is often used by writers in contrasting ways. Bellah, for 
example, evokes Tocqueville to illustrate the civic humanist foundations of 
American mores while Macedo takes Tocqueville to be a liberal (Bellah, 1985; 
Macedo, 1988). Most recently, it is interesting to note that one of Rawls' 
fiercest critics Michael Sandel has also evoked an essentially Tocquevillian 
republicanism in his latest work Democracy's Discontent (Sandel, 1996). 
Sandel's complaint is that the primacy of, and attention to, a Rawlsian system 
of rights has left America's public philosophy bereft of the reflective and critical 
capacities necessary for individuals in today's modern polity to flourish (Sandel, 
1996: 4). As I outlined in earlier parts of the thesis, Sandel's solution is to invoke 
a neo-Athenian version of republicanism that he believes influenced the 
American founders who espoused a theory of self-government and active 
participation. These ideals were central to the maintenance of liberty so that 
citizens have the necessary environment or community in which to maximize the 
exploration of their true selves and to flourish as political animals. This neo- 
Athenian inspired doctrine not only requires that citizens are taught and 
encouraged to play active public roles, but also maintains that the government 
must sacrifice any claims to neutrality among competing ideas of the good. It 
thus fits more closely with Rawls' definition of civic humanism. (Sandel, 1996: 
5-6). 
152 
maintenance of liberty to the existence of certain virtues and ideals exhibited by 
an informed and active citizenry who willingly take part in public life, which in 
turn prevents those who wish "to dominate and impose their will on others" from 
doing so. Rawls' adoption of the language of nondomination is telling in that he 
implicitly acknowledges that the neo-Roman republicans held an alternative 
conception of freedom. In the next section, I will explore Rawls' claim in detail 
and demonstrate that if republicans were to adopt Rawls' restricted political 
approach, the ideal of liberty as nondomination would be undermined. 
Section 2- Fundamental Opposition? 
The central argument of this chapter is that if Rawls maintains that justice 
as fairness is a purely political conception, he cannot hold that there is no 
fundamental opposition between his approach and republicanism. In other 
words, my argument is that republicanism cannot be reduced to political 
liberalism without undermining its alternative conception of liberty. Therefore, 
I maintain that republicans should resist any effort to join up with Rawls' political 
project. The values and ideals that support the republican approach, as I argue 
below, are not only substantive in nature, they purposely affect individuals in 
their nonpolitical lives and thus are at least partially comprehensive. In seeking 
to support my claim that republicanism is not reducible to political liberalism, I 
will advance my argument in five sub-sections. The first sub-section will 
compare and contrast Rawls' conception of liberty with the conception of liberty 
as nondomination developed in chapter 2. From this alternative conception of 
liberty, sub-section 2 will explore how the ideals and institutions that support 
republican liberty as nondomination are not instrumental in nature, but rather are 
constitutive of the liberty experienced by republican citizens. In sub-section 3, 
explore the regulative nature of republican liberty as nondomination and its 
relationship with the ideals and values that support republican versions of 
citizenship and civic virtue. In sub-section 4, I will argue that republicans 
recognise that the right and the good are more than just complementary; that 
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they are deeply related, inseparable, and interdependent. Because the values 
and virtues that support republican liberty as nondomination reflect the 
interdependent, close, and more intimate relationship between the right and the 
good, they are accordingly more substantive and will affect individuals' 
reasonable comprehensive doctrines. Finally, in sub-section 5I argue that 
republican liberty as nondomination is not a value neutral approach and is thus 
incompatible with Rawls' contention that his political project reflects a neutrality 
of aim. Republicanism cannot be said to be neutral in its aim because it 
regulates individuals' final ends in a distinctive republican manner that reflects 
its greater commitment to securing the conditions of nondomination for its 
citizens. 
2.1- republican liberty as nondomination: a distinct conception of freedom 
As I argued earlier, it is my belief that Machiavelli's approach, and 
subsequent approaches influenced by him, offer a compelling account of liberty 
that shares many of the same goals as contemporary liberalism. This approach 
seeks to explore alternative conceptions of liberty and asserts that liberty should 
be conceived of as the absence of arbitrary interference or domination (Pettit, 
1997; Skinner, 1997). By briefly reviewing the republican conception of liberty 
set out earlier, I will build and expand on the substantive differences between 
the republican and Rawlsian conceptions of liberty. Supporters of the 
republican conception of liberty suggest that the traditional liberal benchmark 
of freedom as the lack of interference is fatally flawed and is one of the root 
causes for much of today's disillusionment with the liberal idea (Skinner, 1992: 
215). Within republican thought, individuals are free to the extent that they are 
free to act without being exposed to any actual or threatened arbitrary 
interference from another. For republicans, then, individuals are free to the 
extent that they are not subject to the mastery of another. That is, they are free 
to the extent that they are not subject to any interference, or threat of 
interference, that does not track their own arbitrium (Pettit, 1998: 84). 
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In comparison, Rawls virtually accepts in toto Gerald MacCallum's useful 
definition of freedom as a triadic concept discussed in chapter two (Rawls, 1971: 
202). MacCallum states, "freedom is thus always of something (an agent or 
agents), from something, to do, not do, become, or not become something; it is 
a triadic relation" (MacCallum, 1991: 102, emphasis in original). Rawls goes on 
to add that "persons are at liberty to do something when they are free from 
certain constraints either to do it or not to do it and when their doing it or not 
doing it is protected from interference by other persons" (Rawls, 1971: 202) He 
does, however, allow that certain interferences or limits are inevitable and even 
necessary to ensure the primacy of the basic liberties. Of primary concern for 
Rawls is the total system of liberty and how each of the basic liberties fits 
together to form a complete system of freedom. The restrictions allowed in 
Rawls' conception of liberty are, therefore, judged on how, taken together, they 
uphold the total system of basic liberties consistent with the two principles of 
justice (Rawls, 1971: 203; Rawls, 1993: 294-9). 3 Thus, for Rawls, "the best 
arrangement of the several liberties depends upon the totality of limitations to 
which they are subject, upon how they hang together in the whole scheme by 
which they are defined" (Rawls, 1971: 203). 
Rawls goes on to suggest that the evaluation of legitimate interference 
is controlled by the reasonable ordering of preferences that emerges from the 
two principles of justice. The primacy of the basic liberties of individuals means 
that certain other liberties could be restricted or regulated when doing so 
enhances the total system of liberty. Put simply, then, for Rawls, liberty can 
only be restricted for liberty's sake (Rawls, 1971: 201-5; Rawls, 1993: 294-9). 
Individuals in the original position must decide reasonably which liberties to 
3Following an objection by H. L. A. Hart, Rawls has modified his earlier position 
regarding the primacy of equal liberty to read as the primacy of the basic 
liberties. For our purposes here, however, this clarification does not alter the 
fundamental point of how and why Rawls would restrict liberty. For further 
discussion, see Rawls (1993: 289-371) and Hart (1978: 551-55). For 
commentary on this point see Kukathas and Pettit (1990: 130-1). 
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restrict in order to ensure that individuals have a coherent and complete set of 
basic liberties so that they can live their lives without undue interference (Rawls, 
1971: 250). For Rawls, the point is to maximise individual liberty by minimising 
any unjust interferences in the pursuit of an individual's own ends (Skinner, 
1992: 213). While Rawls is quick to point out that liberty can be restricted, he 
is also very careful to point out that it can only be limited when one of the basic 
liberties is at risk, "and never... for reasons of public good or of perfectionist 
values" (Rawls, 1993: 295). Citing the necessary use of rules of order in the 
regulation of free speech as an example, Rawls suggests that the regulation of 
some of the basic liberties actually will have the effect of enhancing the total 
system of liberty (Rawls, 1993: 295-6). What is central for Rawls here is how 
the basic liberties fit together to form a complete and just system of liberty that 
protects a core area of an individual's activity. Each of these basic liberties can 
be, when necessary, regulated or restricted in such a manner that when 
combined with the other basic liberties, a more complete system of total liberty 
emerges. Moreover, as mentioned above, the basic liberties are regulated or 
restricted not for the public good nor for perfectionist goals, but only to ensure 
that a complete and total system of equal liberty can be secured for every 
individual. 
So how does Rawls' conception of liberty differ from the republican 
conception? Indeed, at first glance, the contrast between Rawls' approach and 
that of republicanism appears to be slight. To be sure, the two approaches 
would agree that individuals who are subjected to both domination and 
interference have unnecessary restrictions on their liberty and therefore cannot 
be said to be free. They would also agree that those who are not subjected to 
any domination or interference can be said to be free. However, Pettit argues 
that republicanism and liberalism diverge over how they each view those 
subjects who are dominated, but not subject to any interference, and those who 
are interfered with but not subjected to any domination (Pettit, 1997: 21-7). In 
the first case of divergence, as I argued in the first part of the thesis, for 
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republicans any degree of dependency, or even the threat of dependency, on 
others or on institutions amounts to an arbitrary restriction of liberty. An 
individual who does not experience any arbitrary interference but is still in a 
position of subservience to another is not considered to be free. Furthermore, 
for republicans, whether or not individuals actually experience any arbitrary 
interference, if there is the threat of arbitrary interference, freedom is considered 
to be restricted. In this case, then, the mere vulnerability to having liberty 
restricted is considered to be domination (Patten, 1998: 808-9). In the second 
case of divergence, republicans view any interference that tracks individuals' 
common interests and ideals as not only being consistent with their liberty, but 
as enhancing it as well (Pettit, 1998: 84). This interference cannot be said to be 
arbitrary - it is not something that denies individuals' interests or desires with 
impunity - but rather it considers what their interests actually are and responds 
appropriately. 
However, it is not clear that Rawls would accept Pettit's claims of 
divergence. Indeed, Pettit, when drawing this conclusion, seems to use an 
overly strict characterisation of liberalism's zeal to guard the individual from any 
interferences. As I outlined above, Rawls does not wholly accept the strict 
interpretation of liberty as non-interference. To be sure, he argues that while 
individuals should be free from any unnecessary interferences, some regulations 
or restrictions on the basic liberties are necessary and even serve to strengthen 
and enhance the total system of liberty. Likewise, republicans argue that 
interferences that are not arbitrary and track the interests of the citizenry have 
a similar effect of enhancing the total system of liberty. Furthermore, republican 
conceptions of liberty are, like Rawls' conception, essentially negative in nature, 
albeit with a significant difference. The two approaches, however, differ in two 
important respects. In the first respect, the two approaches differ in what they 
consider to be the primary measure of freedom, which, for republicans, is not the 
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absence of interference as such, but rather the absence of mastery. 4 In the 
words of Pettit, "it requires something other than the absence of interference. 
It requires the absence of dependency upon the will of another and the absence 
of vulnerability to interference at the will of that other: it requires the absence of 
mastery or domination by any other" (Pettit, 1998: 84). Unlike some strict liberal 
negative conceptions of liberty, republican liberty acknowledges that certain 
forms of interference are not necessarily wholly restrictive of an individual's 
freedom when a total system of liberty is in place. In many ways, for 
republicans, it is these very `interferences' that protect and enhance liberty. 
The difference lies in the fact that under Rawls' system, these 
interferences are viewed as regulations or restrictions that serve to enhance the 
total system of liberty. Whereas, for republicans, these interferences, which are 
not arbitrary, do not have a similar causal sequence like that of Rawls' approach 
where a restriction here may yield an enhancement there. In other words, there 
is no one step back, two steps forward. That is, under a system characterised 
by republican liberty as nondomination, interferences which are nonarbitrary are 
not viewed as being restrictions or regulations in the same sense as they are in 
Rawls' approach. I will discuss this point more fully in the next section, but my 
argument here is that the two approaches have different measures of freedom, 
which supports my contention that they have different conceptions of liberty. 
Furthermore, because these two accounts have different conceptions of liberty, 
they have different underlying values and ideals: and this has a profound effect 
on their overall respective approaches. 
As I outlined above, Rawls maintains that liberty can never be restricted 
for "reasons of public good or of perfectionist values" (Rawls, 1993: 295). 
However, as I argued in earlier chapters, republicans believe that 
nondomination has two interdependent forms of power, one reciprocal and one 
4For a further discussion of republican liberty as a negative form of freedom see 
Skinner (1984). 
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constitutional, that protect and enhance individuals' freedom. Within these two 
forms of power are important distinctions that further separate the republican 
approach from that of Rawls. I will summarise this argument briefly so that I can 
contrast it further with Rawls' approach. Taken together, nondomination's 
reciprocal and constitutional forms of power constitute a resilient core of 
protection that not only allows individuals to determine which nondominating 
ends they will pursue, but also frees them from the inevitable uncertainty, 
anxiety and fear of subordination that they may experience as they constantly 
act and react against those who seek to interfere arbitrarily with them (Pettit, 
1997: 83-90). In addition, the resilient core of republican liberty as 
nondomination places citizens on an equal footing and gives them certain 
subjective and intersubjective benefits that are both defensive and offensive in 
nature. They are defensive because agents realise that they too can defend 
themselves and act to interfere arbitrarily with others. These benefits are 
offensive because an improved subjective and intersubjective status also affects 
the way in which individuals cast their final ends in a manner that does not 
interfere arbitrarily with others. The offensive benefits of the reciprocal power 
of nondomination help to cultivate not only an ideal type of citizen, but an ideal 
type of individual. These substantive benefits are actively promoted from a legal 
and institutional standpoint by the constitutional power of nondomination and 
purposely affect individuals' nonpolitical lives. Through the ideals and 
institutions of the state, republican liberty as nondomination affirms an 
individual's capacity to pursue her own objectives within the larger scheme of 
nondomination which is not solely limited to the political realm. Such 
pervasiveness cannot be the case in Rawls' political liberalism because such 
moves are expressly forbidden. 
Rawls' approach is aimed firmly at only interacting and influencing that 
part of an individual's life that is carried out in the political realm. Rawls does 
not want to affirm and actively promote a set of nonpolitical comprehensive 
values. However, republicanism does. In these two respects, the differences 
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that emerge from the liberal and republican conceptions of liberty necessarily 
render the two accounts incompatible. Within the republican conception of 
liberty as nondomination, there is no restriction or regulation of liberty for 
liberty's sake. Such causal sequences are unnecessary. At a deeper and more 
fundamental level, both the reciprocal and constitutional forms of power of 
republican liberty as nondomination actively cultivate certain ideal types of 
individuals who cast their ends in a nondominating fashion, and all without 
regret. The next sub-section will build on the distinctions between the two 
approaches' conceptions of liberty outlined above by exploring the constitutive 
nature of republican ideals and institutions. 
2.2 - republican liberty is more than a `political good' 
The republican conception of liberty differs from that of Rawls in that the 
primary measure of freedom is not the degree to which individuals are free from 
interference, but rather the extent to which individuals are free from any actual 
or threatened arbitrary interference. As discussed in the last chapter, some 
liberals, including Rawls, maintain that there is no fundamental opposition 
between republicanism and liberalism because both of their accounts of liberty 
are instrumental in nature. For Rawls, in many ways, political institutions and 
ideals, including forms of citizenship and civic virtue, are not necessarily goods 
in themselves, but rather are "purely instrumental to individual or associational 
ends" and as such are "at best a means to individual or associational good" 
(Rawls, 1993: 201). However, he also maintains that these political institutions 
and ideals can be defended as goods, as long as they are defended as `political' 
goods and not justified as such by reference to comprehensive doctrines (Rawls, 
1993: 203). It is in this manner that Rawls maintains that republicanism is not 
in fundamental opposition to his political project. Because both conceptions of 
liberty are held to be essentially negative in nature, the thought is that for the 
most part the republican commitment to civic virtue and public service is 
instrumental to the ends that individuals pursue. Even so, for Rawls, these 
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instrumental goods can be defended as goods themselves as long as they are 
restricted suitably to the political. 
However, as I argued earlier, republicans believe that liberty as 
nondomination, unlike Rawls' conception of liberty, contains within it ideals and 
institutions that are intrinsically valuable and that constitute the liberty 
experienced by republican citizens. In other words, the values of civic virtue and 
republican citizenship and certain properly constituted republican institutions are 
goods themselves which have far reaching consequences for an individual's 
nonpolitical life. One obvious reply that Rawls has to my claims is that the type 
of republicanism that I am defending is the type of republicanism which he 
associates with civic humanism (Rawls, 1993: 205-6). However, as I have 
argued earlier, I believe that this is not the case and that the republicanism that 
I defend is the type that Rawls believes to be compatible with his political 
project. In this sub-section, I will build on the distinction between republicanism 
and political liberalism offered above and further develop the idea that the ideals 
and institutions that support liberty as nondomination affect an individual's 
nonpolitical life and are not inspired by civic humanism. I will also argue that 
they are not instrumental to the realisation of Rawlsian negative liberty, but 
instead constitute the freedom enjoyed by republican citizens and regulate the 
availability of potential life choices. 
Rawls takes civic humanism to be a form of Aristotelianism that holds that 
individuals are social, or political, animals "whose essential nature is most fully 
realised in a democratic society in which there is widespread and vigorous 
participation in political life" (Rawls, 1993: 206). For Rawls, civic humanism so 
understood has all of the defects of what Constant referred to as the liberty of 
the ancients and is thus a non-political comprehensive doctrine. As we saw 
earlier, Michael Sandel accepts the general thrust of Rawls' definition of civic 
humanism and maintains that central to republican theory "is the idea that liberty 
depends on sharing in self-government" (Sandel, 1996: 5). For Sandel, self- 
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government is the only type of political system that can sustain the necessary 
resources for "the moral energies of a vital democratic life" (Sandel, 1996: 24). 
Thus, for both Rawls and Sandel, liberty in the civic humanist strain of 
republicanism is related to self-government by definition. In other words, 
freedom cannot be defined without specific reference to democratic self- 
government. However, the same cannot be said of republican liberty as 
nondomination. According to Pettit, the necessary ideals and institutions that 
accompany republican liberty as nondomination do not define the liberty they 
confer (Pettit, 1998: 86). Unlike the liberty outlined in Rawls' reading of civic 
humanism, republican liberty is not defined by reference to any specific 
institution like that of democratic self-government. Put another way, there is no 
specific requirement that republican freedom can only be realised with reference 
to particular institutions present in the state such as democratic self-government 
(Pettit, 1998: 86). Republican liberty as nondomination can only be defined by 
reference to how well individuals are protected from arbitrary interference. 
Instead, the ideals and institutions that accompany republican liberty as 
nondomination constitute the liberty experienced by republican citizens. They 
do not relate to liberty in the same instrumental manner that characterises 
Rawls' approach. For republicans, properly constituted laws and institutions - 
laws and institutions which are made by and track the interests of those they 
govern - are more than simply of instrumental value to the overall system of 
nondomination. In other words, these ideals and institutions which accompany 
republican liberty as nondomination are the essence of individuals' freedom and 
are a necessary part of it. The interference that republican citizens experience 
due to the presence of these ideals and institutions is not viewed as a restriction 
or regulation of their freedom because this interference is not arbitrary. There 
is no need to restrict or regulate some liberty here to enhance liberty over there. 
According to Pettit, "the nondomination as such precedes such causal 
sequences. It comes into existence simultaneously with the appearance of the 
appropriate institutions; it represents the reality of those institutions in the 
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person of the individual" (Pettit, 1997: 107). 5 In other words, civic virtue and 
citizenship, together with properly constituted laws and institutions, are 
component parts of republican citizens' freedom and represent the realisation 
of nondomination in their lives. Republican citizens have a close and intimate 
relationship with these constituent parts because they are their freedom and 
bring with them certain substantive benefits. These benefits cannot be limited 
only to the political realm in the way that Rawls wants them to be. Moreover, 
republicans do not believe that they should be. 
The subjective and intersubjective benefits that citizens realise under a 
system characterised by republican liberty as nondomination cannot, and should 
not, only apply to the political part of individuals' lives. They cannot, because 
nondomination is more than a political approach. Republicans do not just want 
to prevent arbitrary interference in the political realm or by individuals who use 
the institutions that constitute the basic structure of society. Republicans want 
'For a further discussion of how republican ideals and institutions constitute the 
liberty experienced by republican citizens see Pettit (1997) pp. 106-9 and Pettit 
(1998) pp. 86-7. Pettit maintains that republican institutions act in the same 
manner as the antibodies in our bodies which constitute our immunity to certain 
diseases. 
Consider the connection between the antibodies that make someone 
immune to a certain disease and that immunity itself. The connection is 
not definitional, since immunity to the disease can be defined and 
understood without reference to the antibodies. But neither is the 
connection causal, for it is not as if the immunity is something distinct 
from the antibodies; being immune, for the person in question, comes to 
nothing more and nothing less than having those antibodies. The 
antibodies do not cause the immunity, as we say, they constitute it (Pettit, 
1998: 86). 
Thus, freedom as nondomination is not defined by any specific reference to an 
institution such as participation in democratic government, nor is it caused by 
an institution that inhibits would be interferers in an individual's life. An 
individual does not have to wait for an institution to inhibit a would be offender 
before realizing their nondomination. They have it when they are not subject to 
any arbitrary interference (Pettit, 1997: 107-9). 
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to prevent arbitrary interference in both the political and nonpolitical aspects of 
individuals' lives. It follows that to do so means that certain ideals and values 
must permeate both the political and nonpolitical realms of society. The 
subjective and intersubjective benefits that citizens realise under a system 
characterised by republican liberty as nondomination should not only apply to 
the political part of their lives because republicans want citizens qua individuals 
to realise that they are on an equal footing with others so that they can look 
them in the eye. If citizens experience arbitrary interference in their nonpolitical 
life, republicans do not consider them to be free: to republicans, these 
individuals are in a state of domination. To this end, republican liberty as 
nondomination will regulate the available life choices that individuals have in 
their nonpolitical lives so that all domination, whether it occurs in the political or 
nonpolitical realm, is challenged and minimised. In the next sub-section, I will 
explore how republican liberty as nondomination regulates the available life 
choices permissible for individuals in not only their political lives, but their 
nonpolitical lives as well. 
2.3 - the regulative nature of nondomination 
As I argued in chapter 3, the constant action and reaction to life in civil 
society helps to form an important republican `context for choice' for those 
citizens who know themselves to be free from domination and who can choose 
and revise their life plans according to their own needs and desires. 6 The 
republican context for choice regulates the availability of some comprehensive 
moral traditions and may even challenge or distort some individuals' final ends. 
It does this because the wider, and more pervasive, role assigned to the 
reciprocal and constitutional forms of power that support nondomination will 
actively challenge some individuals' final ends and seek to eliminate or change 
those ends that lead their adherents to interfere arbitrarily with others. This 
6As I outlined in the last chapter, Will Kymlicka often speaks of a `context for 
autonomous choice'. See Kymlicka (1990) pp. 199-237. 
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context for choice serves as a guarantee to those citizens who know themselves 
to be free from arbitrary interference, and have the necessary security to 
choose, question, and revise their life plans in light of their nondomination. 
Moreover, the republican context for choice serves to regulate the final ends 
available to citizens in light of republican liberty as nondomination. As I argued 
above, the republican state does not regret the nonpolitical impact of 
nondomination and the values and virtues that support it. Instead, republican 
liberty as nondomination affects individuals' nonpolitical lives because arbitrary 
interference or domination has no place in a republican state characterised by 
republican freedom. 
These values and ideals have a certain perfectionist quality to them 
because they exist prior to individuals' final ends and purposely affect 
individuals' nonpolitical lives. Rawls' political liberalism too, has some of these 
same elements. However, Rawls' defence of `justice as fairness' as a non- 
perfectionist political doctrine centres around his contention that while `justice 
as fairness' is similar to perfectionism in that it promotes "certain traits of 
character, especially a sense of justice" and "manage[s] to define an ideal of the 
person, " it does so "without invoking a prior standard of human excellence" 
(Rawls, 1971: 327). For Rawls, human perfection is something that the state 
should not define and instead should be determined by individuals using their 
basic liberties to their own ends without any undue coercion (Rawls, 1971: 328- 
9). However, the values and ideals of republican versions of civic virtue and 
citizenship exist prior to individuals' final ends and help to mould and condition 
those final ends into ones that do not subject others to arbitrary interference. 
Individuals, in their nonpolitical lives, are taught the necessary substantive skills 
and virtues that help them to cast their final ends in a manner which is 
consistent with republican civic virtue. 
Once again, because republican liberty as nondomination seeks to 
minimise arbitrary interference in the whole of society, and not just in political 
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domain, the ideals and institutions that support republican liberty must not be 
limited in the way that Rawls favours. By limiting nondomination in the manner 
that Rawls wants to, the republican state would be hard pressed to minimise 
arbitrary interference because the virtues and values that support republican 
liberty would be restricted to the political sphere. The result would be increased 
corruption as individuals sought to dominate others and thus gain advantage 
over them in their nonpolitical lives. Ultimately, liberty would be threatened in 
both the political and nonpolitical realms. For Machiavelli, placing the individual 
good over the common good would almost certainly bring about a rise in 
corruption and the loss of liberty (Machiavelli, The Discourses, 1965: 329). For 
republicans, cleaving off the political from the nonpolitical would undermine and 
threaten liberty as nondomination and usher in an environment of unrestrained 
individual freedom, or licenza. This is not to say that in a system characterised 
by political liberalism, outside of the political domain individuals will be involved 
in a complete free-for-all. To be sure, these individuals will be subject to laws 
and institutions that govern the whole of society. However, as I argued in the 
last chapter, the difference lies in the realisation that where liberals want to 
regulate how individuals behave, republicans want to regulate what they believe. 
For republicans, by understanding their liberty as the lack of arbitrary 
interference in their life choices, citizens believe themselves to be free to pursue 
their own ends according to whatever conception of the good they may have in 
light of the regulative nature of nondomination. Nondomination as a political 
principle, as I argued above, will inevitably affect certain nonpolitical beliefs and 
character traits. But the only fixed ideal of human excellence that it promotes 
is that of an individual's ability to express her ends in a manner that does not 
subject others to arbitrary interference. The state, through its ideals and 
institutions, will promote actively those activities aimed at securing the 
republican context for choice. That is, the state will seek to ensure that 
individuals are free from any actual or threatened arbitrary interference so that 
they themselves can decide those things that are valuable and those things that 
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are not as long as their choices are consistent with liberty as nondomination. 
Living a nondominating life enriches individuals' lives and helps them to `do well' 
on their own behalf (Skinner, 1984: 219). For Machiavelli, fulfilling one's 
obligation to the community by living a nondominating life and actively 
participating in the maintenance of republican liberty was more than a duty, it 
was something that could bring the individual `glory' (Machiavelli, The 
Discourses, 1965: 509). However, the republican account of perfectionism is a 
`thin' or minimalist account. 
As I argued above, the type of republicanism that I defend is not the same 
as the republicanism associated with civic humanism. In that account, human 
flourishing is tied specifically to the development of the self into an ideal type 
within a certain type of community characterised by democratic self-government. 
However, there is less specificity in the republicanism outlined in my argument. 
The particular ends that individuals pursue are not tied to their flourishing in a 
singular specific fashion or to their realising their true nature as political animals. 
The regulation of these ends is not about a specific activity, it is about a range 
of activities that can be said not to dominate others. It is about securing 
individuals from any threatened or actual interference that does not track their 
interests. This, in turn, brings them certain benefits that are not available under 
a system characterised by the ideal of freedom as noninterference. These 
benefits increase the range of activities available to individuals who are secure 
in their liberty and free from the uncertainty and anxiety that accompanies the 
ideal of freedom as non-interference. These citizens know that they are on an 
equal footing with others and can look them in the eye. Each of these benefits 
increases the range of options open to republican citizens because they are 
more secure in their liberty. Thus, there are important subjective and 
intersubjective benefits to republican citizens. Machiavelli maintained that the 
republican commitment to the cultivation of civic virtue, citizenship, and the 
common good allowed republics to increase in wealth and opportunity, and, 
more importantly, to be more secure in their liberty (Machiavelli, The Discourses, 
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1965: 329). Thus, those elements that appear perfectionist within republican 
thought are not as strict as some perfectionist accounts. Within a state 
characterised by republican perfectionism, a wide range of final ends are 
available to individuals as long as those final ends cannot be said to involve the 
domination of others. Furthermore, citizens who attain the character traits and 
skills associated with republican perfectionism will be better able to `do well' by 
themselves. 
These elements are, as I argued in chapter 3, at most quasi-perfectionist 
in nature because while republicans have a firm idea of what types of ends are 
acceptable - those that do not involve the domination of others. They also 
believe that the character traits associated with republican perfectionism secure 
a wide range of final ends available to individuals to pursue unhindered by the 
state or others. Within republicanism, then, being a nondominator, that is, being 
an individual who can cast her ends in a manner that does not interfere 
arbitrarily with others, is an ideal of human excellence. However, there is 
nothing metaphysical nor mysterious about republican liberty, nor does it appeal 
to some rigid a priori idea of what individuals specifically should do to flourish 
or `find themselves' (Skinner, 1984: 217). Thus, the perfectionism inherent in 
the republican approach is about securing those conditions that allow individuals 
to determine what is valuable and what is not within a vast range of final ends 
that cannot be said to dominate others. Moreover, in promoting these 
perfectionist elements without regret, republicanism recognises that certain life 
choices support nondomination better than others, and thus acts to secure 
republican liberty so that all citizens can pursue their own chosen ends free from 
arbitrary interference. Because the substantive values and virtues that support 
nondomination do affect the nonpolitical lives of individuals in the republican 
state, republicanism can be said to be, according to Rawls' definition, at least 
a partially comprehensive doctrine. The comprehensive nature of republican 
liberty as nondomination is also reflected in the intimate nature of the 
relationship between the right and the good. In the next sub-section, I will 
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explore this relationship and argue that for republicans, the right cannot be prior 
to the good. Instead, the relationship between the right and the good, for 
republicans, must be far more intimate than it is in Rawls' account. 
2.4 - the close and intimate relationship between the right and the good 
A key area of criticism of Rawls' project has come from those theorists 
who challenge his insistence that the right is prior to the good. Michael Sandel, 
among others, has argued that Rawls' insistence on giving priority to the right 
has undermined community and caused widespread disillusionment with the 
liberal state (Sandel, 1996: 10-1). However, Rawls maintains that even though 
political liberalism is not based on any wholly or partially comprehensive goods, 
the good itself is not completely abandoned in favour of the right. Rawls 
explicitly states that the "right and the good are complementary, " and that no 
approach can "draw entirely upon one or the other. " What is required, then, for 
Rawls, is a combination or mix of the two that support a political conception of 
justice that places the right prior to the good (Rawls, 1993: 173). Rawls 
maintains that the theory laid out in Political Liberalism satisfies this requirement 
without recourse to any wholly or partially comprehensive philosophical or moral 
doctrines. If we follow Rawls' line of reasoning, the type of republicanism that 
I have been defending would also place the right prior to the good. 
Furthermore, this position would be reflected in the nature of the values and 
virtues that support republican liberty as nondomination. In this sub-section, I 
will argue that this necessarily cannot be the case because the values and 
virtues that support republican liberty as nondomination will interact with an 
individual's nonpolitical self. 
Rawls acknowledges that political liberalism will need a meaningful set 
of values and virtues that support the political theory of justice and the 
institutions that accompany it (Rawls, 1993: 195). These, `political virtues', as 
he calls them, are not said to be based on any wholly or partially comprehensive 
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values, and thus do not violate the political project. Instead they are embraced 
by reasonable individuals in an instrumental manner or seen as purely political 
goods (as discussed in the section above). In this area in particular, Rawls 
seems to move closer to the republican project by advocating republican ideals 
to help `thicken' up his account of the necessary values and virtues that will 
accompany his project. ' However, for Rawls, the use of republican values and 
virtues, such as strong versions of citizenship and the cultivation of an active 
populace, to help complete his project is a justifiable move because he does not 
believe that the two approaches are in fundamental opposition. To support his 
position, Rawls evokes Benjamin Constant's famous distinction between the 
liberty of the moderns and that of the ancients. However, I will argue that unlike 
republicans, Rawls does not follow Constant closely enough, and thus fails to 
acknowledge the gains to be had from a closer and more intimate relationship 
between the right and the good. Furthermore, I will argue that without a closer 
and more intimate relationship between the right and the good, the 
republicanism that I have defended collapses and liberty as nondomination is 
lost. 
Constant maintained that there was a clear distinction between the `liberty 
of the ancients', which reads very much like Rawls' reading of civic humanism, 
and the `liberty of the moderns', a negatively based conception of liberty that 
promotes the right of the individual to be free from unnecessary interferences 
(Constant, 1988: 309-328). Constant believed that the liberty of the ancients 
undermined the cause of individualism by promoting values and virtues that 
7Nicholas Buttle has argued recently that it is possible to defend a "broadly 
Rawlsian interpretation of citizenship which combines both liberal and 
republican themes. " However, Buttle fails to account for republican conceptions 
of liberty as nondomination and the necessary support structures that 
accompany such a conception. Instead he argues that the main difference 
between republicanism and liberalism is one of emphasis. While I accept his 
general thesis that republicanism and political liberalism may share many of the 
same ideals and goals, there are important differences that must be accounted 
for before combining the two traditions (Buttle, 1997: 147-52). 
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subjected the individual self to the will of the common good. For Constant, 
"among the ancients the individual, almost always sovereign in public affairs, 
was a slave in private relations" (Constant, 1988: 311). It was the liberty of the 
moderns, for Constant, that freed the individual from the domination of the 
common good by securing "the enjoyment of security in private pleasures" and 
ensuring a protected space within which to act freely (Constant, 1988: 317). 
Just as Constant endorses the liberty of the moderns, Rawls too believes that 
individual liberty must be a central ideal of political liberalism. However, Rawls 
fails to appreciate fully the implications of Constant's theory of liberty when he 
develops a `political' account of the necessary virtues and values that support 
political liberalism. Constant believed that even though the liberty of the 
moderns was paramount over the liberty of the ancients, no just system could 
completely abandon the institutional priorities of ancient liberty. What was 
necessary, for Constant, was to "learn to combine the two together, " a position 
that, as we saw above, Rawls advocates when assigning the right priority over 
the good (Constant, 1988: 327; Rawls, 1993: 173). Where Rawls goes astray 
is in his failure to recognise that it was beneficial that the institutions that 
represented the liberty of the ancients had a substantive role in not only 
securing and supporting individual liberty, but in providing the citizenry with the 
necessary moral nonpolitical education as well. According to Constant: 
Institutions must achieve the moral education of the citizens. By 
respecting their individual rights, securing their independence, refraining 
from troubling their work, they must nevertheless consecrate their 
influence over public affairs, call them to contribute by their votes to the 
exercise of power, grant them a right of control and supervision by 
expressing their opinions; and by forming them through practice for these 
elevated functions, give them both the desire and the right to discharge 
these (Constant, 1988: 328). 
In this manner, Constant combines the different senses of liberty much in the 
same way as Rawls combines the right and the good. For Constant, the liberty 
of the moderns is prior to the liberty of the ancients, even though the latter plays 
an important role in the moral education of the citizenry. However, for Constant, 
the liberty of the ancients was not restricted to achieving solely the `political' 
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education of the citizenry, and thus had an important nonpolitical function in 
shaping the moral character of the citizens through substantive values and 
virtues. Constant believed that the institutionally driven moral education of 
ancient virtues had an important and substantive role in the nonpolitical 
development of individuals. For Constant, the teaching of ancient virtues to 
citizens "enlarges their spirit, ennobles their thoughts, and establishes among 
them a kind of intellectual equality which forms the glory and power of a people" 
(Constant, 1988: 327). In other words, the virtues and values of the liberty of the 
ancients should not be abandoned by modern liberty because they aid in the 
development of individuals' nonpolitical moral lives. 
However, as we saw above, Rawls claims that these values and virtues 
must be political in nature and not based on any wholly or partially 
comprehensive goods. Despite the political nature of these values, then, for 
Rawls, the right and the good are `complementary'. Furthermore, Rawls informs 
us that "no conception of justice can draw entirely upon one or the other, but 
must combine both in a definite way" (Rawls, 1993: 173). However, Rawls 
seems to want it both ways. For Constant, ancient virtues were not only 
instrumental because they helped secure modern liberty, they were essential 
goods because they contributed to the nonpolitical moral development of 
individuals. Without this nonpolitical moral development, Constant believed that 
modern liberty alone was insufficient to maintain meaningful freedom. In many 
ways, Rawls too recognises this point. He maintains that the `political' virtues 
will have to constitute the ideals that support and "characterise the ideal of a 
good citizen of a democratic state" (Rawls, 1993: 194-5). Education, for Rawls, 
will have to include certain virtues like toleration and an appreciation of the 
constitutional and civil rights that support political institutions. These virtues will 
require that citizens have the ability to stand back and reflect rationally on not 
only their own life choices, but also those of others. Rawls even admits that 
"certainly there are some resemblance between the values of political liberalism 
and the values of the comprehensive liberalisms of Kant and Mill. " But this is 
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unavoidable and the consequences must be accepted with `regret'. 
Nonetheless, they do not violate the `political' nature of his project because of 
their narrow scope and generality (Rawls, 1993: 199-200). Even if these virtues 
are general in nature and narrow in scope, Rawls implicitly admits that they will 
affect an individuals' nonpolitical moral development. The political virtues, by 
Rawls' own admission, cannot be completely constrained in the manner that his 
theory requires. The implication of Rawls' admission is that these political 
goods will spill over into the nonpolitical, albeit that this is a matter of regret. For 
republicans, however, this overlap is not viewed as something that has to be 
regretted: it is something that is actively sought and that has positive benefits. 
Like Constant, then, republicans fully appreciate and embrace the role 
that political institutions and education must play in the lives of citizens in 
conveying the values and virtues that support liberty as nondomination. And, 
as argued above, these values and virtues help to constitute the liberty 
experienced by individuals in the republican state. They help mould and 
condition individuals' life choices and instil in citizens a rich sense of civic virtue. 
In other words, they substantively contribute to individuals' nonpolitical moral 
development, and all without Rawls' `regret'. Republicans cannot support Rawls' 
position for two main reasons. The first, as I argued in the last sub-section, is 
that if republicans' restrict nondomination and the ideals and institutions that 
support it to the political realm, the benefits to citizens who know themselves to 
be free from the uncertainty and anxiety caused by threatened or actual 
domination will be fundamentally undermined. I will develop this point further 
in chapter 6, but my argument here is that unless the virtues and values 
associated with republican liberty as nondomination can take root in both the 
political and nonpolitical domain, republicanism will fail. It follows that the 
second reason republicans cannot support Rawls' position is that those citizens 
who are free from domination in the political realm will not be necessarily free 
from domination in the whole of their lives if nondomination is limited in scope. 
Domination which occurs outside of the political realm will undermine the 
173 
subjective and intersubjective benefits of nondomination because individuals' 
position of equal footing with others will only apply to political issues. In 
individuals' nonpolitical lives, where they may be subjected to domination 
because the virtues and values which accompany republican liberty have not 
taken root, they will not reap the benefits of republican liberty and may not be 
able to look others in the eye. In other words, for republicans, if nondomination 
is to be maximised, its values and ideals cannot be restricted solely to the 
political domain. Republican liberty as nondomination not only needs to 
permeate the whole of society if it is to be successful, it needs substantive inputs 
from the whole of society and not just the political realm. Republicans believe 
that for nondomination to permeate society and take root in the hearts and 
minds of the citizenry, it must be actively promoted by the state. 
For republican liberty as nondomination to be maximised, there must be 
sufficient belief in the capacity of the laws and institutions to prevent arbitrary 
interference. However, if nondomination is restricted to the political, the laws 
and institutions of the state will be fatally undermined. Machiavelli maintained 
that "just as good morals, if they are to be maintained, have need of good laws, 
so the laws, if they are to be observed, have need of good morals" (Machiavelli, 
The Discourses, 1965: 241). Thus, the laws and institutions of the republic can 
only be fully effective if they have a sufficient degree of legitimacy and 
allegiance among the people and are recognised as the norms of society, not 
just the norms of politics. To this end, as I argued in the last chapter, the 
republican state will promote certain character traits and virtues through 
distinctive versions of citizenship and, in doing so, will educate individuals in the 
substantive ideals of nondomination. Furthermore, it follows that civic virtue and 
participation are essential republican components of liberty because they help 
the state track properly the interests of the citizenry. It follows that for these 
ideals and institutions to be truly effective, there must be a sufficient amount of 
virtue and participation in the forums of the state to register accurately just what 
those interests are (Pettit, 1998: 87). The necessary virtues that make up the 
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republican version of citizenship help individuals articulate their own interests 
so that the state, and their fellow citizens, can account for and track their 
interests and respond appropriately. Unlike Rawls' liberal state, the republican 
state does not ask individuals to bracket off their nonpolitical, religious, 
philosophical, or moral comprehensive doctrines. As I will argue in the next 
section, once again, republicans cannot endorse Rawls' political position 
because asking individuals to bracket off their interests and recast them in 
political terms makes it impossible for the republican state and others to track 
their interests. If their interests cannot be tracked, they will inevitably be subject 
to arbitrary interference, and thus dominated. 
My argument in this section has been that following Rawls' move to 
assign outright priority to the right over the good would fundamentally undermine 
the republican project. Instead, republicans recognise, like Constant, that the 
virtues that accompanied the liberty of the ancients represent a positive feature 
that, when taken together with the liberty of the moderns, enriches individuals' 
lives and better secures their liberty. To that end, the republican state promotes 
civic virtue and access to a common language of citizenship in order to support 
the intimate relationship that individuals have with the ideals and institutions that 
secure their freedom as nondomination. In this manner, the republican state 
helps citizens to play the necessary active role in securing themselves from 
arbitrary interference. To help support this effort, the republican state educates 
future citizens in the ways of politics and government and also teaches them the 
necessary civic virtues that help individuals not to dominate others. As I argued 
in the last sub-section, this, in turn, affects how individuals cast their final ends. 
Citizens who live in a republican state characterised by freedom as 
nondomination will have a duty and responsibility not to dominate others. If they 
do, the state's constitutional provisions will ask them to account for their 
domination and may force sanctions on them if they do not cease. In each of 
these areas, the republican state, without regret, affects individuals' nonpolitical 
lives so that their liberty is enhanced and their lives enriched. Once again, 
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where liberals want to regulate how individuals behave, republicans want to 
regulate how they cast their final ends. This, however, highlights another area 
in which the kind of republicanism that I have been defending is not compatible 
with Rawls' political liberalism. In the next sub-section, I will argue that the 
republican state characterised by liberty as nondomination cannot be neutral in 
the same way as Rawls' `political' state. 
2.5 - republicanism is not value neutral 
As I argued earlier, because republican liberty has certain perfectionist 
qualities, it cannot be said to be strictly neutral. Thus, another distinction 
between Rawls' political project and republicanism has to do with Rawls' 
insistence that the value and promotion of certain character traits or virtues by 
a state characterised by political liberalism (and thus a republican state by 
inference) does not violate neutrality. ' For Rawls, these virtues are political in 
nature and thus are distinguishable "from the virtues that characterise ways of 
life belonging to comprehensive religious and philosophical doctrines... " (Rawls, 
1993: 195). As I argued above, Rawls maintains that the state must support 
itself through particular ideals and institutions that maintain and enhance justice 
as fairness as a political doctrine. For Rawls, even though these virtues are 
political, they may be regarded by some as goods themselves, but this still does 
not violate their neutrality because they do not affirm any religious, 
philosophical, or moral comprehensive doctrines (Rawls, 1993: 202-4). Rawls, 
however, is careful to qualify the type of neutrality he is defending. To be sure, 
because the political virtues and justice as fairness as a political doctrine are 
goods, they are not neutral in a procedural sense. The institutions of the state 
and the political virtues do presuppose some forms of public `political' goods, but 
since they are goods nonetheless there is no neutrality of procedure (Rawls, 
8Rawls, however, is right to argue "that the term neutrality is unfortunate 
[because] some of its connotations are highly misleading [and] others suggest 
altogether impracticable principles" (Rawls, 1993: 191). 
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1993: 202). Another sense in which political liberalism is not neutral for Rawls 
is in its effect. Rawls maintains that some forms of the good life will fare better 
than others, while some may come into conflict with the structures and principles 
of the state. Because of this, the state is likely to favour some forms of moral 
character over others, while encouraging certain moral political virtues (Rawls, 
1993: 194). However, Rawls does defend political liberalism as a doctrine which 
displays a neutrality of aim. In other words, the aims of justice as fairness are 
neutral because it is a non-comprehensive doctrine which seeks a common 
ground to provide citizens with equal opportunities to pursue permissible 
conceptions of the good life (Rawls, 1993: 190-5). Among these permissible 
conceptions of the good life, political liberalism makes no judgements about the 
relative worth of the decisions made by reasonable individuals. Central to this 
assertion is Rawls' belief that a political conception of justice is compatible with 
reasonable comprehensive moral and philosophical doctrines. 
However, republicanism fails Rawls' `neutrality of aim' test because its 
aims are not neutral in the sense that nondomination and the reciprocal and 
constitutional forms of power that support it actively challenge some individuals' 
final ends and seek to eliminate or change those ends that lead their adherents 
to interfere arbitrarily with others. Furthermore, the republican state recognises 
and promotes certain nonpolitical goods which support the principles of 
nondomination as a central ideal. However, these goods are not restricted to 
purely political goods in the same way as in Rawls' project. In the last chapter 
I argued that the republican state must abandon any claims to neutrality by 
advocating and supporting certain substantive ideals, institutions, and versions 
of civic virtue and citizenship that support and maintain the principles of 
nondomination. Furthermore, the ideals and institutions of nondomination can 
be said to be quasi-perfectionist in nature and are relevant to the whole of an 
individual's life. To this end, the republican state will set up certain procedures 
and forums in a distinctively republican manner. It will interact and adjudicate 
between the many moral traditions that comprise the republic in a distinctive and 
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substantive manner guided by the principles that support republican liberty as 
nondomination. In doing so, the quasi-perfectionist elements of republican 
citizenship and civic virtue educate individuals in the distinctive and substantive 
ideals of nondomination which stress some goods over others. Individuals will 
realise the reciprocal and constitutional power of republican liberty because it 
regulates or shapes the ways in which they evaluate their needs. By 
recognising these essentially common goods as legitimate ends for the state to 
promote, republicanism abandons liberal neutrality and stands in contrast to 
Rawls' political liberalism. 
If republicans were to accept the thrust of Rawls' neutrality of aim, the 
maximisation of nondomination would be hampered. The aim of a state 
characterised by the ideal of freedom as nondomination is to promote those 
ideals and values that support republican liberty in both the basic structure and 
the whole of society. It does so, as I argued earlier, not in an instrumental 
manner, and not because these ideals and values are purely 'political' goods. 
The republican state advocates certain character traits and particular republican 
ways of doing things to enhance the position of its citizens and secure the 
republican context for choice. Moreover, if the republican state is to maximise 
liberty as nondomination, individuals cannot be asked to bracket off their 
comprehensive ideals. Rawls' liberal state asks individuals to bracket off their 
comprehensive beliefs when interacting with the state over issues of basic 
justice, and instead embrace a 'political' identity. However, insisting that 
individuals bracket off these ideals fundamentally undermines the republican 
effort to track their interests. Even though republicans fully understand the 
importance of individual decisions, they also recognise and appreciate the 
inability to bracket completely private preferences from public expositions (Burtt, 
1992: 162-3). David Miller has argued that it is essential to the republican 
project that the state not limit "what sort of demand may be put forward in the 
political forum" (Miller, 1995: 447). To this end, if the republican state and 
others are to track individuals' interests, individuals must be asked to register 
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their interests as they are, comprehensive or not. Nondomination cannot be 
sustained by a citizenry that only registers what their `political' interests are, 
especially if these `political' interests vary greatly from their comprehensive 
beliefs. 
When certain comprehensive doctrines challenge the principles of 
nondomination by subjecting individuals to arbitrary interference, the state will 
act with the bias of republican liberty as nondomination to secure liberty and 
maintain the republic. Rawls argues that because the types of goods supported 
and promoted by political liberalism are not comprehensive in nature and have 
neutral aims, justice as fairness is a `political' doctrine. In contrast, republicans 
maintain that nondomination and the comprehensive values that support it are 
not value neutral. ' That is, the substantive principles of nondomination are 
biassed in a distinctive republican manner that gives precedence to life choices 
that do not interfere arbitrarily with others. The republic promotes the values 
and ideals that support such lifestyles. 
This is not to say that the republican state has recourse to unlimited state 
activity in the lives of its citizens. As mentioned before, the republican state 
must not itself be a dominator. Pettit argues that 
there will be significant limits on what the republican state should attempt, 
since it is clear that an excessively powerful state can easily become 
dominating; and there will be recognition of the fact that, even if law does 
not itself dominate, it does reduce the ease or range of choice in which 
people can enjoy nondomination; nonarbitrary law offends in a secondary 
way against nondomination (Pettit, 1998: 95; also see Pettit, 1997: 76-7). 
9Although Pettit asserts that the republican state reflects a `shared-value' 
neutrality, I maintain that any element of value violates basic strict neutrality and 
therefore cannot claim to be neutral. For a further discussion of Pettit's position, 
see `Reworking Sandel's Republicanism' (Pettit, 1998: 91). 
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Once again, civic virtue and participation play a positive role in checking the 
power of the state and ensuring that it does not dominate. Republican values 
and ideals are subjected to constant and rigorous efforts of contestability which 
not only ensures that they respond to the various demands placed on them, but 
also helps to educate those citizens who place these demands on the state in 
the ways of government and of a varied and pluralistic society (Pettit, 1997: 230- 
4). However, just as individuals can become corrupt and seek to dominate 
others, the state too can become corrupt and seek to dominate those it is 
supposed to protect. The state must track the interests of its citizens and 
ensure that they are free to choose, question, and revise their life choices 
without arbitrary interference from either others or the state. In chapter 6, I will 
develop this point further. However, my contention in this chapter is that for the 
type of republicanism that I am defending to secure liberty as nondomination, 
its aim cannot be neutral in the way that Rawls maintains it is. 
Conclusion 
In each of the five areas outlined above, republicanism cannot endorse 
Rawls' political approach without fundamentally undermining its alternative 
conception of liberty. Republicans do not regret the impact that their theory has 
on individuals' nonpolitical lives. Instead, republicans embrace the substantive 
and pervasive nature of the values and virtues that support republican liberty as 
nondomination. Republicans maintain that their conception of liberty is both 
distinct from, and an improvement on, Rawls' conception. The benefits of 
republican liberty as nondomination over the ideal of freedom as non- 
interference contribute to individuals' development in the whole of their lives. 
To restrict this development to the political domain, even if possible, would 
threaten republican liberty as nondomination and open the door for increased 
corruption and licenza. It follows that the ideals and institutions that accompany 
republican liberty as nondomination constitute the freedom experienced by 
republican citizens. These components are more than instrumental goods. 
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Taken together they are citizens' means of realising nondomination. 
Furthermore, the ideals and institutions of republican liberty, which come in both 
reciprocal and constitutional forms of power, regulate the final ends available to 
individuals in their political and nonpolitical lives. 
The distinctive republican regulation of permissible final ends reflects the 
republican belief in the interdependent and intimate relationship between the 
right and the good. While securing a wide range of permissible final ends, the 
quasi-perfectionism of republican ideals, such as civic virtue and citizenship, 
moulds and cultivates individuals in a distinctive republican manner. This 
perfectionism means that the republican state is not neutral, but instead aims to 
maximise nondomination, and thus the values and virtues that support it, in the 
whole of society. For the republican state to maximise nondomination, it cannot 
ask individuals to bracket off their comprehensive identities when entering the 
political arena. If the republican state and others are to track an individual's 
interests, they must first know just what that interest is, comprehensive or not. 
The upshot of my argument is that if republican liberty as nondomination is to 
succeed in freeing individuals from arbitrary interference, the values and ideals 
that accompany it must take root in the whole of an individual's life and cannot 
be restricted to the political domain. In other words, republican liberty as 
nondomination must rely on, and affect, certain virtues and values that permeate 
the whole of society. Therefore, despite Rawls' insistence to the contrary, there 
is fundamental opposition between political liberalism and republicanism. 
Furthermore, the republicanism which I have presented is distinct from what 
Rawls calls civic humanism. It is a negatively based theory of freedom that 
contains within it certain substantive and intrinsically valuable virtues and ideals 
that help secure individuals from arbitrary interference. 
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Part 3 
Nondomination: The Challenge of the Modern Polity 
Thus far I have argued that republicanism is a non-neutral doctrine that 
promotes the values and ideals of liberty as nondomination. For republicans, 
citizenship, civic virtue, and other forms of participation are intrinsically valuable, 
non-instrumental goods which have quasi-perfectionist elements that provide 
stability and are able to command allegiance without actual or threatened 
domination. To this end, republican citizens are provided with a distinctive 
republican context for choice that secures the necessary conditions for 
individuals to choose, question and revise their life choices. 
In part 2, I argued that republicanism can be distinguished from both the 
political liberalism of John Rawls and from liberal neutralists like Will Kymlicka. 
However, thus far my argument has concentrated on the philosophical nuances 
of these rival approaches and important questions remain about republicanism's 
effectiveness in today's modern polity. At the forefront of the important issues 
facing republicans is how they will cope with `the fact of pluralism'. 
Republicanism will have to demonstrate that nondomination is a fluid doctrine 
and that the ideals and institutions of the republican state can respond to the 
changing needs and demands placed on it by today's multicultural and pluralistic 
society. In the next, and final, part of the thesis I will explore these issues and, 
in so doing, will further distinguish the contemporary republican approach I have 
presented from its rival liberal accounts. Central to the value of republican 
theory in contemporary discourse is its response to the `fact of pluralism'. For 
if republicans want to be taken seriously, then they must demonstrate that their 
theory can not only cope with the difficulties confronting today's diverse citizenry, 
but that their contribution adds something of substantive value to the modern 
polity and offers an improvement upon the liberal standard. Republicans need 
to bring their theory out of the history of ideas and offer compelling arguments 
that challenge liberalism's hegemony in contemporary discourse. 
This part of the thesis will also revisit some important issues raised in 
earlier parts. In doing so, I will argue that a contemporary account of 
republicanism is a relevant and compelling approach that can breathe new life 
into current debates. In chapter 5, I develop and defend a contemporary 
republican account of pluralism and argue that republican liberty as 
nondomination can address many of the problems confronting the modern polity. 
In chapter 6, I revisit three important themes developed in the thesis, education, 
institutions, and social norms, and unpack them in a manner that explores the 
contemporary claims of republican liberty as nondomination. 
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Chapter 5- Factions and Diversity: A Republican 
Dilemma 
Responding to what John Rawls has called the `fact of pluralism', liberal 
theorists have broadly reacted in two related, but yet distinct manners. On one 
side, some liberals like Will Kymlicka and Ronald Dworkin have argued that 
Kantian autonomy and Millian individualism guided by liberal neutrality is the 
most appropriate way to cope with the many incompatible moral and 
philosophical doctrines found in today's diverse and multicultural societies 
(Kymlicka, 1989; Dworkin, 1978). These theorists argue that the values of 
autonomy and individuality are essential ideals for the development of the self 
and that liberal neutrality is imperative to the modern polity if it is to ensure 
justice and equal respect among the many competing ideas of the good. 
Furthermore, these liberals believe that the capacity of individuals to form, 
question, and revise their ideas of the good must be an essential feature of the 
modern state. On the other side, others led by John Rawls have proposed an 
alternative liberal theory that they believe is more successful in coping with 
today's pluralism, while at the same time respecting the impossibility or 
undesirability of autonomy for some people (Rawls, 1993). These theorists 
argue that by abandoning comprehensive moral and philosophical claims, a 
more limited, but yet still liberal, political theory of justice is possible. 
However, as I have been arguing throughout this thesis, there is another 
alternative, which although distinct from liberalism, is compatible with many of 
its aims. This chapter argues that although they have largely remained silent, 
republicans have a distinct and compelling account of liberty that can cope with 
the pluralism found in today's modern polity. Such an account is possible by 
building on the central assertion that individuals desire freedom from arbitrary 
interference. By exploring historical republican remedies to the diversity of 
interests found within ancient republics, I will argue that today's modern polity 
can seek to secure the necessary conditions of liberty as nondomination, and 
provide its diverse citizenry with the conditions to live their lives according to 
their own chosen ends. 
To explore this issue thoroughly, this chapter is divided into three 
sections. Section 1 briefly outlines how some republicans have addressed the 
pluralism confronting the modern polity. Additionally, in section 11 will briefly 
summarise my argument thus far and discuss how a distinctive and neo-Roman 
republican approach to pluralism is possible using nondomination as its central 
ideal. I will also discuss how nondomination relates to distinct republican 
technologies that were developed in response to the internal tumults caused by 
different and diverse interests found in Rome and later in Florence. Section 2 
seeks to bring these republican ideals out of the history of ideas by using 
Machiavelli as a starting point to construct a compelling contemporary 
republican response to pluralism. By securing liberty as the absence of arbitrary 
interference, the republican state can move the liberal project forward by 
abandoning state neutrality and offering a richer and more robust account of 
citizenship and civic virtue. Finally, section 3 will explore what a contemporary 
republican approach would look like by comparing it with rival approaches. 
Taken as a whole, this chapter will demonstrate that liberty as nondomination 
is a resilient and fluid doctrine which can respond to the many changing needs 
and demands placed on it by a multicultural and pluralistic society. 
Section 1- The Republican Response to Pluralism 
1.1 - the republican alternative: a false start 
In response to liberalism, some theorists have recently embraced the 
republican model as a way forward. However, as I have argued earlier, 
republicanism is not a monolithic doctrine and there are different versions that 
have significant differences. Despite holding many of the same ideals and 
values, these other versions of republicanism endorse a more positive 
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conception of liberty and are based on specific accounts of human flourishing. 
As I outlined in the first part of the thesis, Michael Sandel's recent work has 
embraced a conception of republicanism that follows his earlier more Aristotelian 
philosophy of human flourishing. Sandel believes that the strength of his 
republican argument is its ability to define rights in light of a particular 
conception of the good society - the self-governing republic - and not 
according to principles that are neutral among conceptions of the good. Sandel 
maintains that self-governing republics value the necessary link between self- 
government and the cultivation of civic virtue. Thus Sandel's republicanism 
regards moral character as a public, not merely private, concern (Sandel, 1996: 
25). 
The republican tradition emphasizes the need to cultivate citizenship 
through particular ties and attachments. More than a legal condition, 
citizenship requires certain habits and dispositions, a concern for the 
whole, and orientation to the common good. But these qualities cannot 
be taken as given. They require constant cultivation. Family, 
neighbourhood, religion, trade unions, reform movements, and local 
government all offer examples of practices that have at times served to 
educate people in the exercise of citizenship by cultivating the habits of 
membership and orienting people to common goods beyond their private 
ends. A public life that fails to nurture these practices or is indifferent to 
their fate fails to cultivate the virtues essential to self-government as the 
republican tradition conceives it (Sandel, 1996: 117). 
Thus, for Sandel, if individuals are to be free, self-government and the virtues 
and versions of citizenship that accompany it are essential elements that must 
be forcefully promoted by the state. These distinct and intrinsically valuable 
versions of civic virtue and citizenship are cultivated by the political communities 
and institutions that represent the people. For Sandel, citizens see these 
institutions as part of themselves and identify their good with them. In 
Democracy's Discontent, Sandel uses the United States as an example of a 
rights based liberal community that has eroded the very qualities that it needs 
to flourish. 
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Sandel argues that the U. S. is characterised by a `procedural republic' 
which he takes to be a type of liberalism that "asserts the priority of fair 
procedures over particular ends" (Sandel, 1996: 4). Based on Rawls' earlier 
neo-Kantian work, Sandel believes that the procedural republic avoids 
endorsing conceptions of the good by asserting the `priority of the right' and 
state neutrality. Furthermore, Sandel believes that the liberal conceptualisation 
of the self, which he refers to as the unencumbered self, ultimately is flawed 
because it exists without any understanding of moral experience and does not 
account for "certain moral and political obligations that we commonly 
recognize... . [such as] solidarity, religious duties, and other moral ties that may 
claim us for reasons unrelated to a choice" (Sandel, 1996: 13; also see Sandel 
(1984: 81-96). For Sandel then, the unencumbered self is the archetypical 
liberal citizen whose only responsibility is to respect the rights of others and not 
advance their good unless they have agreed to do so. For Sandel, the 
unencumbered self has a detrimental impact on the community and 
subsequently the state. The liberal vision, for Sandel, "is not morally self- 
sufficient but parasitic on a notion of community it officially rejects" (Sandel, 
1984: 91). Thus the procedural republic's fatal weakness is its inability to 
maintain the moral energies of a vital democratic life; and thus it creates a moral 
void that fails to satisfy one of the main tenets of his version of republicanism - 
the cultivation of civic virtues that will prepare citizens to share in self-rule 
(Sandel, 1996: 24). The effect of the procedural republic in the United States, 
Sandel posits, is a sense of loss and disenchantment by the populace, a feeling 
that the common good is no longer good and that people have little actual 
control of their own lives. For Sandel, the only way to overcome this danger is 
to reinvigorate civic virtue and promote community and citizenship at the 
expense of liberal neutrality among competing ideas of the good (Sandel, 1996: 
24). 
In another republican approach, David Miller has argued that the 
republican version of citizenship is well equipped for today's multicultural 
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society. Miller, less stringently than Sandel, accepts, like the liberal approaches 
outlined above, that there must be limits to what is permissible in light of the 
deep diversity present in modern society (Miller, 1995). Central to this approach 
is that agreement cannot necessarily be found among the competing versions 
of the good, and that the Rawlsian and neutralist approaches fail to 
acknowledge that some individuals will not ever be able, or even want, to adopt 
a political or more complete account of justice. However, like Rawls' theory of 
political liberalism, Miller argues that problems related to political justice should 
be settled by an effort to engage those who subscribe to the many competing 
versions of the good in the public sphere. Thus Miller accepts the thrust of 
Rawls' effort to delineate the dual nature of individuals' identities. Individuals 
have a non-political self that is situated within their own private sphere governed 
by their own beliefs, and a political self that emerges in the public sphere where 
other important issues, including political ones, must be dealt with. The 
public/private split emerges from a collective effort to determine which issues 
should be subject to public control, and which areas should be left to be 
governed by individuals (Miller, 1995: 447). Within this public sphere, citizens 
identify with their political community in some manner and are committed to 
promoting its well being through engagement in a common good (Miller, 1995: 
444). Thus, Miller believes that issues concerning justice and the state should 
be addressed by the members of society in a public forum for the benefit of the 
common good. 
For Miller, a strong version of republican citizenship is the key to 
engaging in a common debate that addresses these important public questions. 
The specifics of the republican version of citizenship help to provide the 
necessary common skills and technologies that are available to all and serve as 
essential components in effective dialogue. These questions, it is argued, 
should be settled through open and inclusive discussions utilising the necessary 
skills and forums of the republic that hold out the promise of a substantial 
degree of consensus (Miller, 1995: 444). Groups and individuals who hold 
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competing versions of the good are given the necessary skills and forums to 
legitimate their claims in the public sphere and to pursue them. However, unlike 
Rawls, Miller believes that republicanism does not ask individuals or groups to 
bracket off their non-political identities when debating public matters. Realising 
that it is not possible for some individuals to bracket off their identity, Miller 
maintains that republicans legitimate difference and diversity by encouraging 
those whose identities are an essential part of their private and public being to 
engage with others in dialogue as themselves, unencumbered or encumbered. 
According to Miller, 
[t]he republican conception of citizenship, then, places no limits on what 
sort of demand may be put forward in the political forum. It does not 
discriminate between demands stemming from personal convictions... and 
demands stemming from group identity.... In all cases the success of any 
particular demand will depend upon how far it can be expressed in terms 
that are close to, or distant from, the general political ethos of the 
community. It requires of citizens a willingness to give reasons for what 
they are claiming, but not that they should divest themselves of 
everything that is particular to them before setting foot in the arena of 
politics (Miller, 1995: 447). 
Furthermore, Miller states that it is not necessary for citizens to "regard political 
activity as the summum bonum in order to adopt the republican view. " Instead, 
they can embrace a more modest standpoint that holds that "although politics 
is indeed a necessary part of the good life, different people can be expected to 
give it a different weight according to their own personal values" (Miller, 1995: 
448). 
From both Sandel's and Miller's account, then, their version of 
republicanism can be said to be an effort to provide the modern polity with 
strong versions of civic virtue and citizenship in the hope of reinvigorating public 
debates in light of the moral pluralism found in the modern polity. However, my 
argument is that there is another republican approach that is firmly based in the 
thought of neo-Roman writers. If my argument is sound, however, then how well 
can it cope with the difference and diversity found in the modern nation-state 
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without undermining the values that are important to individuals and diverse 
communities? Moreover, how can it prevent the institutions of government from 
being used against diverse individuals and communities? In the next section, 
will take up these questions and argue that a neo-Roman republicanism that 
countenances liberty as nondomination can answer these questions while 
remaining a distinct and compelling doctrine. 
1.2 - republican liberty as nondomination 
In the first two parts of the thesis, I argued that central to republican 
theory is its alternative conception of liberty as nondomination. For the 
purposes of this chapter, I will briefly summarise my argument in this sub- 
section. For republicans, individuals are considered to be free when no one, or 
thing, exercises mastery, either real or threatened, over them. Within republican 
thought, individuals are free to the extent that they are free to act without being 
exposed to any actual or threatened arbitrary interference from another. For 
republicans, then, individuals are free to the extent that they are not subject to 
the mastery of another. That is, they are free to the extent that they are not 
subject to any interference, or threat of interference, that does not track their 
own arbitrium (Pettit, 1998: 84). Crucial to republican liberty is the realisation 
that in order for agents not to be in a position under domination, their interests 
must be accounted for or tracked. Importantly, for republicans, the converse is 
also true; individuals must take account of and track other individuals' interests 
before they can act without dominating them. To track someone's interest, 
however, does not mean that their wishes or desires are followed blindly. 
Rather, it means that their demands must be evaluated and responded to in an 
appropriate manner that considers just what their interests are in light of 
nondomination. 
Furthermore, I have argued that there are two interdependent forms of 
power, reciprocal and constitutional, that accompany the republican conception 
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of liberty which provide the necessary security to protect and enhance freedom. 
Importantly though, while allowing individuals to determine which ends they will 
pursue, these forms of power also free them from the inevitable uncertainty, 
anxiety and fear of subordination that they may experience as they constantly 
face those who seek to interfere arbitrarily with them (Pettit, 1997: 83-90). First, 
the reciprocal form of security relies on the realisation that agents can defend 
themselves against any form of domination. They realise that they too can act 
to interfere arbitrarily with another and vice versa (Pettit, 1997: 67). Second, the 
constitutional authority seeks to promote the ideals of nondomination through 
the legal and institutional framework of the state to secure the agent against any 
arbitrary interference. The constitutional authority seeks to prevent arbitrary 
interference before it can actually interfere with other agents. Because the 
constitutional authority is governed by the principles of nondomination, it too 
cannot dominate. That is, it must be based on the interests and ideals of those 
it seeks to protect (Pettit, 1997: 68). Republican liberty affirms the capacity of 
individuals to pursue their own objectives consistent with nondomination, while 
securing the necessary conditions for avoiding any type of coercion or situation 
of servitude which would make individual liberty impossible. Consequently, in 
order for the reciprocal and constitutional securing agents to be truly effective, 
they must be accompanied by the necessary virtues that inform and track the 
common good, which is essential to maintaining republican liberty. For 
republicans, these forms of power are not barriers to their freedom, but instead 
are the foundation upon which their freedom firmly resides (Skinner, 1984: 217- 
9; also see Mouffe, 1993: 38). 
Republicans understand that republican laws and institutions cannot be 
successful in maintaining and enhancing nondomination if there is not sufficient 
moral belief in not only their legitimacy, but also their capacity to prevent 
arbitrary interference. Machiavelli maintained that "just as good morals, if they 
are to be maintained, have need of good laws, so the laws, if they are to be 
observed, have need of good morals" (Machiavelli, The Discourses, 1965: 241). 
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Republicans believe that strong and well-grounded laws and institutions can 
only be fully effective if they have a sufficient degree of legitimacy and 
allegiance among the people and are recognised in the norms of society (Pettit, 
1997: 241-2). To this end, civic virtue and citizenship play important roles in 
securing the conditions of nondomination. The republican state will promote 
certain character traits and virtues through distinctive versions of citizenship 
and, in doing so, will educate individuals in the substantive ideals of 
nondomination. Importantly, as individuals come to realise the reciprocal and 
constitutional power of nondomination, the ways in which they evaluate their 
needs will be shaped in two important areas. First, if the state is to track 
properly the interests of its citizens, then there must be a sufficient amount of 
virtue and participation in the forums of the state to register accurately just what 
those interests are (Pettit, 1998: 87). The necessary virtues that make up the 
republican version of citizenship help individuals articulate their own interests 
to the state and to others who must account for and track them if they are to live 
truly nondominated lives. Republican citizenship helps to provide a common 
discourse for individuals to voice clearly and accurately their concerns and 
demands so that the state and others can register their interests and respond 
appropriately. If individuals are not prepared to let the state or others know what 
their interests are, how can others or the state not dominate them? By 
promoting civic virtue and access to a common language of citizenship, the 
republican state prepares citizens to play the necessary active role in their own 
nondomination. 
In the second area, republican citizenship not only educates future citizens 
in the ways of politics and government, but also teaches them the necessary 
virtues that help individuals not to dominate others. Not to dominate others, 
citizens must learn to account for and track the interests of their fellow citizens 
so that they can properly respond to their demands. They must learn to listen 
and to attempt to understand why these individuals and/or groups have different 
values from themselves. As I noted earlier, according to Quentin Skinner, this 
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sentiment is associated with the type of Renaissance humanism that influenced 
Machiavelli and other subsequent republican writers. For republicans, then, the 
"watchword ought to be audi alteram partem, always listen to the other side. " 
Thus, the most suitable model to fit the republican emphasis on listening to the 
other side is that of a dialogue and "a willingness to negotiate over rival 
institutions concerning the applicability of evaluative terms. [Republicans] strive 
to reach understanding and resolve disputes in a conversational way" (Skinner, 
1996: 15-6; also see Pettit, 1997: 189). To be sure, nothing in republican theory 
suggests that individuals have to agree with or accept alternative points of view 
or change their own beliefs in light of them. Indeed, they will most often reject 
the claims of others. But, as I argued in chapter 2, they must first make an effort 
to listen to and understand their differences so that they do not interfere 
arbitrarily with them. In short, they must learn to cast their own interests in a 
manner that does not dominate others. Essential to this endeavour, then, is an 
effort to account for and track the interests of others which civic virtue and 
republican citizenship helps them to do. 
Republican citizens understand that nondomination is not a one way street. 
Citizens who live in a republican state characterised by freedom as 
nondomination will have a duty and responsibility not to interfere arbitrarily with 
others. If they do, the state's constitutional provisions will ask them to account 
for their domination and may force sanctions on them if they do not recast their 
ends in a nondominating manner. To be sure, there can and will be deep 
disagreements in a republican state, but domination must be minimised. To 
avoid the sanctions of the state, individuals must learn to account for and track 
the interests of others and to respond appropriately without dominating them. 
Republican citizenship and the virtues that accompany it help individuals to do 
this. Not surprisingly, some comprehensive ideals will fare better than others in 
a state characterised by republican liberty as nondomination. However, it is only 
those moral doctrines that seek to dominate others which will be confronted by 
the constitutional form of nondomination. Thus, all competing ideas of the good 
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are tolerated, allowed access to the public forums, and tracked as long as they 
do not arbitrarily interfere with others. Nondomination will not solve all 
disagreements, nor does it seek to. Indeed it is likely to cause quite a few as 
citizens actively engage one another as they, and the state, attempt to account 
for and track the interests of the many competing conceptions of the good held 
by those who comprise today's modern polity. Some may argue that the 
inevitable conflict and discord brought about by a population that is constantly 
engaging with itself will be a strain on stability and threaten liberty. 
Republicans, however, disagree because while internal discord and tumults may 
be threats to liberty, they can also be crucial components of it. Admittedly, 
nondomination and the effort to end actual or threatened domination in any form 
is likely to bring difference and diversity out into the open. But it does so in a 
non-threatening manner. In order to secure and maintain liberty, republicans 
believe that we must be prepared to explore our differences guided by the ideals 
and values of republican citizenship and civic virtue. The tumultuous, but yet 
vibrant, society that emerges from such a project is an important component of 
republican liberty. In order to explore further how contemporary republicanism 
can respond to pluralism in a distinct and compelling fashion, the next section 
will look at how Machiavelli responded to challenges to liberty from the different 
interests that comprised the Roman republic and the Florentine city-state. In 
doing so, it is my intent to construct a compelling contemporary republican 
response to pluralism. 
Section 2- Discord And Diversity: The Life and Death of the Republic 
2.1 - Machiavelli's break with the past 
A controversial, but yet significant aspect of republican theory has been the 
enigmatic role assigned to civic discord and its relation to stability and liberty. 
Many Roman writers believed that one of the keys to maintaining a republic was 
to ensure that there was internal concord. Cicero's concordia ordinum was the 
basis of the belief that the common good took precedence over factional or 
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selfish interest (Skinner, 1990a: 130). Machiavelli challenged this belief by 
arguing that one of the keys to maintaining republican liberty was a progressive 
and inclusive effort to tolerate and institutionalise the inevitable clash of internal 
divisions found within republics. Building on the republican conception of liberty 
discussed above, a closer look at this debate will be a useful exercise in light of 
the deep diversity facing today's modern polity. This section will first look at the 
role of civil discord in republican thought before exploring republican remedies 
and technologies that were designed to cope with vastly different interests. At 
the heart of this issue is Machiavelli's belief in the connection between liberty, 
good education, and good laws and institutions. Using this as our starting point, 
it is possible to construct a contemporary republican response to pluralism. 
In the opening chapters of The Discourses, Machiavelli recounts how the 
early tumults of Rome were important to the laws and institutions that ensured 
republican liberty. Machiavelli believed that Rome's liberty was enhanced by 
the clashes that resulted from the different dispositions of the upper classes and 
the populace. It was this type of inevitable conflict that was not only necessary 
for republics, but a healthy sign of a free and prosperous state. 
Nor can a republic in any way reasonably be called unregulated where 
there are so many instances of honourable conduct; for these good 
instances have their origin in good education; good education in good 
laws; good laws in those dissensions that many thoughtlessly condemn. 
For anyone who will properly examine their outcome will not find that they 
produced any exile or violence damaging to the common good, but rather 
laws and institutions conducive to public liberty (Machiavelli, The 
Discourses, 1965: 203). 
Central to Machiavelli's understanding of Roman liberty was a belief that 
although internal discord and conflict required constant vigilance and attention, 
the resulting political activity and its subsequent influence on the creation of 
good laws and institutions designed to accommodate the diversity of interests 
was a necessary strength of republican government. Importantly, it was 
Machiavelli's belief that education, civic virtue, and the laws and institutions of 
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the state were not only inextricably connected to and dependent on one another, 
but to liberty as well. Thus, without sufficient levels of education and virtue, the 
laws and institutions of the state would suffer, resulting in the loss of liberty. 
Consequently, in republics the maintenance of liberty as nondomination is 
directly tied to sufficient levels of education and civic virtue. For Machiavelli, 
then, tumults and internal conflict are not only unavoidable, but their proper 
management has important implications for the successful maintenance of 
republican liberty as nondomination. 
Machiavelli's republican contemporaries, however, exalted the stability 
found in the Venetian republic that accorded with the concordia ordinum of 
Cicero and relied on a mixed constitution that vested political power in the 
nobility. Against the backdrop of intense civil discord among many of the Italian 
city-states, Machiavelli's contemporaries celebrated Venice and the harmonious 
co-existence between the classes that became its hallmark and, subsequently, 
the characteristic most likely to be coveted by observers. Later republicans, 
most notably James Harrington, seized on Venice's stable and tranquil image 
and promoted it as the ideal republican model. In The Commonwealth of 
Oceana, Harrington's treatise on republican government, he advocated an 
elaborate constitutional mechanism based primarily on the Venetian model that 
would control men's appetite for corruption and avarice through rotating 
representative bodies (Harrington, 1992: 33). In this way, private differences 
were controlled and directed into the common good which resulted in a stable 
and tranquil environment. Oceana sought to balance out private interests so 
that, in many ways, they cancelled themselves out. Such measures, for 
Harrington, were aimed at structuring society in a narrow and specific fashion 
that eliminated the tumults of Rome, and instead emulated tranquil Venice. 
However, the question of whether to emulate Rome or Venice amounts to 
a false choice for republicans. Although Machiavelli never explicitly 
acknowledges the pluralism inherent within his world view, some critics have 
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argued that implicit within his thought is the basis for a republican account of 
difference and diversity (Berlin, 1981: 75; Parel, 1992: 111; and Garver, 1996: 
206). Machiavelli challenged the belief that there was only one supreme value 
system. Machiavelli's world was a complex one in which the various humours 
that comprised his society were in constant conflict with one another, with 
sometimes disastrous consequences. However, as I argued above, Machiavelli 
realised that society was comprised of many different and sometimes 
incompatible values and thus challenged the prevailing wisdom of the 
consequences of tumults and internal conflict. For Machiavelli, according to 
Berlin, "society is, normally, a battlefield in which there are conflicts between 
and within groups. These conflicts can be controlled only by the judicious use 
of both persuasion and force" (Berlin, 1981: 41). In order to secure liberty, then, 
Machiavelli embraced the goodness that could come of such conflicts if they 
were controlled and directed in a distinctive republican fashion. For Garver, 
"Machiavelli discovers in factions the value of diversity and plurality.... " 
Furthermore, Machiavelli advocated a republican model that would incorporate 
these incompatible ends within itself and navigate around them with deliberation 
and activity (Garver, 1996: 206-8). Machiavelli's solution to this dilemma was 
to use history to learn how to deal positively with difference and diversity without 
risking the security or liberty of the republic. By contrasting the fortunes of 
Rome and Florence, Machiavelli develops an account of how to cope with 
diversity and difference by constructing distinctive republican laws and 
institutions that would channel the dynamic energy created by an active 
populace. 
2.2 - Rome vs. Florence 
Writing in the History of Florence, Machiavelli elaborates on, and in many 
ways seems to contradict, his earlier affinity for civil conflict and internal discord. 
Florence, for Machiavelli, was a city that was caught between two extremes: it 
was not entirely capable of preserving its liberty while unable to accept servitude 
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(Machiavelli, The History of Florence, 1965: 1128). Instead of creating the 
conditions that would make Florence great, the tumults and internal conflicts 
brought about misery and servitude for its inhabitants. Even in the Discourses 
we can see Machiavelli's initial affinity for civil discord begin to wane, and in 
book 1, chapter 37 he seems to contradict himself by suggesting that the 
internal power struggle between the grandi (nobility) and the popolo (people) 
over the Agrarian law was one of the causes of the decline in the Roman 
republic (Machiavelli, The Discourses, 1965: 272-275, esp. 274). Gisela Bock, 
however, has argued that these differences are not necessarily contradictory, 
and instead highlight a much more substantive point about Machiavelli's belief 
in the necessary connection between education, virtue, and the institutions and 
laws of the republic (Bock, 1990: 181-201). 
In his detailed history of the city-state, Machiavelli recounts how time and 
time again factions seized power only to be plagued by divisive inner conflict 
which made them susceptible to being overthrown. The resulting conflicts 
greatly weakened Florence and created the conditions for the population to 
become corrupt and to be completely at the mercy of the rulers, regardless of 
who they were (Machiavelli, The History of Florence, 1965: 1031). Casting the 
struggle for power as not only one between the grandi and the popolo, but these 
classes amongst themselves, Machiavelli continuously recounts how these 
power struggles tore Florence apart. In book III of the History of Florence, 
Machiavelli directly compares the Florentine situation to that of Rome and 
concludes that although both cities were beset with similar internal divisions, the 
outcomes of such divisions were very different. Thus, even though the tumults 
in Rome and Florence had similar causes, these causes had very different 
effects on liberty (Bock, 1990: 188). "In the two cities diverse effects were 
produced, because the enmities that at the outset existed in Rome between the 
people and the nobles were ended by debating, those in Florence by fighting. " 
Furthermore, "it must be that this difference of effects was caused by the 
different purposes of the two peoples, for the people of Rome wished to enjoy 
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supreme honours along with the nobles; the people of Florence fought to be 
alone in the government, without any participation in it by the nobles" 
(Machiavelli, The History of Florence, 1965: 1140). 
For Machiavelli, then, the civil discord found in Rome differed from that 
found in Florence because in the case of the former, the resulting remedies - 
good laws and institutions - were the very strengths and hallmarks of 
republicanism that he celebrated. Whereas in the case of Florence, internal 
discord led only to violence, death, and ultimately the loss of liberty and 
servitude. Furthermore, the motivations of the citizens were different in each 
case, with the Florentines desiring power and the Romans liberty. For 
Machiavelli, Florence went from slavery not to republican freedom, as the 
Romans did, but to unrestrained liberty or licenzia (Parel, 1996: 140-1). Thus, 
it is important to note how differently the Florentines and the Romans conceived 
their self-interests and the effects this had on their liberty. For the Romans, their 
self-interest was tied to a larger concern for the common good, whereas the 
Florentines held a narrow and atomistic conception of self-interest that directly 
contributed to their inability to construct a true republican state characterised by 
liberty as nondomination. Thus, in Florence, the different groups were always 
at odds with one another because they each pursued their own narrow self- 
interest without any regard for the interests of the whole (Parel, 1992: 108). 
Without proper motivations, then, groups become factions and threaten the 
security of liberty and the maintenance of the republic. 
In addition to their different motivations, another key reason for the failure 
of the Florentine republic, for Machiavelli, was that in Rome suitable institutions 
were set up to give reasonable expositions of internal conflict so that the 
diversity and difference found in the citizenry had suitable public outlets. In The 
Discourses book 1, chapter 7 Machiavelli argues that essential to the stability 
of republics are the many public forums and institutions which provide proper 
outlets for disagreements and differences between the various humours that 
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comprise the republic (Machiavelli, The Discourses, 1965: 211). 1 That Florence 
lacked proper republican institutions was, for Machiavelli, a key reason for its 
inability to be free. The lack of appropriate outlets for the disagreements and 
differences within and among the many factions found within Florence resulted 
in the uncontrollable and ultimately destructive civil discord that prevented 
liberty from being realised. In Florence, the constitution and law became the 
primary instruments of factional conflict, whereas in Rome it became the means 
of controlling the tumults and calumnies of group conflict (Parel, 1992: 108). It 
also resulted in many citizens becoming disillusioned with the ability of the state 
to secure liberty and caused them to pursue self-interest and power instead. 
Thus, Machiavelli believed that in order to maintain liberty, proper republican 
institutions were essential. Furthermore, if these institutions were to support 
liberty, they necessarily had to be inclusive and open to the many different 
interests found within the republic so that vibrant public debates could take 
place. If republican institutions did secure liberty, Machiavelli believed that 
individuals would be less likely to pursue their own private interests, and more 
likely to respect the common good. An example of Machiavelli's belief in proper 
public forums and inclusionary government is his prescription for Florence in the 
Discourse on Remodelling the Government of Florence. In this short work, 
Machiavelli stresses the need for inclusive public bodies comprised of 
representatives from the various classes and guilds found in Florence 
(Machiavelli, Discourse on Remodelling the GovernmentofFlorence, 1965: 101- 
115). For Machiavelli, it was important that proper republican institutions were 
available to the various humours found in Florence because an inclusive and 
open government would secure the necessary conditions for republican liberty 
and free the people of Florence from their self-inflicted servitude. 
Important for our purposes here is a closer look at how Machiavelli 
characterises the different interests and humours that contributed to the conflict 
'For a good discussion on the role of humours in Machiavelli's political writings 
see Parel (1992: 101-112; 140-152) and Ivison (1997: 58). 
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in Rome and later in Florence. In light of the many interests that comprise the 
modern polity, it will be important to ask ourselves if any parallels can be found 
between the conflicts described in Machiavelli's work and the conflicts found 
today. Machiavelli often wrote of how the umori or main social groups - the 
grandi, popolo, and sometimes the plebs - struggled against one another for 
power. Indeed, it is this example that he relies on early in The Discourses as he 
celebrates the internal tumults found in Rome between the Senate and the 
plebs, and how the resulting laws and institutions served as the foundation and 
protector of Roman liberty (Machiavelli, The Discourses, 1965: 202-204). Later 
in the Discourses, Machiavelli further explains the differences between the two 
groups by stating that the grandi have a longing to dominate and the popolo a 
desire to be free from domination (Machiavelli, The Discourses, 1965: 204). 
Bock maintains that even in Machiavelli's use of language, we can discern just 
how his varied view of civil discord manifested itself in his writings and whether 
or not he was expressing positive or negative opinions (Bock, 1990: 182-3). 
The variegated vocabulary he uses in this connection would not seem to 
leave any doubt as to the negativity of the phenomenon: discordia (civile), 
divisione, odio, inimicizie, disunione, disordine, disparere, parti, sette and 
occasionally, fazioni and contenzioni. On the other side, to the vision of a 
well-ordered city he applies a vocabulary that includes such terms as 
unione, amicizia, quiete, pace, stabilitä, amore or amore della patria (Bock, 
1990: 182-3). 
An example of this can be found in the later books of the History of Florence 
where Machiavelli's language turns decidedly negative as he explicitly recounts 
how the different factions began to divide among themselves resulting in great 
tumults and pain to the citizens of Florence. In book VII, Machiavelli heaps 
disgust on how the sette (sects, factions) began to cause Florence new and 
more serious problems than the earlier tumults caused by the struggle between 
the grandi, popolo, and plebs. Importantly, the sette were quite distinct from the 
differences found in the umori that had occupied much of Machiavelli's attention 
in the Discourses and earlier parts of The History of Florence. According to 
Bock, "the divisions [were] not between the horizontal class-like umori, but 
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between vertical groups such as families (case), clans, client groups, [and] 
patronage systems" (Bock, 1990: 196-7). Machiavelli is careful to point out that 
the umori were unavoidable naturally occurring groupings that could be 
controlled by proper laws and institutions. The sette, however, presented a 
more serious and often fatal problem for republics and needed constant 
attention (Bock, 1990: 196-7). 2 According to Machiavelli, these types of private 
and un-natural divisions represent a real threat to liberty and should be avoided. 
Sette or factions which sought power to dominate others and to promote their 
own private good above that of the common good are fatal for republics and 
result in the loss of liberty and, thus, servitude. It follows that it is only those 
factions that have a narrow conception of self-interest and seek to dominate 
others that are real dangers to the republic. 
2.3 - legitimate difference and diversity 
That Machiavelli believed that factions should be avoided does not, 
however, mean that republicans do not look favourably on diversity and 
difference. Importantly, it should be remembered that despite the language 
Machiavelli employed to describe the various interests and differences found 
within the community; certain conclusions remained constant and are extremely 
useful for addressing the problems facing a modern polity characterised by deep 
moral pluralism. For Machiavelli, legitimate difference and diversity were 
naturally occurring phenomena and the only way to cope appropriately with them 
was to tolerate and institutionalise them within a true republican constitutional 
framework that sought to secure and promote liberty (Bock, 1990: 201). An 
important distinction for Machiavelli was the origin and motivation of the different 
humours found in the republic and which kind could legitimately make public 
claims. For Machiavelli, factions were selfish and un-natural groups who sought 
to subjugate others to their own private interests and, thus, represented a real 
threat to liberty and should be opposed. Different in nature to factions, however, 
For further discussion see Bock (1990: 197-8). 
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legitimate claims of diversity and difference do not necessarily represent a threat 
to liberty. Machiavelli believed that internal tumults were inevitable given the 
different dispositions of the many divisions found within republics. Because 
such divisions could be fatal to liberty, Machiavelli argued that the best course 
of action was for the republic to give them appropriate public outlets where their 
competing interests could find meaningful expression. Additionally, the effects 
of such an inclusionary government would strengthen the republic because a 
republic that progressively responded to the challenges presented to it by 
diversity and difference was one that was the most likely to secure and enhance 
liberty for its citizens. And it was only in an ideal republic that the different 
dispositions of the citizenry could find their proper public expositions without 
threatening liberty. To be sure, difference and diversity are, for Machiavelli, real 
and constant threats to liberty. However, despite the inherent risks associated 
with a diverse citizenry, difference and diversity help to form crucial components 
of republican liberty. "They are both the life and the death of the republic" 
(Bock, 1990: 201). 
Thus, factions, brought on by legitimate and naturally occurring difference 
and diversity, can have inherent value for republicans. Machiavelli believed that 
by bringing competition out into the open so that it could be observed and 
checked, republics would contain the necessary flexibility and energy to secure 
republican liberty. For Machiavelli, the Romans found, albeit by accident, "the 
right means for safely using the energy factions supply" (Garver, 1996: 206). 
While the aim of some factions may be the promotion of their own narrow self- 
interests, the result of the activity generated by them can help support the 
common good when combined with proper republican institutions and laws 
(Garver, 1996: 207). According to Machiavelli: 
Thence is comes that a republic, being able to adapt herself, by means of the 
diversity among her body of citizens, to a diversity of temporal conditions 
better than a prince can, is of greater duration than a princedom and has 
good fortune longer (Machiavelli, The Discourses, 1965: 453). 
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By factoring in the given nature of diversity and difference, republics have many 
ways of doing things and increased flexibility when it comes to securing liberty 
for its citizens (Garver, 1996: 209). Factions may cause republics to be 
unstable at times, but they require individuals to keep maximum vigilance and 
attention which leads to the creation of good laws and institutions that can offer 
innovative solutions to the often complex problems brought about by a 
population defined by difference and diversity. 
2.4 - good laws and institutions 
From the threats to liberty caused by discord and conflict emerge 
necessary, but yet dynamic, laws and institutions which secure and enhance 
freedom for republican citizens. The content and forms of these laws and 
institutions are aimed at preserving the common good and not promoting any 
private or factional interests (Machiavelli, The History of Florence, 1965: 1145- 
1148, esp. 1146). Furthermore, good laws and institutions will affect republican 
citizens in a positive manner by educating them in the ways of nondomination. 
Important in Machiavelli's belief in the rule of law is an understanding that no 
one is exempt from it and that all those who stand before it do so as equals. ' 
Echoing Cicero, Machiavelli believed that civic inequality created very 
dangerous conditions for republics because it resulted in unmanageable conflict 
(Viroli, 1990: 153). Without civic equality, then, it is easy to see how republican 
liberty is lost because corrupt factions place their own narrow interests above 
that of the community (Machiavelli, The Discourses, 1965: 306-10, esp. 310). 
Another important feature of Machiavelli's strong belief in equality is his 
insistence that all citizens have access to public offices. Without open public 
access, some citizens may lose faith in the laws and institutions of the republic 
because they do not see them promoting the common good, but rather believe 
'As I noted in chapter 1, it is important to note that Machiavelli's equality is not 
social or economic in nature, but rather legal and political. For further 
discussion see Bock (1990: 189). 
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that they are being used for private gain (Machiavelli, The Discourses, 1965: 
242). The resulting damage to the republic is twofold. First, the republic loses 
access to a wide range of good ideas and potentially virtuous citizens, and 
second, citizens are denied proper avenues to make demands on the state, 
which may result in them seeking satisfaction through their own narrow self- 
interests at the expense of the common good. Returning to the Discourse on the 
Remodelling the Government of Florence, Machiavelli argues that unless public 
offices are open to the most qualified, and not just those from certain groups or 
classes, many virtuous and intelligent citizens will be alienated from the 
government which may force some to seek power through subversive factions 
(Machiavelli, Discourse on the Remodelling the Government of Florence, 1965: 
101-115). Furthermore, in The Discourses book 3, chapter 25 Machiavelli 
argues that one of the reasons that the Roman republic survived as long as it 
did was the openness of public offices regardless of income or group 
membership. All citizens, rich or poor, were able to make demands on the state 
to register their interests. 
Machiavelli argues that the only positive way to deal with the prevalent 
difference and diversity found within society was to incorporate all the groups 
into the political system so that they can use republican citizenship and 
technology to resolve their differences without threatening liberty. To support 
this claim, Parel maintains that in a properly constituted republic, diverse social 
groups can resolve their differences "through the medium of the constitution and 
the law.... so that no group can dominate public affairs or put their own narrow 
self-interest forward as the only way" (Parel, 1992: 107). In this way, the diverse 
groups share power and serve as a check on each other. This ensures that the 
republic as a whole provides for the satisfaction of all the relevant groups that 
constitute it. To this end, the republic encourages the development of citizens 
from as many different backgrounds and beliefs as possible within the larger 
scope of republican liberty (Parel, 1992: 107-8). Thus citizenship, civic virtue, 
and education all play essential roles in republican government and in the lives 
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of republican citizens. Without widespread civic virtue and citizenship, the laws 
and institutions of the republic will inevitably be driven by private interests, and 
therefore dominate some individuals or groups. The necessary engagement in 
the machineries of government, in whatever form, ensures that narrow private 
interests do not rise to the level of domination and that the common good 
prevails. Because Machiavelli's faith in the goodness of people was limited, he 
believed that unless proper republican institutions were in place, some 
individuals would seek to promote their own private interests and dominate 
others causing liberty to be Iost. 4 Isaiah Berlin has argued that Machiavelli 
believed that "only [an] adequate education can make [citizens] physically and 
mentally sturdy, vigorous, ambitious, and energetic enough for effective co- 
operation in the pursuit of order, power, glory, and success" (Berlin, 1981: 40). 
Furthermore, certain traits of character are necessary for republics to develop 
in order to secure republican liberty. "By developing certain faculties in 
[citizens], of inner moral strength, magnanimity, vigour, vitality, generosity, 
loyalty, above all public spirit, civic sense, [and a] dedication to the security, 
power, glory, [and] expansion of the patria" (Berlin, 1981: 43-4). For Berlin, 
then, Machiavelli's values were not purely instrumental, but moral and ultimate 
(Berlin, 1981: 57). That is, these values were not merely a means to well being 
or wealth, they were goods themselves and had inherent value. Thus, within 
Machiavelli's thought, republics had good and compelling reasons not only to 
tolerate the diversity found within society, but to develop and exploit the benefits 
brought on by such differences in order to secure liberty. As in the case of 
Rome, Machiavelli believed that the various dispositions of the groups that 
constituted society when combined with strong and just laws and institutions 
yielded a stable, but yet fluid, balance that secured liberty and maintained the 
vitality of the republic. 
'For a useful discussion on Machiavelli's view of people see Ivison (1997: 65-6). 
Also see Berlin (1981: 41). 
206 
Furthermore, as discussed above, Machiavelli envisioned a close and 
intimate relationship between the laws and institutions of a republic and the 
citizens that comprised it (Machiavelli, The Discourses, 1965: 486). For 
Machiavelli, an important interdependent relationship existed between the 
governed and the rules that governed them. Because of this interdependent 
and intimate relationship, republican institutions and the laws that emerge from 
them are directly related to the level of education and virtue found in the 
citizenry and vice versa (Machiavelli, The Discourses, 1965: 241). The higher 
the quality of debate and deliberation, the higher the quality of law with respect 
to nondomination will follow. To this end, the inevitable internal tumults and 
conflicts that emerge from a population defined by difference and diversity must 
be channelled by republican institutions into appropriate outlets to produce 
successful policies that do not dominate and secure liberty while at the same 
time they promote the common good over private interests (Machiavelli, The 
Discourses, 1965: 421). A tumultuous populace, for Machiavelli, was the logical 
extension of an active citizenry and thus a manifestation of civic virtue (Skinner, 
1978: 181). Thus, republican institutions and laws need virtuous citizens, just 
as virtuous citizens need good laws and institutions to protect and enhance their 
freedom. And as discussed earlier, Machiavelli directly correlates the relative 
goodness of people to the quality of laws and institutions and to their 
maintenance and security of liberty. 
A Tribune, and any other citizen whatever, had the right to propose a law 
to the people; on this every citizen was permitted to speak, either for or 
against, before it was decided. This custom was good when the citizens 
were good, because it has always been desirable that each one who thinks 
of something of benefit to the public should have the right to propose it. 
And it is good that each one should be permitted to state his opinion on it, 
in order that the people, having heard each, may choose the better. But 
when the citizens became wicked, such a basic custom became very bad, 
because only the powerful proposed laws, not for the common liberty but 
for their own power, and for fear of such men no one dared to speak 
against those laws. Thus the people were either deceived or forced into 
decreeing their own ruin (Machiavelli, The Discourses, 1965: 242). 
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Thus, republican institutions and laws are a reflection of the level of virtue found 
in the population and vice versa. Proper republican institutions and laws help 
to channel the conflicting interests of the different and diverse humours found 
among the population while at the same time rendering a free and open society 
secure in its freedom. A republican state characterised by liberty as 
nondomination is not hostile to pluralism. In fact, it relies on the energy 
generated by a healthy and diverse population to secure important components 
of republican liberty. It does so in a distinct, but yet compelling manner, that not 
only expects the inevitable clash of diversity and difference in republican forums, 
but in many ways relies on them to help secure republican liberty. 
Education and civic virtue form important components of republican 
versions of citizenship that are directly linked to the quality of institutions and 
laws that emerge from an active and diverse population. Because certain 
inherent conflicts and tumults are inevitable, republicans believe that good 
institutions and laws are essential to the maintenance of liberty. If individuals 
want security and liberty given the diversity inherent within society, they need a 
well-ordered republic to help them achieve it (Parel, 1992: 140). Republicans 
understand that diversity and difference are real threats to liberty, but they also 
believe that they play important roles in securing liberty as nondomination. 
Respecting individuals as citizens, republicans believe that appropriate public 
forums and outlets help channel the dynamic energy of the various humours 
found within the republic. Because the success orfailure of republican laws and 
institutions is directly related to the cultivation of civic virtue through particular 
versions of republican citizenship, a rigorous public effort is necessary. Liberty 
can be threatened by difference and diversity, but it can also be secured by it. 
Section 3- Coping with Pluralism 
In the historical section above, I have attempted to outline just how 
Machiavelli responded to the challenges to liberty caused by the difference and 
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diversity found in ancient Rome and later in Florence. I have argued that 
important lessons can be learned from exploring how Machiavelli responded to 
difference and diversity, and that the republican tradition can be helpful in 
addressing contemporary concerns by stressing the intimate connection 
between liberty as nondomination, civic virtue, citizenship, and good laws and 
institutions. To be sure, my claim is not a historical one, but rather one that 
seeks to use Machiavelli's historical account to provide a firm foundation to the 
contemporary claims of nondomination as a public philosophy. While 
Machiavelli's experiences with difference and diversity can not be said to be of 
the same kind as the radical and deep diversity comprising the modern polity, 
it is my belief that we can take the main thrust of his thoughts and construct a 
compelling contemporary republican account of pluralism. This section seeks 
to bring Machiavelli's remedies to difference and diversity out of the history of 
ideas and construct the foundation for a distinctive republican account of 
pluralism. To explore fully my contemporary claims, it will be useful to look at 
Charles Taylor's criticism of the liberal state to delineate the key differences 
between Sandel's brand of republicanism, liberalism, and my neo-Roman 
version of republicanism. 
3.1 - respecting the `other' 
Responding to Michael Sandel's claims in Democracy's Discontent, 
Charles Taylor has recently suggested that much of the discontent in today's 
modern liberal polity does not necessarily come from the actual measures put 
forth by the liberal state, but from what individuals see as the motivation behind 
these measures (Taylor, 1998: 216). In other words, liberal remedies to the 
problems facing the modern polity are not necessarily problematic in 
themselves, it is the motivation behind them that causes some in society to 
withdraw from politics and heap disdain on the liberal state. Because the liberal 
state has asked them to bracket off their own personal value systems in light of 
a liberal commitment to reasonable agreement, those who disagree are branded 
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unreasonable. Taylor's fear is that the liberal state's definition of 
reasonableness is too stringent and that by labelling unreasonable those who 
do not, or cannot, bracket their own value systems, the liberal state exacerbates 
the conditions for fundamental conflict among those groups and communities 
that comprise it. Instead, he argues, the liberal state should be less concerned 
with expressing itself with recourse to fundamental expressions of justice 
through procedural claims and more concerned with doing what is right to the 
`other'. 
To illustrate his point, Taylor uses a hypothetical example of Christian 
parents advocating school prayer in the public school system to argue that the 
liberal state undermines its own position by unnecessarily degrading those who 
disagree with its policies. Liberals, he argues, have two broad ways in which 
they can react to demands for Christian prayer in schools. On the one hand, 
they can deny these demands by asking the Christian parents to consider the 
feelings of those in the school who do not share their belief in Christianity. The 
upshot of this approach is that all those who are party to the decision, and their 
comprehensive doctrines that motivate them, are recognised as making 
legitimate demands on the state. This public recognition lets them know that 
they have a place in the deliberative community, and that their value system is 
at least respected, if not officially adopted. For Taylor, because an individual's 
identity is at least "partly shaped by recognition or its absence.... nonrecognition 
or misrecognition can inflict harm [and be] a form of oppression" (Taylor, 1994: 
25). On the other hand, the state could deny the request by stressing how these 
demands are inconsistent with the latent moral principles of the modern liberal 
polity because they violate fundamental procedures - in this case the 
separation between church and state (Taylor, 1998: 217). This denial, the kind 
of denial that Taylor believes liberals often opt for, would have the effect of 
demonstrating that these values are inconsistent with principles that we all 
reasonablely could agree upon. Thus, instead of recognising the value that 
these ideals have to their adherents, these ideals and the lifestyles that promote 
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them are deemed unreasonable. Taylor argues that liberals need to find an 
alternative way of framing the debate that doesn't give precedence to procedural 
principles, but rather gives each identity and value a fair hearing in light of the 
circumstances present (Taylor, 1998: 218). The liberal reply to this, according 
to Taylor, is to promote equal respect and fair procedures that adjudicate 
according to the principles that reasonable comprehensive doctrines can accept. 
But, for Taylor, "we are left with the paradox, that a theory which is meant to be 
based on equal respect ends up offering what many supposed beneficiaries 
cannot help seeing as the very opposite of respect" (Taylor, 1998: 219). 
Taylor's solution is to adopt an approach that puts consideration of the `other' 
at the fore instead of procedural values. He advocates a deliberative process 
that asks all those involved to listen and try to understand the demands of others 
in the deliberative community. However, this system cannot exist on its own, it 
must embody a strong commitment from those who participate in it in order to 
maintain itself and function properly. Like Sandel, Taylor believes that the civic 
humanism of Aristotle and Arendt is needed to ensure that there is proper 
allegiance and participation in the deliberative process. And like Miller, Taylor 
believes that those who do participate in the process should not be asked to 
bracket off their comprehensive identities in order to participate (Taylor, 1998: 
221). Taylor's complaint is that liberals unnecessarily start a cultural war based 
on difference and diversity by branding a lot of valid and important beliefs 
unreasonable. 
Now I have some sympathy with Taylor on this issue. And while my 
solution is quite different from his, it is one that I believe he would have good 
reasons to accept. As I argued in chapter 4, Miller is right to maintain that 
liberal attempts to deal with diversity and difference by asking individuals to 
bracket off their comprehensive identities are impossible in light of the deep 
pluralism in the modern polity (Miller, 1995). Furthermore, as I have argued 
above, liberal attempts to cope with diversity and difference by resorting to strict 
liberal neutrality and equal respect are also deeply troubling. But the solution 
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is not to embrace the human flourishing of the civic humanist approach. Rather, 
I believe that nondomination can help solve this problem without deeply 
offending either civic humanists or liberals. As I outlined in section 2, 
Machiavelli and those later neo-Roman republicans who followed him, did not 
have a singular supreme version of human flourishing. What they did have was 
a belief that liberty as nondomination had to be a key organising principle in 
constituting a republic. Additionally, instances of difference and diversity had 
to be tolerated and institutionalised within the technology of the state so that no 
one was subject to actual or threatened domination. The interdependent 
connection between liberty, good laws and institutions, and civic virtue and 
citizenship was important, but not because it embraced a singular version of 
human flourishing as civic humanists would have it. This intimate connection is 
important to republicans because it maintains and enhances liberty as 
nondomination and thus secures individuals and communities from domination. 
Furthermore, it gives republican citizens an opportunity to embrace certain 
goods that help them to do well and enriches their lives. Without sacrificing 
many of the key ideals of the civic humanist version of republicanism, my neo- 
Roman version would contain the strong commitment to citizenship and civic 
virtue that Sandel, Taylor and Miller advocate. Likewise, it would abandon strict 
state neutrality in favour of a distinctive republican bias that countenanced 
liberty as the absence of mastery. It would strive for a vibrant public culture 
where political activity was cherished. So how would this version of 
republicanism cope with Taylor's hypothetical example and how is it different 
from liberal approaches? 
By starting with a conception of liberty that conceives freedom as the 
absence of domination, republicanism can satisfy Taylor's call to focus on the 
`other' when faced with deep divisions, but without a singular version of human 
flourishing. A republican state characterised by nondomination requires that 
individuals not dominate others, just as it requires that the state itself should not 
be a dominator. What this requires is an effort to discover just what individuals' 
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and communities' true interests actually are. And to do this, all parties to the 
issue must be willing to sit down and listen and attempt to understand what each 
other party's interests actually are. For the state, and the citizens that comprise 
it, to not be dominators they must track the interests of the 'other'. Moreover, 
as discussed above, this doesn't mean that diverse interests always get their 
way, or that their wishes or desires are followed blindly. No state could operate 
in that manner. To track someone's interest, rather, means that their demands 
must be evaluated and responded to in an appropriate manner that considers 
just what their interests are in light of nondomination. It means that the state, 
and those individuals who are party to the issue at hand, must account for and 
then appropriately respond to the demands being made in light of the greater 
republican commitment to nondomination. So, in the case of school prayer, the 
republican state would have institutionalised and inclusive procedures that 
encouraged each party to engage one another in an open and public forum 
using the language of civic virtue and citizenship. This knowledge would be 
gained from not only their own experiences and particular socialising agents, it 
would also be gained from the republican state's own distinct civic education in 
virtue and citizenship. The decision being made would take all opinions and 
values of the participants into account before an appropriate, and most 
importantly, nondominating decision was reached. 
Each participant would stand before the forum as equals, and each 
comprehensive or encumbered identity would receive proper recognition by the 
state as a legitimate nondominating value system (if indeed they are 
nondominating). Each would be asked to consider the `other' and how their 
decision might impact on the many incompatible, but equally legitimate, value 
systems found in the polity. In difficult cases such as these, the keyword for the 
republican state must be accommodation. Shelly Burtt has argued that the 
modern polity must be prepared to accommodate wide ranging dissension from 
those individuals and groups whose final ends are in conflict with the state, 
especially over forms of public education (Burtt, 1994: 51-70). The republican 
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state has a responsibility to ensure that both proponents and opponents of 
school prayer in Taylor's hypothetical example can register their interest in a fair 
and meaningful manner so that each party's interests can be tracked and 
responded to appropriately. A republican state will seek to minimise, to the 
extent possible without sacrificing its larger commitment to nondomination, the 
arbitrariness of its decisions by accommodating a wide range of comprehensive 
moral doctrines by finding compromise solutions that ensure that all parties to 
the dispute are not subjected to arbitrary interference. Thus Taylor's concerns 
are met, but without relying on a singular conception of the good that contains 
a thick version of human flourishing. In the next chapter, I will explore my 
argument further when I develop and defend a republican approach to civic 
education. But what about liberals, how would they see this process? 
3.2 - nondomination and tracking values 
Liberals often complain about republicanism in both its neo-Roman and 
civic humanist forms. As I argued earlier, some liberals like Alan Patten charge 
that neo-Roman republicanism adds nothing to the liberal state because its 
values and ideals are instrumental in nature. Furthermore, for Patten, 
republicans place too much emphasis on active, and thus intrusive, versions of 
citizenship (Patten, 1996: 26; 36 esp. fn 41). Similarly, liberals such as Stephen 
Macedo and William Galston both believe that republicanism's focus on activity 
is too intrusive into each individual's personal sphere and results in unwarranted 
interference in their conception of the good (Macedo, 1990: 99; Galston, 1991: 
225). Even John Rawls, as I argued in chapter 4, believes that the republican 
commitment to activity can be troubling, especially if it falls outside of the basic 
structure of society. However, as I argued earlier, the republican commitment 
to activity is not just instrumental, nor does it necessarily restrict individuals' 
freedom by interfering in their personal identity. Because republicans do not 
see interference as such as a restriction of their freedom, the real question is not 
about whether or not this activity is interference. The crucial question for 
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republicans is whether or not this activity is arbitrary? And in response to this 
question, republicans would argue that this interference is not arbitrary because 
it tracks the interests of the people while securing the conditions for them to 
pursue their chosen ends, as long as those ends are nondominating, by 
protecting them from actual or threatened domination. The republican 
commitment to activity is centred on the republican belief that citizens wish to 
be free from mastery. That is, they desire freedom as nondomination, and to 
achieve this, they must be willing to be active in letting their interests be known 
so that the state, and other citizens, can track and appropriately respond to their 
demands. And, as I argued in section 2, this process is best fulfilled by certain 
republican technologies and a strong commitment to republican versions of civic 
virtue and citizenship. Furthermore, for republicans there is an interdependent 
relationship between liberty as nondomination, good laws and institutions, and 
civic virtue and citizenship. With the goal of ending domination, the republican 
state has distinct inclusive and open public forums which allow demands from 
any particular comprehensive moral doctrine. Separating those demands which 
come from factions from those which come from legitimate diverse moral 
traditions, the public forums of the republic help to form the common good and 
secure those individuals and communities from any actual or threatened 
domination. Furthermore, the republican polity relies on the dynamic energy 
created by its diverse communities to help secure and enhance liberty as 
nondomination. 
Another common complaint from liberals is that republicanism has not only 
an overly narrow definition of civic virtue and citizenship, but one which is 
fundamentally biassed with respect to cultural minorities and women. Donald 
Moon has charged that republicanism's versions of civic virtue and citizenship 
are too stringent because they rely on a strong commitment that not everyone 
can achieve (Moon, 1993: 148). Furthermore, Moon charges that republicanism 
relies on versions of civic virtue and citizenship that are rooted in ancient and 
exclusionary values that carry an inherent bias. Thus, for Moon, republican 
215 
virtue and citizenship contribute to a privileged status that in its very essence 
excludes women and minority groups because its fundamental ideals are based 
on values that are inherently biassed. Moon has a point: the classical 
republican image of virtue and citizenship was focussed on ideals that were 
inherently biassed. Furthermore, some republican constitutional mechanisms 
favoured the wealthy aristocracy of a privileged few and sought to protect their 
status as full citizens while the rest of society existed at a level far below. As 
I argued in chapter 1, the Machiavellian image of virtue is inherently tied to his 
view of military discipline and the willingness to take up arms to protect the 
beloved patria. Women and minority groups did not figure in the ancient 
republican image of citizen. There is no doubt that this approach must be 
emphatically jettisoned. But republican liberty as nondomination as a 
contemporary public philosophy requires as much. Nondomination has no time 
for exclusive elitist approaches to government that limit citizenship and subject 
large segments of the population to the interests of the few (Pettit, 1997: 96). 
A republican state characterised by nondomination must be a state that takes 
seriously the troubling historical and present realities of the shortcomings of 
equal treatment of cultural minorities and women. Indeed, the modern 
republican state must actively seek to address these complaints and redress 
past injustices of domination. According to Pettit, even though historically 
freedom as nondomination was only accessible to privileged males, its principles 
are cultural and gender free. In short, nondomination makes sense for all 
individuals, regardless of background or gender. In order to move beyond the 
pre-modern republican image of civic virtue and citizenship as the privileged 
domain of landed males, modern republicanism must progressively seek to end 
the domination of women and cultural minorities by actively fighting both real 
and threatened domination (Pettit, 1997: 139-46). Thus Moon's concerns are 
well placed, but nondomination can rise above and satisfy them. 
Returning to our school prayer example then, liberals have good reasons 
to accept the republican solution because the ideals and procedures of 
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republicanism are in many ways consistent with the liberal cause. Furthermore, 
republicans hold a negative conception of liberty that allows individuals to 
pursue their own chosen ends free from any actual or threatened domination as 
long as those ends are consistent with republican liberty. Where republicans 
will differ with liberals, though, is in the area of strict state neutrality and in 
asking individuals to bracket off their comprehensive identities. Thus, claims for 
school prayer would be evaluated in light of a greater republican commitment 
to nondomination. If the participants to the issue all reach agreement that 
ensures that no domination can occur with the outcome, then the issue is not 
about labelling one group or the other unreasonable. It is instead about arriving 
at a conclusion that does not dominate individual or community beliefs. Unlike 
liberals, then, republicans use nondomination as a tracking value. That is, the 
type of public justification that republicans prefer moves beyond whether or not 
a belief can be said to be reasonable to whether or not a belief can be said to 
be dominating. Thus, despite the claims of John Christman, there is a 
substantive difference between liberty as nondomination and other normative 
liberal claims (Christman, 1998: 205). The distinction emerges when we 
consider the differences in using nondomination as a tracking value and not 
limiting participation to those who are `reasonable'. The key differences 
between liberals and republicans, then, are that in the first case, republicanism 
cannot be said to be neutral because it stands for the supreme value of 
nondomination and acts with a particular bias against dominators to cultivate 
certain valuable ideals and virtues that enable individuals to do well. In the 
second case, where liberals' seek to arrive at procedures that all reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines can agree upon, the republican goal is to arrive at 
procedures that do not dominate any of the comprehensive doctrines present in 
society, whether or not liberals would consider them to be reasonable or 
unreasonable. 
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3.3 -a contemporary republican account of pluralism 
Republicanism takes a different approach to pluralism than the liberal 
accounts outlined above by starting with a conception of liberty that conceives 
freedom as the absence of domination. Accompanying this alternative 
conception of liberty are necessary and substantive ideals and institutions that 
constitute republican freedom. Furthermore, republicanism does not only accept 
the inevitability of moral pluralism, it seeks to harness and utilise the dynamic 
energy created by difference and diversity to help secure and enhance liberty. 
Just as Machiavelli accepted as given that some individuals and groups hold 
different, and sometimes incompatible value systems, a contemporary 
republican account of pluralism must also use this as its starting point. 
Republicans believe that given the pluralism present in today's society, a well 
constituted republic characterised by liberty as nondomination is the best way 
forward. For republicans, the choice is stark. We can either go down the path 
taken by Florence and hold a strictly negative conception of liberty and allow 
individuals or groups to develop into factions by promoting their own narrow self- 
interest and risk losing liberty as nondomination. Or we can let Rome serve as 
our model and seek to accommodate a wide range of possible final ends within 
the scope of nondomination by combining a rich account of citizenship with 
strong and robust institutions and laws. Furthermore, by understanding and 
incorporating the intimate and interdependent connection between education, 
civic virtue, good laws and institutions, and liberty, the modern polity 
characterised by liberty as nondomination seeks to allow its diverse groups both 
the ability and access to publicise their interests so that the arbitrary interference 
they may experience can be minimised. 
This effort will manifest itself in two main areas. In the first area, on a more 
nonpolitical and social level, republican liberty as nondomination requires that 
citizens acquire certain character traits and values through specific forms of 
citizenship that will assist them not only in their own nondomination, but in their 
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ability to cast their ends in a nondominating fashion. Because Machiavelli 
believed that there was an intimate relationship between good citizens and good 
laws and institutions, the republican approach must contain a robust account of 
citizenship. These values will help them acquire specific forms of civic virtue 
which will help them to cast their own life choices in a manner that does not 
arbitrarily interfere with others. By teaching citizens how to articulate and 
effectively publicise their interests through distinctive forms of republican 
citizenship, the republican state does not ask individuals and groups to bracket 
off their comprehensive identities like political liberalism when determining 
matters of basic justice. Furthermore, by maintaining that citizens' life choices 
must not dominate others, the republican state moves beyond comprehensive 
liberals' insistence on toleration and mutual respect. To be sure, republican 
forms of citizenship rely on more than the mere tolerance or respect of another's 
life choices. 
Republicanism teaches the necessary values and virtues that help 
individuals and groups ensure that their life choices do not arbitrarily interfere 
with others, just as it teaches others how not to dominate their life choices. 
Thus, the primary goal of republican citizenship is the inculcation of civic virtue 
and values aimed at teaching individuals the necessary skills of nondomination 
and how to cast and express their ends in a nondominating fashion which helps 
them to do well. A republican state characterised by liberty as nondomination 
requires that individuals not dominate others, just as it requires that the state 
itself should not be a dominator. Individuals and groups must be willing and able 
to make an effort to discover just what each other's true interests actually are. 
And to do this, all parties to the issue must be willing to sit down, listen, and 
attempt to understand what each other's interests actually are. As stated above, 
republicans attempt to solve disputes and arrive at mutual understandings in a 
conversational manner. Thus, the most appropriate model to fit the republican 
emphasis on listening to the other side is that of a dialogue (Skinner, 1996: 15-6; 
Pettit, 1997: 189). For the state, and the citizens that comprise it, to not be 
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dominators they must track the interests of others in society. However, this 
doesn't mean that diverse interests always get their way, or that their wishes or 
desires are followed blindly. No state could operate in that manner. To track 
someone's interests, rather, means that their demands must be evaluated and 
responded to in an appropriate manner that considers just what their interests 
are in light of the greater republican commitment to nondomination. 
In the second area, republican liberty as nondomination requires that fair 
and strong forms of laws and institutions are available so that the diverse 
populace has inclusive, open, and nondominating public forums. Following what 
Machiavelli believed made Rome more successful than Florence, contemporary 
republicans maintain that if we are to harness properly the power of diversity and 
difference and use it to secure and enhance liberty as nondomination, we must 
have a strong and properly constituted system of fair and just laws and 
institutions. That is, if we are to harness and channel the energy created by an 
active citizenry characterised by difference and diversity, the republican state 
must have a well ordered system of public forums and other governmental 
institutions available to individuals and groups where they can publicise their 
interests so that they can then be tracked. Republican institutions must be able 
to accommodate the various methods and ways in which individuals 
communicate to one another and must be designed to ensure that all points of 
view are able to be presented, no matter how encumbered they may be. The 
ability of the republican state to minimise arbitrary interference in the lives of 
individuals is dependent on both the laws and institutions and the level of 
citizenship and civic virtue found in the citizenry. With the goal of ending 
domination, a contemporary republican state must have distinct inclusive and 
open public forums which allow demands from any particular comprehensive 
moral doctrines. Separating those demands which come from factions from 
those which come from legitimate diverse moral traditions, the public forums of 
the republic help to form the common good and secure those individuals and 
communities from any actual or threatened domination. 
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Where liberals use mutual respect, toleration and reasonableness as their 
regulative value, the republican state uses nondomination. In this way, the 
republican approach is further distinguished from the liberal approach because 
it requires more than mutual respect and toleration, and does not limit 
participation to those who are considered to be `reasonable'. As we saw above, 
for some liberals, only those doctrines which can be said to be reasonable can 
be allowed access to the public forums and help determine matters of basic 
justice. Rawls has argued that only those doctrines which accept the burdens 
of judgement and truly understand the principle of reciprocity can legitimately 
help to constitute the overlapping consensus, and thus participate in determining 
matters of basic justice (Rawls, 1993: 58-61). Those who do not, or cannot 
accept these principles are labelled `unreasonable' and not allowed to participate 
in the political process unless they disown these kinds of comprehensive views. 
Alternatively, republicanism does not seek to limit participation by excluding 
some members of society who may hold unpopular or controversial views. 
Republicanism is instead concerned with arriving at principles that do not 
dominate individuals' or communities' beliefs, however extreme or controversial 
they might be. Unlike liberals, then, republicans insist that citizens employ the 
tracking value of nondomination. In other words, the type of public justification 
that republicans prefer moves beyond whether or not a belief can be said to be 
reasonable, to whether or not a belief can be said to be dominating. 
Conclusion 
The republican state does not seek to deny the pluralism present in today's 
society. It accepts it as what it is. To be sure, non-liberal moral doctrines will be 
able to exist within the republic and participate freely in its forums and help 
shape the laws and institutions. But only if their non-liberalness does not require 
the domination of others. If they do, they will be challenged by the state. 
Individuals and groups within a republican state can be non-liberals, but they 
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cannot be non-republicans. That is, they cannot be dominators. ' Those citizens 
whose ends arbitrarily interfere with others will first be asked to be a part of the 
deliberation so that all parties to the issue can register their interests, and 
second to identify with and approve of the method and manner in which the 
decision are made so that they can see that their interests were tracked, even 
if they were not adopted (Pettit, 1997: 198). They will be asked to participate 
actively in the process so that their interests are fairly and openly registered 
before being considered along with everyone else's. The state and others will 
then appropriately respond to their demands and the burden will be on them to 
explain why it is that these ends arbitrarily interfere with them. Individuals and 
groups who refuse to recast their ends into ones that do not arbitrarily interfere 
with others will risk encountering either the domination of those they arbitrarily 
interfere with, or confrontation with the state which may force sanctions on them 
if they do not cease to express their ends in a nondominating fashion. 
The republican state that is characterised by liberty as nondomination can 
cope with the deep moral pluralism found in the modern polity. It can do so 
without endorsing a singular version of human flourishing, and without 
sacrificing several important liberal goals. By illustrating how Machiavelli 
responded to the challenges brought about by his experiences with difference 
and diversity, contemporary republicans can use his solutions as the foundation 
'An example of this approach can be found in Machiavelli's view of the difficulty 
republics faced when confronted with the ideals of Christian morality. 
Machiavelli opposed Christianity on the grounds that its value system was 
inconsistent with the secular, and more superior, virtues of the value system 
found in his neo-paganism. For Machiavelli, Christian morality fundamentally 
undermined the necessary virtues that were needed to secure liberty and 
nurture the kind of society that would maintain the republic (Berlin, 1981: 45-6; 
also see Garver, 1996: 197). However, despite believing that Christian morality 
was incompatible with republican values, Machiavelli maintained that individuals 
could still subscribe to both, as long as their commitment to liberty was real and 
strong. For Machiavelli, Christians could come over to republican thinking 
without having to sacrificing their ultimate ends, whereas republicans could only 
accept the full thrust of Christian morality by ceasing to be republican (Garver, 
1996: 215). 
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of their contemporary remedies. By stressing the interdependent relationship 
between liberty as nondomination, good laws and institutions, and civic virtue 
and citizenship, the republican state can cope with moral pluralism. By 
tolerating and institutionalising the moral pluralism found within the modern 
polity, the republican state uses the dynamic energy and activity generated by 
difference and diversity to secure and enhance liberty as nondomination. 
Individuals and groups are free to pursue their own final ends, as long as those 
ends do not seek to dominate others. The republican polity will be characterised 
by strong versions of civic virtue and citizenship which will help ensure that no 
one group or community is subject to the domination of another. Citizens will 
engage each other in the inclusive and pubic forums of the republic using 
nondomination as their supreme tracking value to construct fair and just laws 
and institutions. The next chapter will explore just what these distinctive 
republican institutions look like and how individuals and communities will 
interact with them. 
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Chapter 6- The Three Pillars of Republicanism: 
Education, Institutions, and Social Norms 
In the last chapter I argued that a republican state characterised by liberty as 
nondomination can cope with the deep moral pluralism found in the modern 
polity in a way that respects the liberal concern for diversity. It does so in a 
manner that does not endorse a singular version of human flourishing and 
secures individuals from arbitrary interference. By stressing the interdependent 
relationship between liberty as nondominat`on, good laws and institutions, and 
civic virtue and citizenship, the republican state holds out the promise of 
securing individuals and groups from arbitrary interference. However, the 
promise of liberty as nondomination is not one which can be created and 
sustained without a concerted effort. As we have seen throughout this thesis, 
the ideals and values of republican liberty as nondomination require constant 
attention. The crucial question now is how to nourish and sustain the republican 
project? Without a purposeful and resolute effort, republican liberty as 
nondomination is unattainable. As Philip Pettit has argued, if republicanism is 
to breathe and live as a real force in public philosophy, its ideals and institutions 
must become resident in the habits and hearts of the citizenry. That is, if 
individuals and groups are to live their lives free from arbitrary interference, the 
ideals and institutions of republicanism must take residence in their habits, and 
be embedded in the norms of civil society (Pettit, 1997: 241). 
Crucial to this effort are three main areas in which the republican state 
interacts with individuals and groups and transmits the necessary virtues that 
help to maintain and enhance republican liberty: civic education, institutional 
design, and social norms. As I argued in the last chapter, Machiavelli 
maintained that there was an intimate and close relationship between education, 
good laws and institutions, and liberty. This chapter will explore how specific 
forms of republican education, distinctive republican institutions, and republican 
social norms interact positively with individuals and communities to transmit the 
necessary virtues that support liberty as nondomination. The first section will 
explore the distinctive and vigorous educative effort that supports and enhances 
republican ideals and institutions by teaching citizens not only how not to be 
dominators, but also how to use both the formal and informal institutional 
apparatus of the republican state. This section will also explore the important 
role of political education in keeping the state under control and making sure that 
it does not become a dominator itself. Section 2 will build on these themes and 
apply them to the distinctive republican institutions that serve to support liberty 
as nondomination. It will explore how citizens and groups will relate to these 
institutions as they experience the regulative nature of nondomination. Finally, 
section 3 will discuss the powerful role of social norms in the republican project. 
If the republican project is to succeed, these norms must support liberty as 
nondomination. 
Section 1- Educating the Republic 
Contemporary liberal theories of civic education argue that certain ideals 
and values are essential to the survival of the modern democratic state. For 
many, mutual respect and toleration combine with the essential features of the 
modern democratic state to ensure that future citizens are prepared to 
participate fully in today's multicultural and diverse society. The content of this 
effort, then, is crucial to its success. However, the content of this effort may 
have negative effects on certain individuals or groups who have heavily 
encumbered comprehensive identities that are often at odds with liberal ideals 
and values. In this section, I first plan to explore some of the compelling 
reasons liberals have put forth in relation to education and its civic content. I will 
then explore what a republican version of civic education might look like. If the 
republican state is to be successful, specific forms of civic education are 
essential to the overall republican project of minimising arbitrary interference. 
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1.1 - two liberal approaches to civic education: Gutmann and Callen 
Amy Gutmann has put forth an intriguing and compelling approach to 
liberal civic education. In this account, Gutmann argues that an essential 
feature of any liberal democratic state must be the ability to transmit and nurture 
certain liberal political virtues that ensure a vibrant public culture. Furthermore, 
this political education "has moral primacy over other purposes of public 
education in a democratic society. [It] prepares citizens to participate in 
consciously reproducing their society, and conscious social reproduction is the 
ideal not only of democratic education but also of democratic politics... " 
(Gutmann, 1987: 287). So that individuals are prepared for the active role they 
must play in maintaining their own liberty, education must be structured in such 
a manner that they have access to a common language of citizenship and the 
capacity to involve themselves actively in public affairs. For Gutmann, then, 
"democratic education supplies the foundations upon which a democratic society 
can secure the civil and political freedoms of its adult citizens without placing 
their welfare or its very survival at great risk" (Gutmann, 1987: 289). Thus, a 
proper liberal democratic education is essential if individuals are to keep their 
liberty intact and secure the survival of the liberal state. Gutmann believes that 
the liberal state must embrace and teach certain comprehensive liberal doctrines 
such as individuality and autonomy which not only help to support the continuity 
of the state and secure liberty, but aid in the development of the self. By 
fostering such values as mutual respect, Gutmann maintains that the liberal 
approach to civic education will expose individuals to different ways of life and 
give them the necessary tools with which to evaluate their own choices when it 
comes to making personal decisions about conceptions of the good (Gutmann, 
1995: 564). 
The thrust of Gutmann's project is to require that minimum standards of 
civic education are thoroughly integrated into the public school curriculum 
regardless of the impact that such an effort might have on individuals whose 
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comprehensive life choices are at odds with liberal ideals. By insisting that 
citizenship and certain political virtues are essential in the lives of developing 
citizens, Gutmann argues that the state has a compelling interest in transmitting 
these values, even when they conflict with individuals' or groups' comprehensive 
moral doctrines. This robust account of civic education relies on an attempt to 
foster mutual respect among citizens. Gutmann believes that one of the keys 
to maintaining and enhancing justice is that individuals respect one another and 
can find a basis for social cooperation. In order to foster mutual respect, the 
state legitimately exposes individuals to contested conceptions of the good. For 
Gutmann, the point is not only to expose individuals to competing conceptions 
of the good, it is to teach them how to "evaluate different political perspectives 
that are often associated with different ways of life" (Gutmann, 1995: 577). 
Gutmann's project is to ensure that individuals have the necessary resources to 
evaluate the various ways of thinking about political issues that accompany the 
different ways of life found in a society characterised by social diversity. In other 
words, future citizens need the ability to reflect critically on the many different, 
and sometimes incompatible, values held by a population defined by diversity. 
If today's democratic state is to flourish, then, for Gutmann, citizens must 
have the capacity and resources to make informed decisions about complex 
problems that often lie outside of their own much narrower convictions. The 
teaching of civic virtue helps future citizens to attain the ability to engage in fair 
and just political reflection which is an intractable feature of today's modern 
polity. For example, if the state fails to instil a commitment among the citizenry 
of mutual respect, individuals, and even public servants, cannot be expected to 
honour certain liberal principles such as non-discrimination which will in turn 
undermine equality (Gutmann, 1995: 577-8). Thus, Gutmann's approach cuts 
deep into the nonpolitical values that individuals hold. Nevertheless, for 
Gutmann, such a project is necessary and she believes that the public education 
system is the best vehicle to promote certain liberal virtues and accomplish this 
important task. For Gutmann, democratic principles, combined with mutual 
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respect and toleration help to ensure that citizens are prepared to engage 
positively with one another in the political process. Such a project will help to 
enlarge future citizens' range of thinking about moral ideals, even in instances 
where these principles may impinge on theirfamily's deeply help comprehensive 
doctrines (Gutmann, 1995: 578). For Gutmann, it is essential that the liberal 
approach to civic education affect individuals' and communities' comprehensive 
moral doctrines. The upside is that liberal values will enlarge individuals' and 
groups' range of possibilities when confronting different ways of life. 
Similarly, Eamonn Callen has put forth a conception of civic education 
based on the ideas found in Rawls' political project (Callen, 1997). Callen, like 
Gutmann, maintains that civic education is the key in developing citizenship and 
the necessary virtues that ensure the survival of the liberal state. Callen argues 
that education must play an active and vital role in developing the necessary 
character traits that ensure the vitality of a just political order. According to 
Callen, "creating virtuous citizens is as necessary an undertaking in a liberal 
democracy as it is under any other constitution" (Callen, 1997: 3). Callen's 
conception of a political liberal civic education centres around his re-formulation 
of Rawls' political project and the necessary virtues that must accompany it that 
I discussed in chapter 4. 
Callen's claims centre on his belief that Rawls' political virtues that 
support the fair terms of cooperation in the idea of public reason bring 
"autonomy through the back door of political liberalism" (Callen, 1997: 40). For 
Callen, the active acceptance of the burdens of judgement will necessitate the 
attainment of certain reflective skills and character traits. This, in turn, requires 
future citizens to assess critically certain conceptions of the good which lie 
outside of the basic structure of society. Callen argues that "future citizens must 
be taught to think in particular ways about doctrines that properly lie outside the 
scope of public reason: they must become critically attuned to the wide range 
of reasonable political disagreement within the society they inhabit and to the 
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troubling gap between reasonable agreement and the whole moral truth" 
(Callen, 1997: 40). In securing active agreement over the fair terms of 
cooperation, and in accepting of the burdens of judgement on a political level 
with the necessary understanding of reciprocity, individuals' nonpolitical beliefs 
will either intentionally or unintentionally be affected in a profound manner. By 
accepting the burdens of judgement, an individual's political life will necessarily 
affect their view of the good in their nonpolitical life. For Callen, then, individuals 
who accept the nonpolitical burdens of judgement must also accept a particular 
version of autonomy which cannot be separate from their nonpolitical beliefs. 
To accept Rawls' burdens of judgement "enjoins us to be ethically autonomous 
to a substantial degree and, given the requirement of reciprocity, to respect the 
autonomy of others when we cooperate politically with them" (Callen, 1997: 41). 
Furthermore, "learning to accept the burdens of judgement in the sense 
necessary to political liberalism is conceptually inseparable from what we 
ordinarily understand as the process of learning to be thetically (and not just 
politically) autonomous" (Callen, 1997: 40). The primary goal of liberal versions 
of civic education, according to Callen, is to develop an idea of the reasonable 
that contains within it certain informal "cardinal personal virtue[s] of liberal 
democratic politics" (Callen, 1.997: 8). 
Freed from Rawls' insistence that the values and virtues of political 
liberalism must be political in nature and not presuppose any partially or wholly 
comprehensive goods, Callen argues that any successful liberal approach to 
civic education must make certain substantive demands on individuals by relying 
on what he calls `justice as reasonableness'. 
Justice as reasonableness devolves into a cluster of mutually supportive 
habits, desires, emotional propensities, and intellectual capacities whose 
coordinated activity requires contextually sensitive judgement. Future 
citizens need to develop some imaginative sympathy for compatriots 
whose experience and identity incline them to see political questions in 
ways that differ systematically from their own. A respect for reasonable 
difference and a concomitant spirit of moderation and compromise has 
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to be nurtured. A vivid awareness of the responsibilities that the rights of 
others impose on the self, as well as a sense of the dignity that one's own 
rights secure for the self, must be engendered. (Callen, 1997: 8). 
Callen's thought is to exploit the substantive elements of specific forms of liberal 
virtues by arguing that the burdens of judgement would require certain minimum 
ideals that are liberal and comprehensive in nature. Callen maintains that in 
accepting the burdens of judgement, individuals must also accept a degree of 
ethical autonomy. Importantly, individuals must also accept the autonomy of 
others under the constraints of reciprocity (Callen, 1997: 41). As stated above, 
this acceptance of autonomy falls outside of the political sphere and will affect 
individuals and groups in their nonpolitical lives. Autonomy and individuality, 
then, are justified in Callen's approach because they help to maintain justice as 
reasonableness, no matter how they affect those comprehensive views that 
don't countenance them. That is, for Callen, justice as reasonableness 
regulates the ends permissible in a liberal state by placing certain substantive 
requirements on its citizens. 
Some elements remain constant in both Callen's and Gutmann's 
approaches to public civic education. Both theorists maintain that the mere 
survival of the liberal project demands that some form of substantive state driven 
educative effort take place. Both theorists fill their approaches with certain 
liberal goods that may be incompatible with some individuals' or communities' 
conceptions of the good, but maintain that this minimum level of virtues is both 
justifiable and necessary. Both theorists advocate a position that puts mutual 
respect at the centre of liberal civic education. Furthermore, both theorists 
argue that the state should be an active partner in the total educative effort along 
with other forms of civic education such as the media, industry, and other 
government institutions. In short, there doesn't seem to be anything further that 
a republican focus might add to the above discussed liberal approaches. Just 
what, then, can a republican approach add to this debate? In the next sub- 
section, I will broadly outline what form and direction a republican conception of 
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civic education might take and argue that it goes farther than the liberal 
approach even though both approaches share similar commitments and rely on 
certain necessary and essential virtues. In short, the republican approach 
requires a richer and more robust account of the necessary virtues transmitted 
by public education. 
1.2 - the republican approach to civic education 
Republicanism has a long and abundant tradition of advocating a 
complete and pervasive system of civic education to support its distinctive ideals 
and institutions. Much of this tradition owes its thrust and focus to the neo- 
Athenian version of republicanism espoused by Aristotle among others and 
discussed in earlier chapters. In The Politics, Aristotle suggests that the 
provision of a common education helps to foster a sense of unity and 
togetherness that is essential in constituting a state (Aristotle, 1988: 1263b- 
1264a; also see Rahe, 1992: 24). This commitment to education, as we have 
seen in earlier chapters, is aimed at fulfilling a narrow definition of the good and 
promoting specific forms of eudiamonia or human flourishing so that individuals 
can realise their true self. For neo-Roman writers, such as Machiavelli, who did 
not define a singular notion of the good, education has a slightly different focus 
(Rahe, 1992: 266). Nevertheless, the importance of a complete and compelling 
notion of civic education remains intact in the neo-Roman version of 
republicanism that I advocate. This is especially true when it comes to the 
contemporary public philosophy developed by Pettit and Skinner who advocate 
the neo-Roman republican conception of liberty as nondomination. As I argued 
in the last chapter, for Machiavelli, education, virtue, and the laws and 
institutions of the state were not only inextricably connected to one another, but 
to liberty as well. Although Machiavelli does not offer a specific republican 
account of civic education, it is clear, however, that a strong educative effort was 
a necessary feature of a properly constituted republic. For example, Machiavelli 
equates corrupt cities with those "where education has not produced any 
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goodness in [individuals]" (Machiavelli, The Discourses, 1965: 496). It follows 
that if the republic was to stave off corruption, it was essential that the state be 
filled with sufficient levels of education and virtue which in turn would support the 
laws and institutions of the state (Machiavelli, The Discourses, 1965: 202). In 
this section, I will argue that in republics the maintenance of liberty as 
nondomination is directly tied to sufficient levels of education and civic virtue 
which help form important components of republican versions of citizenship. 
Furthermore, without sufficient levels of education and virtue, the laws and 
institutions of the state suffer, resulting in the rise of corruption and the loss of 
liberty. Consequently, in republics the maintenance of liberty as nondomination 
is directly tied to sufficient levels of education and civic virtue. 
For Machiavelli, the failure of republican versions of citizenship and civic 
virtue in this educative effort will negatively affect the laws and institutions of the 
state and liberty will be at risk. Without widespread civic virtue and citizenship, 
the laws and institutions of the republic will inevitably be driven by corruption and 
private interests and the risk of domination will rise. As I argued earlier, 
corruption occurs in republics when some individuals seek to promote their own 
private interests and dominate others which puts liberty at great risk. In chapter 
5, I discussed how Isaiah Berlin maintained that Machiavelli believed that only 
a thorough education could prepare citizens to play the necessary active role in 
the maintenance of republican liberty (Berlin, 1981: 40). To this end, certain 
substantive character traits are necessary for republican citizens to develop so 
that liberty as nondomination can be secured. Thus, the republican approach 
to civic education must, according to Berlin, inculcate certain virtues such as 
"inner moral strength, magnanimity, vigour, vitality, generosity, loyalty, above all 
public spirit, civic sense, dedication to the security, power, glory, expansion of 
the patria" (Berlin, 1981: 43-4). Furthermore, as I argued earlier in the thesis, 
Machiavelli believed that the republic necessarily had to `educate the desires' of 
its citizenry (Burtt, 1990: 28). This effort would not only secure republican 
liberty, it was also the only way for individuals to do well by themselves. 
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Citizenship, civic virtue, and education all play essential roles in republican 
government, and in the lives of republican citizens. Without widespread civic 
virtue and citizenship, republicans believe that the instruments of state powerwill 
inevitably be driven by individuals who promote their own private interests at the 
expense of the common good. Thus, the contemporary republican state must 
play an active role in the content of public education by educating its citizens in 
the substance and forms of nondomination, and the necessary values and 
virtues that accompany it. In doing so, the republic hopes to cultivate certain 
types of individuals who locate their good with that of the greater community. 
First and foremost, republican civic education will begin with the distinct 
conception of liberty as nondomination. Certain substantive quasi-perfectionist 
virtues and values, such as the ones mentioned above, are crucial to the 
success of liberty as nondomination, as are the institutions and ideals that 
accompany the republican conception of liberty. The republican state, then, will 
supply certain components of civic education aimed at creating a citizenry 
characterised by civic virtue, which is the ability to treat others in a 
nondominating manner. In order to instil these values in the citizenry, the 
republican state will directly interfere, but not in an arbitrary manner, in the 
education of citizens, starting at an early age by sculpting the basic curriculum 
of public education. It will teach children and adults the virtues that comprise 
republican versions of citizenship and help individuals not to interfere arbitrarily 
with others. However, the inculcation of these virtues and values are not purely 
instrumental to the maintenance of republican liberty. They also seek to orient 
republican citizens in a particular direction so that their lives are enriched and 
they can do well by themselves. Crucial, then, to this effort are certain skills and 
character traits that will help citizens not only to treat others without domination, 
but will also help them to play the active role in their own nondomination. As I 
argued in the last chapter, unless individuals are prepared to play an active role 
in their own nondomination by letting others and the state become aware of their 
interests, their interests cannot be registered and responded to in an appropriate 
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manner. In this way, they sow the seeds for their own domination. 
To help individuals with this task, the republican state will play an active 
role in ensuring that civic education cultivates specific virtues that help them cast 
their ends in a nondominating fashion and play the active role in articulating their 
interests so that they are not dominated. First, like the liberal approach, the 
republican state will demand that the public school curriculum inculcates 
individuals with the virtues necessary to learn how to tolerate and respect 
others. It will ask them to listen to the varying demands of individuals and 
encourage them to engage one another so that each party plays the necessary 
active role in their own nondomination. But it goes further than liberal versions 
of good citizenship in that it asks individuals to not only tolerate and respect 
others. It also asks individuals to engage others in an effort to discover just what 
their interests are so that they are registered and then tracked. By engaging 
others in this manner, individuals are better able to cast their ends in a 
nondominating manner. As I argued earlier, according to Quentin Skinner, this 
sentiment is associated with the type of Renaissance humanism that influenced 
republican writers such as Machiavelli. Republicans stress the necessity of 
listening to the other side and engaging them from an informed position. In 
stressing dialogue and the willingness to compromise, republicans endeavour 
to find common ground " in a conversational way" (Skinner, 1996: 15-6; also see 
Pettit, 1997: 189). The republican conversational model is not one sided, nor is 
it instrumental. Individuals who engage is this activity open up the possibility 
that they can receive certain benefits and goods. Not only do virtuous 
individuals make it more likely that republican liberty will be secure, they may 
receive honours and glory for their virtue. Quentin Skinner traces this sentiment 
from Cicero through into Machiavelli's thought. According to Skinner, Cicero 
believed that if individuals behaved unjustly, they not only cheated themselves 
of honour and glory, they fundamentally undermined their capacity to promote 
the common good and subsequently lost their liberty (Skinner, 1984: 215). 
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Thus, using Charles Taylor's suggestion discussed in the last chapter, the 
republican model asks individuals to respect the 'other', and to understand that 
their own nondomination requires them to attempt to locate their interests within 
the larger republican effort to secure all individuals from actual or threatened 
arbitrary interference (Taylor, 1998). It seeks to place their demands on equal 
footing with the demands of others so that each party can account for, and then 
appropriately respond to, one another. It follows that the second task of 
republican civic education is to help citizens gain the ability to articulate their 
interests so that others can track and then respond to them. Republican civic 
education must enable and empower individuals to play this necessary active 
role in their own nondomination. If others are to track their interests, individuals 
must first let them know what their interests are. However, as we discussed in 
chapter 3, this effort does not come without a price for some individuals or 
groups. Liberals like Kymlicka are fearful that such robust requirements will 
negatively affect minorities and other traditionally disadvantaged groups by 
forcing them to defend publically their conceptions of the good. Republicans 
share this fear, but believe that there is a greater good at stake that serves to 
protect minorities and other traditionally disadvantaged groups by securing them 
from the arbitrary interference of others. If the successful maximisation of 
republican liberty as nondomination is dependent on communication and 
dialogue, the republican state must make every effort to develop a language of 
citizenship that allows a common point of entry and is accessible to all the 
individuals and groups that comprise the republic. 
As I discussed in chapter 4, these values and virtues have a certain 
quasi-perfectionist quality to them. Nondomination will inevitably affect certain 
nonpolitical beliefs and character traits of individuals' nonpolitical comprehensive 
doctrines. The republican state legitimately promotes those values and virtues 
that help individuals to publicise their interests, so that they can be tracked. 
These values and virtues help them to track other individuals' interests so that 
they can act without dominating them, which in many ways secures them from 
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arbitrary interference. However, because nondomination seeks to secure 
individuals from any actual or threatened arbitrary interference, it provides them 
with the security and freedom to pursue their own chosen ends so that they 
themselves can decide those things that are valuable and those things that are 
not, as long as their choices do not dominate others. Thus, the quasi- 
perfectionism within the republican approach educates and inculcates individuals 
in the substantive virtues that support liberty as nondomination which can bring 
them some benefits while leaving their ultimate ends open, as long as these 
ends are cast in a republican manner. While the republican state has a firm idea 
of what types of ends are acceptable - those that do not dominate - liberty as 
nondomination secures a wide range of final ends available to individuals to 
pursue unhindered by the state or others. Thus the republican state not only 
secures those conditions that allow individuals to determine what is valuable and 
what is not within a wide range of final ends that cannot be said to dominate 
others, they also help individuals to publicise their ends so that they themselves 
are not dominated. And in doing so, republicanism recognises that certain life 
choices support nondomination better than others, and thus acts to secure these 
conditions so that all citizens can live nondominated lives and pursue their own 
chosen nondominating ends. 
One way in which to accomplish both of these tasks is to use history, 
especially the history of social and cultural conflict to illustrate how individuals 
and groups can make their interests known as they make demands on the state 
and the wider prevailing social structure. Furthermore, using history in this 
manner has been a primary feature of the development of republicanism 
(Garver, 1996: 198). For example, throughout Machiavelli's writings, history is 
used as the primary demonstrative tool upon which he both formulates and 
illustrates his theory of republicanism. In the last chapter I outlined Machiavelli's 
theory of tumults and conflict which was primarily drawn from a comparison 
between Roman and Florentine history. For Machiavelli, then, the use of history 
has important implications for the preservation of liberty. As the modern state 
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is characterised by deep moral and cultural pluralism, using the history of conflict 
would be a powerful tool in teaching the necessary virtues that must accompany 
liberty as nondomination. Moreover, as we saw in the last chapter, because 
republicanism progressively copes with difference and diversity by utilising the 
dynamic public energy generated by a society defined by pluralism, the history 
of conflict provides the ideal opportunity to illustrate how individuals and groups 
articulate their interests so that others and the state can register and respond to 
their demands without dominating them. An example of this would be to use the 
American civil rights struggle to highlight how African Americans and other 
minority groups successfully campaigned for equal political and social rights. ' 
By challenging the state and the prevailing racial attitudes of many in society, 
civil rights campaigners not only forced the state to recognise and respond 
appropriately to their demands, they forced society itself to shift inherently 
biassed cultural attitudes in a fundamental manner that tracked their interests. 
Another example would be the continuing struggle for gay and lesbian 
individuals and groups as they actively engage the cultural and public 
marketplace in search of equal respect and fair policies in light of their 
conception of the good. Those individuals and groups who refuse to engage 
and track the interests of the gay and lesbian community are willfully and actively 
contributing to the domination of these individuals and groups. Under a system 
that put liberty as nondomination at the centre of its approach to justice, this type 
of domination would be actively challenged. Gays and lesbians would be 
extended the range of civil rights available to all groups and individuals and the 
state would actively seek to end their domination. Importantly, as the republican 
state utilises the history of conflict to inculcate certain republican virtues, certain 
political and social attitudes will be challenged. Learning about how individuals 
'I use the term `successfully' here not to suggest that the struggle for civil rights 
is over, but merely to illustrate that this effort has achieved a high degree of 
success. Surely, there is much to be done on this account and the republican 
state would play an active and key role in addressing these issues. 
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and groups challenge the state and the prevailing social attitudes towards 
individuals' own conception of the good highlights not only the constitutional 
nature of nondomination, but its reciprocal nature as well. While civil rights 
campaigners used constitutional and legal grounds to challenge their treatment 
by the state, they also used moral arguments to challenge the prevailing social 
norms. Because nondomination contains within it both constitutional and 
reciprocal power, individuals will learn not only what rights and duties they have 
under the legal framework of the state, they will also learn how to articulate their 
own interests to the state and to others so that they can be appropriately 
tracked. Additionally, they will learn how to listen and different methods in which 
they can properly evaluate the demands made by others who have a different 
conception of the good so that they can appropriately respond to these 
demands. In short, they will learn that people come from different backgrounds 
and have alternative conceptions about what is acceptable and what is not. 
They will learn that nondomination takes a co-operative effort from not only 
themselves, but from those with whom they are engaging, and the state. 
Critics however, may charge that this requirement will force some to alter 
or mis-state their interests. Additionally, the forms and language of republican 
civic education may undermine some individuals' or communities' traditional 
methods of communication (Young, 1990; Moon, 1993). These critics charge 
that the republican effort to regulate life plans is overly prescriptive and may 
undermine certain cultural or social practices and beliefs. The republican state 
must be sensitive to this criticism if it is to not allow some individuals or groups, 
or even itself, to dominate those who object to the form and vehicles of 
republican civic education. However, any serious theory of justice requires that 
certain virtues and ways of doing things are essential to the maintenance of 
liberty. Liberal theories, such as the one put forth by Kymlicka and outlined in 
chapter 3, maintain that civic education must teach individuals liberal virtues and 
values such as individuality or autonomy (Kymlicka, 1996). Gutmann's liberal 
theory also maintains that individuals must learn some basic principles that may 
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be in conflict with their own conception of the good. Callen's conception of 
political liberalism too requires that civic education teaches certain values that 
may be viewed by some as comprehensive in nature and thus in conflict with 
their own conception of the good. Republicanism is no different from these 
approaches when it come to insisting that certain values and ways of doing 
things are necessary if individuals are to secure their freedom and live 
nondominated lives. 
As I argued in earlier chapters, liberty as nondomination regulates the 
acceptable life choices that are permitted in the republican state. But 
nondomination regulates in a distinct and different manner than the approaches 
discussed above. Nondomination requires that individuals' and communities' 
ends are cast in a manner that does not arbitrarily interfere in the lives of others. 
What nondomination does not require is that individuals or groups adopt each 
other's ends, or those ends that are fairly and justly translated into matters of 
basic justice. The regulation inherent within nondomination is about casting 
certain life choices into ones that track the interests of others and do not require 
the domination of them. Admittedly, this effort may adversely affect or even 
cause some individuals' ends to be distorted in amanner to which they may 
object. This ties in with my discussion in chapter 2 on what can legitimately 
count as an interest that should be registered and tracked to republicans. 
Legitimate interests for republicans are ones that, for the most part, take into 
consideration the interests of others and do not subject others to arbitrary 
interference (Pettit, 1997: 56; also see 198). These interests are often ones that 
are widely recognised and shared in common with others and do not require the 
domination of others. For republicans, pure external preferences are not 
regarded necessarily as legitimate interests that individuals can demand be 
tracked, especially if those interests do not respect others and result in 
dominating them. 
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For example, a fundamentalist Christian may object to certain state 
policies that extend political and civic rights to gays and lesbians. However, 
these types of conceptions of the good deny the legitimacy of gay and lesbian 
lifestyles and seek to dominate them by not attempting to track and appropriately 
respond to their interests. In many ways fundamentalist Christians seek to 
extend their own narrow self-interest at the expense of others, and thus 
arbitrarily interfere in the lives of those who they oppose or do not recognise as 
being legitimate agents. As a pure external preference that seeks to codify the 
domination of others, these interests cannot be said to be legitimate in the ideal 
republican state. On a constitutional level, perpetrators of such domination may 
face the sanctions of the state if they attempt to extend this arbitrary interference 
into areas that the state cannot permit. On a reciprocal level, they risk their own 
nondominating status because they put their life choices at risk from the arbitrary 
interference of those agents they seek to dominate. They also lose access to 
certain goods such as public honours and glory by maintaining a dominating 
stance. Republican liberty as nondomination requires that those ends that can 
be said to dominate others are adjusted so that all life choices are free from 
arbitrary interference. Republican civic education will teach individuals how to 
engage constructively with others who hold incompatible life choices and how 
to attempt to express their ends in a nondominating fashion. As stated above, 
it does not require that they accept or adopt these alternative ends. What it 
does require, however, is that they cast their ends in a manner that does not 
subject others to arbitrary interference. In this way, the republican approach to 
civic education is not just a repackaging of liberal toleration and mutual respect. 
To be sure, it is more than the mere tolerance or respect of another's life 
choices. Republican civic education teaches the necessary values and virtues 
that help individuals and groups to ensure that their life choices do not interfere 
arbitrarily with others, just as it teaches others how not to dominate their life 
choices. Thus, the primary goal of a republican approach to civic education is 
the inculcation of values and virtues aimed at teaching individuals the necessary 
skills of nondomination and how to cast and express their ends in a 
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nondominating fashion. 
But what of those citizens who see these ideals and institutions and even 
republicanism itself as a source of domination? How is it that these citizens' 
interests will be tracked if their comprehensive identities are in fundamental 
conflict with the necessary virtues and ideals that help to support liberty as 
nondomination? In most cases, those individuals or groups whose 
comprehensive identities fall into this category cannot expect the state, or even 
others, to tolerate or accept their dominating ends. Citizens whose ends 
arbitrarily interfere with others will be-asked first to be a part of the deliberation 
so that all parties to the issue can register their interests, and second to identify 
with, and approve of, the method and manner in which decisions are made so 
that they can see that their interests were tracked, even if they were not adopted 
(Pettit, 1997: 198). They will be asked to participate actively in the process so 
that their interests are fairly and openly registered before being considered along 
with everyone else's. The state and others will then appropriately respond to 
their demands and the burden will be on them to explain why it is that these 
ends arbitrarily interfere with them. Individuals and groups who refuse to recast 
their ends into ones that do not arbitrarily interfere with others will risk 
encountering either the domination of those they arbitrarily interfere with, or 
confrontation with the state which may force sanctions on them if they do not 
cease to express or act on their ends in a nondominating fashion. For those 
who cannot identify with or accept the open and inclusive procedures or 
decisions of the state and see this as an explicit form of domination, the 
republican state must be prepared to find a compromise or settlement so that 
these closely held ends can be accommodated while minimising the risks to 
others. The content of this compromise will in large part depend on how 
extreme these individuals demands are. According to Pettit, an example of this 
type of compromise is the unique manner in which indigenous people are dealt 
with in post-colonial society (Pettit, 1997: 200). Thus, those individuals who 
have valid and compelling reasons which warrant special treatment from the 
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state to ensure that they are not the subject of state domination will be given the 
opportunity, to the extent that is possible, to live their lives according to their 
dominating ends. However, the state will seek to ensure that the risks of 
domination to others is minimised and will only consider their claims in 
extraordinary circumstances. 
In these difficult cases, the key word for the republican state must be 
accommodation. This point ties in with my argument in the last chapter over 
Taylor's hypothetical example involving school prayer. According to Shelly Burtt, 
the modern polity must be prepared to accommodate wide ranging dissension 
from those individuals and groups whose final ends are in conflict with the state 
(Burtt, 1994: 51-70). To further explore this issue, it will be useful to look at an 
important U. S. court case, Mozart v. Hawkins County Board of Education, about 
public education and the limits of religious freedom. This case centred on a 
challenge to the state's right to mandate certain facets of public education and 
involved the failed efforts of fundamentalist Christian families to exempt their 
children from their school's basic reading curriculum that not only taught reading 
skills, but also citizenship and the values and virtues that accompany it (Mozart 
v. Hawkins County Board of Education, 827 F. 2d (6th Cir. 1987)). The children's 
parents objected to the reading list because they believed its content was a 
threat to their chosen way of life because it contradicted their strict religious 
beliefs (Gutmann, 1995: 565). The court decided that the state had a compelling 
interests in requiring students to obtain a minimum level of civic education and 
rejected the parent's objection. Many liberals have supported the court's 
decision by arguing that the state has good reasons to insist that all future adults 
are educated to at least a minimum standard of civic education that would help 
prepare them to be fully functional citizens. As I outlined above in sub-section 
1.1, the overarching liberal position is that some values and virtues such as 
autonomy or individuality are so important to the maintenance of justice that the 
state has good reasons to insist that they are actively promoted and integrated 
into the public school system's basic curriculum (Gutmann, 1995: 567; Macedo, 
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1995: 470. Also see Kymlicka (1996: 87) and Rawls (1993: 200)). Specifically, 
in this case, these liberals maintain that the court was right to insist that the 
children in the Mozart case participated in these reading courses despite the 
effects it might have on their deeply held comprehensive beliefs. As we have 
seen above, republicans too, would argue that the state has good reasons to 
require certain basic levels of citizenship and actively promote these values and 
ideals. However, the republican approach would differ from liberalism's in its 
willingness to find a solution that would track the interests of the parents in the 
Mozart case, and still teach the children the necessary values and virtues of 
nondomination. 2 
Analysing the Mozart case, Burtt maintains that both the state and the 
parents of the children involved could have found a compromise solution which 
would have satisfied both their competing demands. For Burtt, "when families' 
religious values clash with the public school curriculum, ... democratic ideals and 
practises are in most cases best served by working with parents to minimise 
their objections.... " Burtt believes that by allowing the parents to opt their 
children out of the substantive elements of the state's citizenship program, the 
parents could have developed their own curriculum that would have given due 
consideration to their narrow comprehensive doctrines andtaughtthe necessary 
values and virtues that are essential for members of a modern democratic polity. 
By placing the burden of finding an acceptable alternative on the parents, it is 
hard to see how they could have maintained that they were subjected to 
arbitrary interference from the state. For its part, in accommodating the parents, 
the state could have fulfilled its duty to ensure that all children are educated to 
at least a minimum standard of citizenship. What sets this example off from the 
one involving indigenous populations discussed above is that the final ends of 
both the state and the parents were not fundamentally incompatible. If these 
2As discussed in the last chapter, Taylor has an alternative approach to these 
types of divisive issues see Taylor (1998: 212-226). 
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ends are incompatible, the state has two main options. In the first case, in the 
presence of special circumstances such as that of indigenous populations, the 
state can allow the individuals or groups an exemption from certain substantive 
requirements. Or, in the second case, the state can minimise the arbitrariness 
of the decision by accommodating, to the extent possible, these comprehensive 
moral doctrines by finding a compromise solution that satisfies both parties. 
However, as a last resort, if such a compromise cannot be found, then those 
individuals and groups who insist on interfering arbitrarily with others will be 
confronted by the republican state. The state must have the right to protect 
other members of society from their arbitrary interference, even if it leads to 
confrontation. 
In addition to the necessary values and virtues that support 
nondomination, the republican approach to civic education, like the liberal 
approach, will educate individuals in the institutions and legal framework of the 
state. If the state is to secure and enhance liberty as nondomination for its 
citizens, the institutions and legal framework of the state must be a central part 
of civic education. As we discussed in the last chapter, republican institutions 
and laws play a central role in securing the conditions of nondomination for the 
citizenry. These institutions must be inclusive and open to the many different 
interests found within the republic so that vibrant public debates can take place. 
Additionally, as we discussed earlier, in many ways these institutions help to 
constitute the liberty experienced by republican citizens. For Machiavelli, an 
important interdependent relationship existed between the governed and the 
rules that govern them. Due to this interdependent and intimate relationship, 
republican institutions and the laws that emerge from them are directly related 
to the level of education and virtue found in the citizenry and vice versa. 
(Machiavelli, The Discourses, 1965: 241). The higher the quality of debate and 
deliberation within the republican institutions, the higher the quality of law with 
respect to nondomination that emerges. It follows that citizens must learn about 
the substantive nature of the institutions of the republic, how they work, how to 
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use them, and, importantly, how to challenge them. If the republican state is to 
support a version of justice that is admittedly non-neutral, then it is essential that 
the citizenry have both the ability and the means to challenge the institutions and 
laws of the state. Furthermore, the republican state cannot itself be a dominator, 
thus every institution and legal or policy decision made by the state must be 
open to meaningful challenges and contestation. This contestory process itself 
will help to educate citizens in the ways of the republic and of nondomination as 
individuals and groups engage each other and the state to let their interests be 
known so that they can be tracked. In the next section, I will discuss in greater 
detail just how these institutions and the laws and policies that emerge from 
them interact with individuals and groups. 
Section 2- Republican Institutions 
In earlier chapters I argued that one of the hallmarks of republicanism is 
its distinctive institutional design that emerged over time under the influence of 
many different writers. The task of this section is to provide a basic outline of 
republican institutions and explore not only how they constitute the liberty 
experienced by republican citizens, but also to examine how individuals and 
groups relate to these institutions. Of primary concern is the nature of these 
institutions and how they progressively seek to eliminate domination without 
themselves dominating. 
2.1 classical republican technology 
It was, perhaps, in Montesquieu's seminal work The Spirit of the Laws, 
that the technological features of classical republicanism were consolidated into 
a coherent and feasible blueprint for the modern nation-state (Montesquieu, 
1989). Furthermore, as I argued in chapter 1, Montesquieu firmly believed that 
the only way to rescue the modern state from monarchy was to "demonstrate 
that republican virtue was possible only in genuinely popular non-monarchical 
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republican regimes... " (Shklar, 1990: 266). Montesquieu's main purpose in The 
Spirit of the Laws was to assess the successes and failures of various regimes 
and from their experiences "construct a comprehensive theory of comparative 
law" (Shklar, 1990: 268). By contrasting ancient and modern regimes alike, 
Montesquieu sought to demonstrate certain timeless principles that, if 
incorporated correctly in the laws and institutions of the modern polity, would 
create a permanent new republican ideal based on separation of powers and 
democracy. The novel technological advent of checks and balances was crucial 
to classical republican thought for two main, but differing, reasons. First, for 
Machiavelli, checks and balances were essential to a strong republican 
government because they represented the only way to combat the evil of 
corruption brought on by narrow self-interested individuals which characterised 
his view of a tumultuous population. Machiavelli believed that open and 
inclusive representative bodies could, in their debates and deliberations, 
minimise the influence of individual self-interest and promote those goods that 
benefited the citizenry as whole. Second, for other classical republicans like 
James Harrington, the separation of powers and checks and balances were the 
best way to ensure that domestic tranquillity and concord characterised the 
collective effort to secure liberty. For these republicans, the key to having such 
a society lay in the ability of the polity to institute a mixed constitution based on 
checks and balances. This allowed self-interest to play a decisive role in 
governing by bringing it out into the open and letting each interested party 
participate in the maintenance of liberty while fully acknowledging their own 
narrow self-interests. 
Despite their various reasons for advocating a mixed constitution that 
sought to balance the competing interests of the citizenry, these republican 
writers sought to ensure that liberty was safeguarded by injecting as many 
interests as possible into the public debate. This is most clearly illustrated in 
Publius' Federalist Papers. In Federalist 10 and later in Federalist 47-51, 
Publius argued that the only way to safeguard liberty in the face of the many 
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different competing interests that had emerged in the drive for American 
independence was to counteract their debilitating effects by ensuring that the 
republic was comprised of a federal representative system made up of as many 
interests as possible (Hamilton, A., Madison, J., Jay, J., 1961). Such a system 
would seek to ensure that no one faction or group gained too much influence 
without being exposed as doing so. This would safeguard the republic by 
diffusing power among the various self-interested factions so that each one 
provided a check and balance on the other (Hamilton, A., Madison, J., Jay, J., 
1961: 83). Furthermore, these writers advocated institutions that were 
democratic in nature so the citizenry could become the ultimate check and 
balance on the power of the state. 
2.2 - contemporary republican technology 
It is upon this technological pedigree that the contemporary claim of 
republicanism as a compelling and relevant public philosophy rests. This 
general approach to checks and balances underscores the greater belief that 
republicans have in the positive qualities of extensive governmental machinery 
and the rule of law. Republicanism contains a firm commitment to the principles 
of a democratic mixed constitution characterised by checks and balances to 
ensure that no one individual, group, or governmental entity can exercise too 
much power and potentially dominate others. In the spirit of the Federalist 
Papers, a contemporary republican state will disperse power over a wide range 
of levels to, in the words of Pettit, "increase the non-manipulability of the law and 
to guard against the government exercising arbitrary sway over others" (Pettit, 
1997: 178). Not surprisingly then, republicans embrace the division of 
government into judicial, executive, and legislative branches. Each of these 
areas is supported and checked by inclusive and meaningful public forums 
which are at the disposal of the diverse interests that make up the modem polity. 
Moreover, as mentioned earlier, they are open to all and do not ask those 
engaging with them to bracket off their comprehensive moral doctrines. These 
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public forums must stretch the imagination of the various manners in which 
individuals and groups communicate with each another and accept the use of 
different forms and methods which some use that may be inherently tied to their 
conceptions of the good. In this way, the republican state can overcome the 
objections of some that the ways and means of republican government are too 
narrow and overly prescriptive (Young, 1990; Moon, 1993). Not surprising is the 
high degree of contestability that the republican state must have in order to be 
successful as a contemporary public philosophy. 
For a state to rely on a high degree of contestability, citizens must be 
educated in the substantive forms of both the institutions of the state and the 
manner in which to engage with them, and with each other. As discussed 
above, the republican approach to civic education prepares citizens to play this 
active role in guaranteeing their liberty and securing them from domination. Not 
only must citizens have the rights, channels, and forums in which to contest the 
decisions of the state, they must have the necessary knowledge and virtues that 
allows them to do so (Pettit, 1997: 187). The republican approach to civic 
education which I have outlined above will help prepare individuals to contest the 
decisions of the state and to engage in the common purpose of securing their 
liberty from domination. Encouraging individuals and groups to play this active 
role in their own nondomination helps to ensure that the state itself does not 
encroach upon their liberty. This aspect of the republican state connects to 
Madison's contention in the Federalist Papers that the people themselves are 
the ultimate check on the power of the state (Hamilton, A., Madison, J., Jay, J., 
1961: 324). In this way, the republican approach that I advocate ties in closely 
with other recent developments in contemporary political discourse, such as 
deliberative democracy (see Cohen, 1989). 
As mentioned above, a high degree of contestability will help to ensure 
that the republican state itself does not interfere arbitrarily in the lives of its 
citizens. This is important because the republican state is likely to be an active 
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presence in the lives of individuals in the modem polity. However, republican 
citizens will be less likely to object to state intervention and activity than liberal 
citizens who cherish liberty as non-interference (Pettit, 1997: 148). This state 
interference is not restrictive of the liberty enjoyed by republican citizens 
because republicans measure freedom in a different manner than liberals. If this 
interference is not arbitrary, then the republican state's activity can address the 
many problems faced by the modern polity with greater vigour than the liberal 
state without restricting the liberty of its citizens. Moreover, as I argued in part 
2 of the thesis, the republican state will be an active force in the lives of 
individuals and will affect them in both their political and nonpolitical lives. 
Contestability, then, is the key to ensuring that this interference is not arbitrary. 
The republican state must track their interests and not be seen as something 
that denies their interests with impunity. Therefore, the republican approach to 
civic education outlined above, which teaches the necessary values and virtues 
that allow individuals to play an active role in theirown nondomination, combines 
with the open and inclusive republican forums that help to ensure that the state 
does not arbitrarily interfere in the lives of individuals. If either of these fails, 
then the state itself will become a source of unfreedom (Pettit, 1997: 171). The 
republican state will coercively interfere in the lives of its citizens by imposing 
laws in common upon them. According to Pettit 
the agencies of the state, including the state that is devoted to republican 
causes and policies, interfere systematically in people's lives: they coerce 
the people as a whole through imposing laws in common upon them, and 
they coerce different individuals among the populace in the course of 
administering that law and applying legal sanctions (Pettit, 1997: 171). 
As I argued earlier, this interference is not purely instrumental to liberty in the 
same way that interference in a liberal state is. Instead, this interference, which 
comes in the forms of citizenship and institutions of the state, helps to constitute 
the liberty experienced by republican citizens. 
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Republican forms of citizenship and institutions combine to secure 
individuals from arbitrary interference. These institutions, then, are intrinsically 
valuable to republican citizens because they themselves are not only the 
guarantor of their freedom, but a constituent part of their freedom. Thus, 
republican citizens who cherish their freedom will also cherish the institutions 
that maintain and secure theirfreedom. This account of freedom differs from the 
liberal account in that individuals do not view the necessary interferences that 
the modern state must have as a restriction of their liberty. There is no one step 
back, two steps forward causal sequence for republicans. In many ways, 
instead of being a restriction, it is an enhancement of their freedom. They know 
that they are not going to be subject to the arbitrary will of others as long as their 
ends do not require the domination of others. Thus, the constitutive nature of 
the necessary ideals and institutions that accompany liberty as nondomination 
means that republican citizens will have a more intimate and close relationship 
with those ideals and institutions. The nondomination that individuals enjoy in 
the republican state is realised in the presence of certain ideals and institutions 
that form component parts of their overall conception of liberty. Institutions or 
ideals which track their interests are not seen as restrictions of their liberty. 
Rather they are viewed as the reality of their freedom (Pettit, 1997: 108). 
Thus far, we have seen that the republican state has a rich and 
substantive approach to public civic education. The values and virtues that 
support liberty as nondomination must be integrated into the public school 
curriculum and taught to children who will develop into adults with all the rights 
and duties that are necessary to maintain the republican state. These 
substantive forms of republican citizenship will help to prepare citizens to play 
the necessary active role in the maintenance of liberty, and will also help to 
prepare citizens to play the necessary active role in their own nondomination. 
By learning how to cast their final ends in a nondominating fashion, citizens will 
be free to choose and revise their ends in a manner that is consistent with 
republican liberty and their position to pursue those chosen ends will be 
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improved. The open and inclusive republican institutions help to secure citizens 
not only from arbitrary interference from others in society, but from the state as 
well. A high degree of contestability will ensure that the state itself does not 
become a dominator, and that citizens register their interests with the state and 
with others. However, good education and good institutions are not enough to 
sustain the republican project. The republican state's success in guaranteeing 
liberty as nondomination also depends in large part on the development of a 
comprehensive set of social norms that help to buttress both the values and 
virtues of nondomination, and the ideals and institutions that they support. The 
more republican liberty as nondomination has integrated itself in the norms of 
civic society, the less the state has to intervene to protect individuals and vice 
versa (Pettit, 1997: 148). In the next section, I will discuss the crucial role and 
power of social norms and argue that without them the republican project is 
lifeless and doomed to failure. 
Section 3- Social Norms 
If the republican state is successfully to secure republican liberty as 
nondomination for its citizens, the virtues and values that support this conception 
of liberty must become the norms of society. This point, however, is nothing 
new to republican theory. Earlier, I discussed how Machiavelli believed that the 
relative success of republican laws and institutions was inextricably tied to the 
existence of certain norms that would complement these laws and institutions 
(Machiavelli, The Discourses, 1965: 241). There is an intimate and close 
interdependent relationship between the norms of society and the laws and 
institutions that constitute the republican state. As outlined above, the 
republican approach to civic education and the distinctive republican institutions 
play a central role in the development and support of these norms. In many 
ways, republican norms must win a place in the habits and hearts of its citizens. 
According to Pettit, "the laws must be embedded in a network of norms that 
reign effectively, independently of state coercion, in the realm of civic society" 
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(Pettit, 1997: 241). Education, laws, and the norms of society must work 
together if the republican state is truly to secure its citizens from arbitrary 
interference. 
3.1 - nondomination must become an embedded norm 
In its most simple formulation, a norm is a behavioural regularity (Pettit, 
1997: 243). Norms are ways of doing and thinking about things that are 
accepted as general practice and adhered to by individuals and groups, 
sometimes unconsciously. They help to give depth and character to a society 
and can be a powerful social force (Pettit, 1997: 246). They help to shape the 
different ways in which individuals and groups evaluate their life choices and 
provide a common tie which binds them together. In many ways, they are an 
integral part of the collective identity of a society. The development of norms is 
a process which is deeply rooted in the traditions and customs of individuals and 
groups and their power as a social force is in large part dependent on how 
closely they track the interests of the people. 
For the republican state which I have been developing to be successful, 
norms must play a vital role in ensuring that liberty as nondomination is the 
prevailing public philosophy. The norms of a society characterised by the 
republican conception of liberty will help to make liberty available to all segments 
of society, both on an individual and group level. In many ways, norms serve as 
a fundamental and rudimentary check on the power of the state and can help 
keep the state focussed on its commitment to prevent arbitrary interference 
(Pettit, 1997: 247). To this end, the state must take great vigilance not to 
undermine the important role that norms play in society. However, at the same 
time the state should not hesitate to challenge those norms that can undermine 
the nondomination enjoyed by citizens. The state must play an active role in 
combatting this arbitrary interference and will have to take controversial 
positions because some social norms can ignore the interests of some 
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individuals and groups in society (Pettit, 1997: 255). For example, consider the 
United States' current non-recognition of gay and lesbian unions and the effects 
this has on key areas of their life like health care, taxes, or insurance premiums. 
Same sex unions certainly challenge the traditional manner in which many in 
society view marriage and it has become not only a social norm to prohibit these 
types of marriages, but a legal norm as well. However, a modern republican 
state characterised by liberty as nondomination would have to address this 
problem on both the legal and social front. The first front would be a legal one. 
In an ideal situation, the republican state would use its open and inclusive 
forums and institutions of the state to consult with individuals and groups to 
gauge their interests and opinions. All points of view would be surveyed, and a 
conversational effort to arrive at a decision would take place. A vibrant debate 
would help to separate legitimate interests from illegitimate ones and a decision 
would be made that tracked the interests of the citizenry. For the sake of this 
example, if the decision was to end the prohibition on same sex unions, the 
republican state would play an active role in challenging those segments of 
society who maintained that the norms of traditional marriage should continue. 
The republican state, along with those whose interests are to expand the legal 
definition of legal unions, would have to listen to the objections of those who 
opposed their position and engage in an educative campaign to ensure that 
everyone's interests were being registered and aired. In this instance, on both 
the legal and social fronts, the republican state must play a key role in not only 
educating those who are opposed to same sex unions, but in becoming 
educated itself on why they oppose it so that they can respond appropriately. 
But what of those who still maintain that the recognition of same sex unions 
dominates them and degrades the institution of marriage? 
Some individuals will feel hard done by the decision to grant legal 
recognition to same sex unions. They may argue that such recognition 
fundamentally undermines the institution of marriage which is closely tied to 
religious beliefs which are held deeply by many. For these individuals, to 
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challenge their beliefs and conception of the good in this manner is not seen as 
tracking their interests and represents the arbitrary interference of the state. To 
these individuals, they are in a state of domination and are thus not free. In 
response to these questions, there are three important points to make. The first 
point is that by consulting all parties to the issue in open and inclusive forums, 
the republican state has taken the first step to eliminate arbitrary interference. 
No individuals or groups were asked to bracket off their deeply held beliefs or 
opinions and all were given equal opportunity to air their concerns in the open 
and inclusive forums of the republic. The second point is that the objectors were 
expressing illegitimate and misplaced demands in the form of external 
preferences. In this case, their external preference against same sex marriages 
caused the domination of gay and lesbian individuals and groups because it 
interfered with them in an arbitrary manner at will and with impunity. To be sure, 
from their point of view, they objected to gay and lesbian marriages because 
such recognition was not sanctioned by their beliefs. For many, the thought of 
gay and lesbian marriages is tantamount to blasphemy and undermines their 
beliefs fundamentally. They do not view these beliefs as purely external 
preferences. However, as I argued in earlier chapters, beliefs such as these are 
not consistent with republican liberty as nondomination because they inherently 
require the domination of others. The third important point is that the republican 
state, in recognising same sex unions, has not actually forced the objectors to 
recognise or accept same sex marriages. In this case, the republican state has 
not asked them to alter their procedures or beliefs to allow same sex marriages 
in their churches. Instead, the state has held that from a legal and civil 
standpoint, gay and lesbian unions should be allowed and recognised. The 
state has not forced the church in this case to recognise these unions as 
marriages or to participate in performing them if they object. Rather, the 
republican state has sought to accommodate the interests of the citizenry and 
minimise any arbitrary interference. 
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In this example, protecting gay and lesbians in a legal manner from the 
arbitrary interference from others is only the first goal that republicans want to 
accomplish. The end goal of this process for republicans is the hope that those 
whose final ends required the domination of others are taught that casting their 
ends in this manner deprives them of certain benefits and goods. The 
republican hope is that through the ideals and institutions of the state, individuals 
will come to identify their own good with that of the greater republican 
community so that corruption is kept at bay, and nondomination maximised. In 
this manner, the legal recognition of same sex unions was only the first step for 
republicans. The second step is to challenge the social norms that caused the 
domination of same sex couples and denied them certain legal rights. If 
republican ideals are embedded in a network of prevailing social norms, arbitrary 
interference will be minimised and individuals and groups will be better able to 
do well by themselves. Aggressively challenging dominating social norms will 
have a profound effect on the republican project. The vibrant and tumultuous 
environment discussed in the last chapter will play a key role in both the 
development and maintenance of norms. 
3.2 - conflict and norms 
Dominating norms that are not consistent with the republican project must 
be challenged and modified so that they too can become a power force within 
society. Tumults can help to challenge and re-shape norms so that they are 
alive and shift to fit the ever-changing circumstances of life in the modern polity 
(Pettit, 1997: 251). Earlier in this chapter I discussed how the American civil 
rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s not only challenged the legal 
impediments to equality, but also challenged the social hindrances as well. 
Using the vibrant public forums of the state, civil rights campaigners had a 
significant impact on the prevailing social norms that accepted inequality and 
segregation. The legal impediments were just one of the reasons that civil rights 
campaigners engaged in this enormous undertaking. Challenging the social 
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norms of inequality and segregation was a primary goal as well. For the civil 
rights campaigners, and for republicans, the two are inseparable. In the words 
of Martin Luther King, Jr.: 
Through education we seek to change attitudes; through legislation and 
court orders we seek to regulate behaviour. Through education we seek 
to change internal feelings (prejudice, hate, etc. ); through legislation and 
court orders we seek to control the external effects of those feelings. 
Through education we seek to break down the spiritual barriers to 
integration; through legislation we seek to break down the physical 
barriers to integration. One method is not a substitute for the other, but 
a meaningful and necessary supplement. Anyone who starts out with the 
conviction that the road to racial justice is only one lane wide will 
inevitably create a traffic jam and make the journey infinitely longer (King, 
1987: 40). 
It is no mystery that civil rights campaigners in America had to wage their fight 
for justice and equality on the two fronts mentioned above. On the one hand, 
they had to fight for just and equal political and legal rights with whites, while on 
the other hand, for their campaign to succeed, they had to challenge directly the 
prevailing social norms that saw them as second class citizens. Republicans, 
then, recognise the need for strong social norms that help to ensure that 
arbitrary interference is minimised. However, when such social norms are 
themselves the source of arbitrary interference, the republican state has an 
important and necessary role in seeking to bring these norms in line with liberty 
as nondomination. 
Admittedly, this effort will be difficult and will be seen by many as the 
embodiment of domination itself. As stressed above, great vigilance is required 
to check the power of the state so that it does not become a dominator itself. 
When social norms that dominate are challenged, as in the example above, 
some may seem alienated and seek to withdraw so that they can hold on to their 
cherished, but dominating, ways of life. The republican state must be sensitive 
to this sentiment and seek to accommodate such individuals as far as possible 
within the constraints of its wider commitment to liberty as nondomination. 
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However, the republican state's commitment to liberty as nondomination must 
be resilient to such claims if it is to minimise arbitrary interference. While coping 
with such dissenters may prove taxing or difficult for the republican state, other 
positive effects can be seen. According to Pettit, the republican state's 
commitment to civic virtue and civility may fundamentally challenge some 
individuals' ends and identities. As we saw earlier, the values and virtues 
associated with liberty as nondomination may alter or even distort some 
individuals' final ends. Ends that require the domination of others cannot exist 
within a republican state characterised by liberty as nondomination. This may, 
however, help improve the options available to some individuals because there 
may be some nondominating dimensions of identity that are attractive and 
compelling that were not available to them under their dominating identity (Pettit, 
1997: 257). Furthermore, a widespread commitment to the maintenance of 
norms which support liberty as nondomination will help to foster group-level 
points of view and assist individuals as they engage in the formation of the 
common good. An overriding commitment to group-level identities such as 
patriotism helps to nurture community and unite individuals and groups from 
widely varying moral traditions (Pettit, 1997: 257-9; also see Taylor, 1989; 
Oldfield, 1990; Viroli, 1995; and Miller, 1995). This point ties in with Robert 
Putnam's now famous essay on the need for a renewed sense of civic 
engagement to stem the erosion of social capital (Putnam, 1995: 66). 
Putnam's research charts the fall of traditional forms of civic engagement 
and suggests that there has been a corresponding drop in social capital which 
he takes to be the "features of social organisation such as networks, norms, and 
social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit" 
(Putnam, 1995: 66). Noting that several factors related to modernity may be the 
cause of this erosion, Putnam suggests that we seek to find new ways of 
restoring social capital that fit in with life in the modern, and often hectic, polity. 
Importantly, his recommendations suggest that preventing the erosion of social 
capital must be a holistic effort undertaken by society (Putnam, 1995: 75-7). In 
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other words, it is not a problem that politics alone can solve. The solutions to 
the need for social capital are mostly found outside of the political sphere. 
Republicans too understand the need for civic engagement and social capital. 
Furthermore, as I have been arguing in this chapter, it is not something that can 
be done by government institutions alone. The collective effort that helps to 
form and support norms will be an asset to the republican state as it tries to 
minimise its citizens' exposure to arbitrary interference. The republican approach 
to civic education along with republican institutions will, to a large extent, rely on 
the power of social norms to ensure that arbitrary interference is minimised. 
Strong social norms require high levels of social capital if they are to be truly 
effective and help minimise the extent to which individuals and groups are 
exposed to arbitrary interference. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have explored how the republican commitment to 
nondomination is likely to interact with individuals and groups in three main 
areas. In the first area, the republican approach to civic education will contain 
distinctive and substantive values and virtues that help to support liberty as 
nondomination and foster a republican spirit among the people. Like liberals, 
republicans believe that the development of certain values and virtues are 
essential for citizens in the modern polity. Unlike liberals, these goods are 
substantive in nature and may challenge and even distort some individuals' and 
groups' comprehensive moral doctrines. However, the republican state justifies 
this by appealing to the value of nondomination and the benefits that accompany 
it. Ends that explicitly or implicitly arbitrarily interfere with others must be 
confronted by the republican state. Thus, the republican approach to civic 
education goes well beyond the liberal approach which relies on the principles 
of toleration and mutual respect. The republican approach asks individuals to 
go further by insisting that they cast their ends in a manner that does not subject 
others to arbitrary interference. To do this, they must first listen and understand 
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how their differing, and possibly incompatible ends, can be recast into ends that 
do not arbitrarily interfere in the lives of others. Republican forms of civic virtue 
requires a commitment from all parties to utilise the values and ideals that 
support liberty as nondomination to act in a manner that tracks the interests of 
others. Republican versions of citizenship will help individuals to use the open 
and inclusive public forums of the state to register their interests so that they can 
be tracked. 
In the second area, the ideal republican state will be filled with open and 
inclusive public forums and institutions that help to ensure that arbitrary 
interference is minimised. These ideals and institutions rely on the vibrant 
energy created by the diversity and difference that is so prevalent in the modern 
polity to help ensure that domination is kept in check and eliminated where 
possible. To the extent that the republican state is an active and present force 
in the lives of individuals by affecting them in both their political and nonpolitical 
lives, vibrant channels of contestability will be a key feature in ensuring that this 
interference is not arbitrary. In this way, the republican approach to civic 
education combines with the open and inclusive republican forums to help 
ensure that the state does not arbitrarily interfere in the lives of individuals. 
Furthermore, the open and inclusive republican forums help individuals and 
groups themselves register their interests to each other so that they can 
appropriately respond in a nondominating manner. Relying on the fundamental 
thrust behind classical republican technologies such as checks and balances, 
the republican commitment to strong constitutional mechanisms and safeguards 
helps to ensure that domination is exposed and minimised. 
Finally, recognising the powerful force of social norms, both the 
republican approach to civic education and the ideals and institutions which 
support nondomination are aimed at fostering a group-level commitment to 
certain distinctive ways of doing things. Understanding the close and intimate 
relationship between certain social norms and the success of republican laws 
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and institutions, the republican state must play a very delicate role in maintaining 
those norms that help to minimise arbitrary interference, and challenging those 
that undermine the cause of liberty as nondomination. At its most basic, 
republicans understand that nondomination will not be successful in minimising 
domination unless it becomes an integral part of the public and private culture 
of the many individuals and groups that comprise the modern polity. 
Republicanism, and the virtues and values that accompany it, is a rich and 
robust manner of thinking about liberty. Without a deep commitment from 
individuals on a nonpolitical level, nondomination cannot become an embedded 
and overriding public philosophy. 
Republicanism has a distinctive conception of liberty, a particular image 
of the form that a constitution should take, and an insistence on a distinctive 
form of civic virtue (Pettit, 1997: 245). If liberty as nondomination is to become 
a meaningful and powerful public philosophy, all three of these components are 
necessary. If one fails, they all fail as they are completely interdependent. 
However, a further requirement is necessary if republican liberty as 
nondomination is to minimise actual or threatened arbitrary interference. Liberty 
as nondomination, and the virtues and values that support it, must take root in 
the habits and hearts of the citizenry and change with them. Active citizen 
involvement, a widespread and meaningful commitment to checks and balances, 
and fair and open procedures must all combine to make liberty as 
nondomination a reality (Pettit, 1997: 173). In many ways, the successor failure 
of republican liberty as nondomination will depend on how well education, 
institutions, and norms perform their overlapping and interdependent part in 
developing a distinctive and pervasive republican culture that secures its citizens 
from domination and allows them to exercise their freedom in a society free from 
domination. 
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Conclusion 
In the last part of the thesis I have explored how republican liberty as 
nondomination can manifest itself in the modern polity. Indeed, throughout this 
thesis, I have argued that republican liberty as nondomination represents a fresh 
new approach that can cope with the many problems facing the modern polity. 
Conflict, citizenship, and civic virtue all play important and interdependent roles 
to help secure this alternative conception of liberty. By accepting the inevitable 
clash of difference and diversity, the modern polity can reinvigorate the 
institutions of the state and secure its citizens from arbitrary interference. 
However, as Machiavelli argued, tumultuous politics alone cannot secure 
republican liberty. A properly constituted republic must be characterised by 
strong laws and institutions that help cultivate certain types of citizens that can 
identify their own good with that of the community, and thus secure 
nondomination. Through strong forms of citizenship and civic virtue, the 
republican state helps individuals to mould and cast their ends in a manner 
which is consistent with republican liberty. As I argued in chapter 5, a 
contemporary republican approach must stress the intimate relationship 
between liberty as nondomination, good laws and institutions, and civic virtue 
and citizenship. Furthermore, by tolerating and institutionalising the pluralism 
found within the modern polity, the republican state can channel the dynamic 
energy and activity generated by a population defined by difference and 
diversity to secure and enhance liberty as nondomination. 
However, as I argued in chapter 6, if republican liberty as nondomination 
is to become a meaningful and powerful public philosophy, the virtues and 
values that support it must take root in the habits and hearts of the citizenry and 
change as they change. As Pettit has argued, active citizen involvement, a 
widespread and meaningful commitment to checks and balances, and fair and 
open procedures must all combine to make liberty as nondomination a reality 
(Pettit, 1997: 173). To support this effort, the republican state must actively seek 
to educate and cultivate individuals of a certain republican character type that 
can cast their ends in a nondominating manner. In many ways, the success or 
failure of republican liberty as nondomination will depend on how well education 
and institutions can cultivate certain republican norms that are embedded within, 
and reflected by, the attitudes of society as a whole. 
The republican approach that I have defended is not something that is 
new, or is too radical to be taken seriously. Central to my argument is an 
understanding that there is a direct lineage between contemporary 
republicanism and neo-Roman republicans like Machiavelli. I have argued that 
even though republicanism is firmly grounded in the writings of Machiavelli and 
others, a central feature of this approach is its ability to change and be adapted 
to different situations to address a range of problems. At the heart of this 
republican approach is its alternative conception of liberty as nondomination and 
the unique manner in which its ideals and institutions help to constitute the 
freedom experienced by its citizens. Although the republicanism which I have 
defended is distinct from its neo-Athenian counterpart and the rival liberal 
approaches I discussed in part 2, I firmly believe that it is compatible with the 
aims of these approaches and I have tried to demonstrate that. Republican 
versions of civic virtue and citizenship, when combined with strong institutions 
and laws, can play the important role of helping redefine political activity so that 
individuals and groups can better utilise the structures of the state to secure 
their liberty as nondomination. Furthermore, as I have argued throughout this 
thesis, republican liberty as nondomination requires a high level of activity to 
support the necessary ideals and institutions which accompany it. Moreover, as 
I have also tried to point out, republicans who are serious about nondomination 
must understand that not all problems are purely `political' in nature and can be 
solved in the narrow realm of politics. What is needed is a more holistic 
approach that relies on the fundamental goal of nondomination to secure 
individuals and groups from arbitrary interference on both a political and 
nonpolitical level. However, the activity that is required by a properly constituted 
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republican state is no more burdensome than other rival approaches. Indeed, 
it is this very activity that enables contemporary republicans to offer the modern 
polity a way forward. By understanding liberty in this alternative sense, 
individuals and groups can secure themselves from the domination of others and 
the state while helping themselves to do well. 
263 
Bibliography 
Allen, A. and Regan, M. (eds. ) (1998), Debating Democracy's Discontent: 
Essays on American Politics, Law, and Public Philosophy(Oxford: Oxford 
University Press). 
Arendt, H. (1958), The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press). 
Aristotle (1988), The Politics, (ed. ) Everson, S. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press). 
Avineri, S. and de-Shalit, A. (eds. ) (1992), Communitarianism and Individualism 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
Baldwin, T. (1984), `MacCallum and the Two Concepts of Freedom', Ratio, 26: 
125-42. 
Barber, B. (1984), Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age 
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press). 
Beiner, R. (1992), What's the Matter with Liberalism? (Berkeley, CA: University 
of California Press). 
Bellah, R. et a!. (1985), Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in 
American Life (New York, NY: Perennial Library). 
Benn, S. I. and Weinstein, W. L. (1971), `Being Free to Act, and Being a Free 
Man', Mind, 80: 194-211. 
Berlin, I. (1969), Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
Berlin, I. (1981), Against the Current: Essays in the History of Ideas (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press). 
Bock, G. (1990), `Civil Discord in Machiavelli's Istorie Florentine', in Bock et al. 
(1990), pp. 181-201. 
Bock, G., Skinner, Q., and Viroli, M. (eds. ) (1990), Machiavelli and 
Republicanism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
Branch, T. (1988), Parting the Waters: America in the King Years 1954-63 (New 
York, NY: Simon and Schuster Press). 
Brock, D. (1987), `Truth or Consequences: The Role of Philosophers in Policy- 
Making', Ethics, 97: 786-791. 
Brugger, B. (1999), Republican Theory in Political Thought: Virtuous or Virtual? 
(New York, NY: St. Martin's Press). 
Burns, J. H. and Goldie, M. (eds. ) (1991), The Cambridge History of Political 
Thought: 1450-1700 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
Burtt, S. (1990), `The Good Citizen's Psyche: On the Psychology of Civic Virtue', 
Polity, 23: 23-38. 
Burtt, S. (1992), Virtue Transformed: Political Argument in England 1688-1740 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
Burtt, S. (1994), `Religious Parents, Secular Schools: A Liberal Defence of an 
Illiberal Education', The Review of Politics, 56: 51-70. 
265 
Burtt, S. (1996), `In Defence of Yoder. Parental Authority and the Public 
Schools', in Shapiro et al. (1996), pp. 412-37. 
Buttle, N. (1998), `Liberal Republicanism', Politics, 17: 147-156. 
Callen, E. (1997), Creating Citizens: Political Education and Liberal Democracy 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press). 
Chapman, J. and Galston W. (eds. ) (1992), NOMOS XOOCIV: Virtue (New York, 
NY: New York University Press). 
Chapman, J. and Shapiro, I. (eds. ) (1993), NOMOS )OOCV: Democratic 
Community (New York, NY: New York University Press). 
Christman, J. (1998), `Pettit, P., Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and 
Government', (book review), Ethics, 109: 1: 202-206. 
Cicero (1991), On Duties, (eds. ) Griffin, M. and Atkins, E. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press). 
Cohen, J. (1989), `Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy', in Hamlin and Pettit 
(1989), pp. 17-34. 
Constant, B. (1988), Political Writings, (ed. ) Fontana, B. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press). 
Dagger, R. (1997), Civic Virtues: Rights, Citizenship, and Republican Liberalism 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
Daniels, N. (ed. ) (1978), Reading Rawls (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers). 
266 
de Marneffe, P. (1990), `Liberalism, Liberty, and Neutrality', Philosophy and 
Public Affairs, 19: 253-274. 
Dunn, J. (1994), `The Identity of the Bourgeois Liberal Republic', in Fontana 
(1994), pp. 206-25. 
Dworkin, R. (1975), `Non-Neutral Principles', in Daniels (1978), pp. 124-40. 
Dworkin, R. (1978), Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press). 
Fontana, B. (ed. ) (1994), The Invention of the Modem Republic (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press). 
Galston, W. (1991), Liberal Purposes: Goods, Virtue, and Diversityin the Liberal 
State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
Garver, E. (1996), `After Virtü: Rhetoric, Prudence and Moral Pluralism in 
Machiavelli', History of Political Thought, 27: 195-222. 
Goodin, R. and Reeve, A. (eds. ) (1989), Liberal Neutrality (London: Routledge). 
Goodin, R. and Pettit, P. (eds. ) (1995), A Companion to Contemporary Political 
Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers). 
Gray, J. (1989), Liberalisms: Essays in Political Philosophy(London: Routledge). 
Gutmann, A. (1987), Democratic Education (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press). 
267 
Gutmann, A. (1995), `Civic Education and Social Diversity', Ethics, 105: 557- 
579. 
Hamilton, A., Madison, J., and Jay, J. (1961), The Federalist Papers, (ed. ) 
Rossiter, C. (New York, NY: Mentor Press). 
Hamlin, A. and Pettit, P. (eds. ) (1989), The Good Polity: Normative Analysis of 
the State (Oxford: Blackwell Press). 
Harrington, J. (1992), The Commonwealth of Oceana and A System of Politics, 
(ed. ) Pocock, J. G. A. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
Hart, H. L. A. (1978), `Rawls on Liberty and Its Priority', in Daniels (1978), pp. 
230-53. 
Herzog, D. (1986), `Some Questions for Republicans', Political Theory, 14: 473- 
493. 
Heyd, D. (ed. ) (1996), Toleration: An Elusive Virtue (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press). 
Hobbes, T. (1968), Leviathan, (ed. ) MacPherson, C. B. (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin). 
International Herald Tribune (1995a), `Clinton's New Message: Put Democracy 
Back to Work', 23 Jan. 
International Herald Tribune (1995b), `Clinton Bowing to Political Reality, Models 
a More Centrist Presidency', 26 Jan. 
268 
Ivison, D. (1997), The Self at Liberty: Political Arguments and the Arts of 
Government (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press). 
Jones, P. (1989), 'The Ideal of the Neutral State', in Goodin and Reeve (1989), 
pp. 9-38. 
Kahane, D. (1996), `Cultivating Liberal Values', Canadian Journal of Political 
Science, 29: 699-728. 
King, M. L. (1984), The Words of Martin Luther King, Jr. (New York, NY: 
Newmarket Press). 
Kukathas, C. and Pettit, P. (1990), Rawls: A Theory of Justice and its Critics 
(Cambridge: Polity Press). 
Kymlicka, W. (1989), Liberalism, Community, and Culture (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press). 
Kymlicka, W. (1990), Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press). 
Kymlicka, W. (1992), `Liberal Individualism and Liberal Neutrality', in Avineri and 
de-Shalit (1992), pp. 165-85. 
Kymlicka, W. (ed. ) (1995), The Rights of Minority Cultures (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press). 
Kymlicka, W. (1996), `Two Models of Pluralism and Tolerance', in Heyd (1996), 
pp. 81-105. 
269 
Kymlicka, W. (1 998a), Finding Our Way: Rethinking Ethnocultural Relations in 
Canada (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
Kymlicka, W. (1998b), `Liberal Egalitarianism and Civic Republicanism: Friends 
or Enemies? ', in Allen and Regan (1998), pp. 131-48. 
Long, D. (1977), Bentham on Liberty (Toronto: University of Toronto Press). 
MacCallum, G. (1991), `Positive and Negative Freedom', in Miller (1991), pp. 
100-22. 
Macedo, S. (1988), `Capitalism, Citizenship, and Community', Social Philosophy 
and Policy, 6: 113-139. 
Macedo, S. (1990), Liberal Virtues: Citizenship, Virtue, and Communityin Liberal 
Constitutionalism (Oxford: Clarendon Press). 
Macedo, S. (1995), `Liberal Civic Education and Religious Fundamentalism: The 
Case of God v. John Rawls', Ethics, 105: 468-496. 
Macedo, S. (1996), `Community, Diversity, and Civic Education: Toward a 
Liberal Political Science of Group Life', Social Philosophy and Policy, 13: 
240-268. 
Maclntyre, A. (1985), After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (London: 
Duckworth). 
Machiavelli, N. (1965), The Chief Works and Others, (tr. ) Gilbert, A. (3 vols., 
Durham, NC: Duke University Press). 
Machiavelli, N. (1970), The Discourses, (ed. ) Crick, B. (New York, NY: Penguin). 
270 
Manin, B. (1994), `Checks, Balances and Boundaries', in Fontana (1994), pp. 
27-62. 
Miller, D. (ed. ) (1987), The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Political Thought (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishers). 
Miller, D. (ed. ) (1991), Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
Miller, D. (1995), `Citizenship and Pluralism', Political Studies, 43: 432-450. 
Moon, D. (1993), Constructing Community: Moral Pluralism and Tragic Conflicts 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press). 
Montesquieu (1989), The Spirit of the Laws, (tr. and ed. ) Cohler, A., Miller, B., 
and Stone, H. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
Mouffe, C. (ed. ) (1992), Dimensions of Radical Democracy (London: Verso 
Press). 
Mouffe, C. (1993), The Return of the Political (London: Verso Press). 
Mozart v. Hawkins County Bd. of Education, 827 F. 2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987). 
Muthall, S. and Swift, A. (eds. ) (1996), Liberals and Communitarians (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishers). 
Oldfield, A. (1990), Citizenship and Community: Civic Republicanism and the 
Modem World (London: Routledge). 
Oppenheim, F. (1981), Political Concepts: A Reconstruction (Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishers). 
271 
Pangle, T. (1988), The Spirit of Modem Republicanism: The Moral Vision of the 
American Founders and the Philosophy of Locke (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press). 
Patten, A. (1996), `The Republican Critique of Liberalism', British Journal of 
Political Science, 26: 25-44. 
Patten, A. (1998), `Pettit, P., Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and 
Government', (book review) Political Studies, 46: 808-810. 
Parel, A. (1992), The Machiavellian Cosmos (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press). 
Parent, W. A. (1974), `Some Recent Work on the Concept of Liberty', American 
Philosophical Quarterly, 11: 149-167. 
Pennock, J. R. and Chapman, J. W. (eds. ) (1983), NOMOS XXV: Liberal 
Democracy (New York, NY: New York University Press). 
Pettit, P. (1996), `Freedom as Antipower', Ethics, 106: 576-604. 
Pettit, P. (1997), Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
Pettit, P. (1998), `Reworking Sandel's Republicanism', The Journal of 
Philosophy, 95: 73-96. 
Pocock, J. G. A. (1975), The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought 
and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press). 
272 
Putnam, R. (1995), `Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital', Journal 
of Democracy, 6: 65-78. 
QCA (the Qualifications and Curriculum Authority) (1999), `Citizenship: The 
Report', 29 March, 1999. 
Rahe, P. (1992), Republics Ancient and Modern: Classical Republicanism and 
the American Revolution (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina 
Press). 
Rawls, J. (1971), A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press). 
Rawls, J. (1993), Political Liberalism (New York, NY: Columbia University 
Press). 
Rawls, J. (1996), `Introduction to Paperback Edition', Political Liberalism (New 
York, NY: Columbia University Press), pp. xxxvii-lxii. 
Raz, J. (1986), The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press). 
Rorty, R., Schneewind, J., and Skinner, Q. (eds. ) (1984), Philosophy in History 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
Rousseau, J. J. (1978), The Social Contract, (tr. ) Masters, R. and Masters, J. 
(New York, NY: Hafner Press). 
Sandel, M. (1984), `The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self, 
Political Theory, 12: 81-96. 
273 
Sandel, M. (ed. ) (1984), Liberalism and Its Critics (New York, NY: New York 
University Press). 
Sandel, M. (1996), Democracy's Discontent: America in Search of a Public 
Philosophy(Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press). 
Sargent, L. T. (ed. ) (1997), Political Thought in the United States: A Documentary 
History (New York, NY: New York University Press). 
Shapiro, I. and Hardin, R. (eds. ) (1996), NOMOS X O(VIII: Political Order (New 
York, NY: New York University Press). 
Shklar, J. (1990), `Montesquieu and the New Republicanism', in Bock et a!. 
(1990), pp. 265-79. 
Sidney, A. (1990), Discourses Concerning Government, (ed. ) West, T. 
(Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund). 
Skinner, Q. (1978), Foundations of Modern Political Thought, vol. 1 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press). 
Skinner, Q. (1981), Machiavelli (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
Skinner, Q. (1983), `Machiavelli on the Maintenance of Liberty', Politics, 18: 3- 
15. 
Skinner, Q. (1984), `The Idea of Negative Liberty: Philosophical and Historical 
Perspectives', in Rorty et al. (1984), pp. 193-221. 
Skinner, Q. (1990a), 'Machiavelli's Discorsi and the Pre-humanist Origins of 
Republican Ideas', in Bock et a!. (1990), pp. 121-41. 
274 
Skinner, Q. (1990b), `The Republican Ideal of Political Liberty', in Bock et al. 
(1990), pp. 293-309. 
Skinner, Q. (1991), 
183-205. 
`The Paradoxes of Political Liberty', in Miller (1991), pp. 
Skinner, Q. (1992), `On Justice, the Common Good and the Priority of Liberty', 
in Mouffe (1992), pp. 211-24. 
Skinner, Q. (1996), Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
Skinner, Q. (1997), Liberty Before Liberalism (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University). 
Strauss, L. (1958), Thoughts on Machiavelli (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago 
Press). 
Taylor, C. (1989), Sources of the Self. - The Making of Modern Identity 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press). 
Taylor, C. (1991), `What's Wrong with Negative Liberty', in Miller (1991), pp. 
141-162. 
Taylor, C. and Gutmann, A. (ed. ) (1994), Multiculturalism (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press). 
Taylor, C. (1995), PhilosophicalArguments(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press). 
Taylor, C. (1998), `Living with Difference', in Allen et al. (1998). 
275 
Time (1994a), `Stampede!: The Republican Romp lets President Clinton Really 
Feel the Voter's Pain', 21 Nov. 
Time (1994b), `Right Makes Might', 21 Nov. 
Time (1995), `Stuck in the Middle', 30 Jan. 
de Tocqueville, A. (1969), Democracy in America, (ed. ) Mayer, J. P. (New York, 
NY: Perennial Library). 
Tuck, R. (1993), Philosophy and Government 1572-1651 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press). 
Tully, J. (1993), An Approach to Political Philosophy: Locke in Contexts 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
Viroli, M. (1990), `Machiavelli and the Republican Idea of Politics', in Bock et al. 
(1990), pp. 143-71. 
Viroli, M. (1992), From Politics to Reason of State: The Acquisition and 
Transformation of the Language of Politics 1250-1600 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press). 
Viroli, M. (1995), For Love of Country: An Essay on Patriotism and Nationalism 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press). 
Viroli, M. (1998), Machiavelli (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
Washington Post (1995), `At Clinton's Dinner, Ideas were on the Menu: 
President Invites `Big Thinkers' to Camp David in Preparation for State 
of the Union Address', 20 Jan. 
276 
Weinstein, W. L. (1965), `The Concept of Liberty in Nineteenth Century English 
Political Thought', Political Studies, 13: 145-162. 
Weisbard, A. (1987), `The Role of Philosophers in the Public Policy Process: A 
View from the President's Commission', Ethics, 97: 776-785. 
Wikler, D. (1987), `Introduction: Symposium on the Role of Philosophers in the 
Development of Public Policy', Ethics, 97: 775. 
Wood, G. (1969), The Creation of the American Republic, 1776 - 1787 (Chapel 
Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press). 
Wootton, D. (ed. ) (1994), Republicanism, Liberty, and Commercial Society, 
1649-1776 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press). 
Worden, B. (1994a), `Marchamount Nedham and the Beginnings of English 
Republicanism, 1649-1656', in Wootton (1994), pp. 45-81. 
Worden, B. (1994b), `James Harrington and The Commonwealth of Oceana, 
1656', in Wootton (1994), pp. 82-110. 
Worden, B. (1994c), `Republicanism and the Restoration, 1660-1683', in 
Wootton (1994), pp. 139-93. 
Young, I. M. (1990), Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press). 
277 
